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INTRODUCTION
Hedge fund activism is relatively a new phenomenon which has gained considerable attention
in academics as well in financial press. Being exempted from several regulatory constraints,
using sophisticated investment strategies, and attractive managerial compensation have al-
lowed activist funds to replace the monitoring role once occupied by other corporate raiders
in 80’s. As a result of activist effective monitoring, all associated stakeholders have been
seen as benefitting from the realized positive outcomes in the short-run as well as in the
long-run. In order to extract these gains, active funds adopt a multifaceted strategy which
may include to acquire largely concentrated stake in firm, lead campaign using tools of
shareholder proposal, proxy contest, takeover, and media attention among others. Activist
funds lead solely, however at times also function collaboratively with other institutional
investors.
Despite the significant gains, fund-related activism has been criticized for the gains in
the short-run, which are supposedly extracted on the cost of long-run value destruction. In
addition, these gains are considered to be realized when markets were functioning in good
conditions. The recent financial crisis, which has appeared significantly detrimental to hedge
fund industry and challenged the traditional approach to activism, provides a competitive
environment to test the performance in firms targeted by activist funds.
Using a uniquely hand collected dataset consisting of 551 US listed firms targeted by
112 active hedge funds over the period of January 2000 to December 2013, we study the
impact of activism in two distinctive perspectives; in general for the entire sample period
and in particular for the crisis period. Related with activism, we largely emphasize on to
examine fund behaviour whilst targeting the firms and working mechanism with which the
management in target firms is engaged. In doing so, we initially investigate the target firms’
characteristics whether they are valued or growth stock. How activists do attempt to impact
the internal governance of targets by influencing their managerial decisions? In addition,
are there any observable changes to targeting patterns following the recent financial crisis?
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Does crisis affect the return to activism? And equally important question whether target
firms perform better than nontargets in the short-run as well in the long-term before and after
the crisis. These questions have been raised and possibly discussed in first chapter of the
dissertation.
We define fund activism as an event when a hedge fund acquires 5% or more ownership
stake in a publicly listed firm with intent to influence the firm’s internal governance, and
it reports a mandatory file namely Schedule 13D within 10 days of acquiring stake to the
Securities and Exchange Commission of the US. In Schedule 13D fund states explicitly its
objective of targeting firm and proposes its agenda. If a fund is not interested to serve an ac-
tive role, then upon crossing a threshold of 5% or more, alternatively it reports Schedule13G
within 45 days at the end of calendar year. We collect our event firms from Schedule 13D and
nonevent firms from Schedule 13G. The firms drawn from 13D Forms and 13G Forms are
targeted by a similar set of 112 US hedge funds over the period of 2000 to 2013. Thus, using
samples comprised of firms drawn from similar funds allow us to control for the quantitative
and qualitative characteristics of the activists in comparative analysis.
The summary statistics of target firms characteristics in lagged year of fund activism
exhibit that firms are medium in size, undervalued, and financially profitable using time-series
and cross-sectional analyses. The differential effects between target and nontarget firms
largely explain the cross-sectional variation in fund decision of targeting the firms based
on observable characteristics thus causing selection bias issue in analysis. To mitigate this
potential issue, we identify propensity score matching methodology to assess the probability
of firm to be targeted for fund activism based on certain observables. The estimates obtained
from propensity score matching reveal that target firms are significantly distinguishable from
nontarget firms.
Prior documented studies on hedge fund activism report that stock market positively
responds to the fund announcement in target firm. We test this phenomenon by assessing the
market reaction to fund’s notification in target firm around the announcement date by utilizing
event study framework. Using several event-windows of multiple lengths, we find that on
average more than 5% cumulative abnormal returns is realized in the short-run. At next stage,
we examine the cross-sectional distribution of these abnormal returns for well-defined types
of activism. Regressing multi-period abnormal returns against types of activism, we find that
fund’s stating its objective to intervene in firm’s capital structure is significantly rewarded
followed by intervention in business strategy. However, these results pronounce more for
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business strategy, when we account for crisis effect. Interestingly, the funds targeting firms
without a pre-specified plan generate significant returns regardless the crisis effect.
In addition, we address the concerns expressed by critics about fund’s myopic behaviour
which describes activist as destructor to long-term value by analyzing long-term performance
following the activism. We examine one year post-activism accounting performance in targets
using propensity score matching methodology assuming firms are targeted nonrandomly.
Then we relax this assumption and report the results using standard difference-in-difference
approach. While using two different approaches, we present results in time-series and
cross-sectional analysis. Our findings for one year succeeding activism suggest that targets
experience substantial improvement in valuation, profit margin, and investment.
To examine crisis impact on target firms’ performance, we test two distinctive hypotheses.
In first hypothesis, we test whether recent crisis has impacted the performance of target firms.
To test this hypothesis empirically, we divide full sample broadly into two periods; pre-crisis
period from 2000 to 2006, post-crisis period from 2007 to 2013. The accounting measures
of performance initially suggest that target firms perform better than nontargets in terms of
value, profitability, and investment.
In second hypothesis, using a subsample of firms targeted during 2006 and 2007, we
examine their performance in two years 2008 and 2009 during crisis period. We test whether
these firms perform better in excess of matching sample firms before and after the crisis
period. The post-activism two years performance in firms suggest that target significantly
perform better than nontargets when assessed by valuation, profit margin, and investment
measures.
We extend our analysis by raising question whether activist funds extract short-run gains
over the cost of long-term value destruction. Another equally important question to be inves-
tigated is whether induced performance by activist funds in target firms have reversal effect
over long-horizon. We are also interested to examine whether monthly abnormal returns
pronounce when we control for several biases, and test-specifications over the long-period.
These are few central questions which we raise in chapter two of this dissertation.
For a sample of 589 actively targeted firms over the period of January 2000 to December
2013, we explore two distinctive perspectives; first, we examine the power of test-statistics
by constructing a wide array of well-defined benchmarks, second, after identifying an appro-
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priate matching criterion, we test the abnormality in monthly stock returns using multiple
approaches including cumulative abnormal returns, buy-and-hold abnormal returns, and
calendar-time portfolio approach.
Using various benchmarks based on reference portfolios, matching sample firms, and
multiple market indices, we find that cumulative abnormal returns approach using equally-
weighted market index yields well-specified test-statistics which likely helps in mitigating
new listing and skewness bias. Using well-defined benchmark, we test abnormality in
monthly returns using Fama-French three-factor model in holding period approach and find
insignificantly negative abnormal returns for (-12, +36) month event-window. Our findings
invariably remain the same when we control for crisis effect.
In contrast with results obtained from using cumulative abnormal returns approach, buy-
and-hold approach appears more effective in mitigating biases. When we test for monthly
abnormal returns using Fama-French three-factor model as a reference portfolio, the estimates
appear negatively significant for (–12, +36) month event-window for full sample period.
However, after controlling for crisis effect, the post-crisis period results underperform the
pre-crisis.
Unlike cumulative abnormal returns and buy-and-hold abnormal returns approach, test-
specifications significantly pronounce for the calendar-time portfolio approach when we use
carefully constructed size deciles as benchmark. In addition, the results are consistent and
in line with other approaches when reference portfolio is used to address the new listing
and rebalancing bias. Moreover, when we test for abnormality in monthly returns, the esti-
mates appear lowest in magnitude, however significant for (-12, +36) month event-window.
This finding is in contrast with other approaches for which we do not observe any significance.
In summarizing these results, we may conclude that actively targeted firms relatively
perform better than passively targeted firms by similar hedge funds, however underperform
the private equity firms over the (-12, +36) month event-window. Our results for both full
sample period as well as for crisis are significantly negative. The methodologies to control for
the biases and misspecifications in test-statistics partly address the issues. Due to the presence
of overlapping in calendar-time and cross-sectional dependence in monthly abnormal returns,
the yielded significant estimates are critically questionable.
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Have hedge fund target firms become more leveraged following the recent financial
crisis? It is the central question, we are attempting to answer in our third chapter. Given the
enormous capital outflows from hedge fund industry following the recent crisis, activist funds
are curtailed in raising funds to invest their positions in portfolios. On the contrary, Fed’s new
policy of quantitative easing has led to low interest rates which consequently enticed to high
borrowings from financial intermediaries. Hedge funds which are arguably characterized as
leveraging their targets have optimally availed this opportunity and channelized the additional
borrowings for activism. We initially address this puzzle of additional borrowing in target
firms and then examine whether increased level of leverage in target firms affect the fund
decision of selling its holdings. We also investigate the impact of crisis on target firm’s
leverage and on explaining the cross-sectional variation in fund decision making.
Using 543 US listed firms targeted by 112 activist funds, we examine target firms leverage
in the year prior to fund activism. We find that target firms leverage level is lower than
nontarget firms matched on benchmark of size/book-to-market value/ 2–digit SIC industry
codes.
We test the hypothesis whether firm’s leverage explains any cross-sectional variation in
fund decision making about selling its stock. By employing a wide array of multivariate
logit regression model, we find mixed results. For full sample period we find that target
firm’s leverage significantly explains the fund decision making in first and second year of
activism. However, when we control for the crisis effect, we find firm’ leverage is significant
in the first year of activism and insignificant in second year of activism. We interpret these
results by implying that in first year with higher level of leverage, activist delays to sell target
since it is less likely to find potential buyer. For second year, leverage being insignificant is
economically justified as activist restructures debts and thus reduces the leverage.
We also investigate those potential venues to which these additional borrowings are
allocated. To examine firms characteristics one year post-activism, we find that target firms
experience significant improvement in distribution policy as measured by dividend yield, and
payout and investment as indicated by capital structure.
This study has important implications for researchers, regulators, and for investors in the
wake of recent financial crisis. For researchers, it provides additional empirical evidence and
fresh insights on fund selection behaviour, targeting patterns, working mechanisms, evolved
outcomes in a comparative analysis before and after the crisis. To regulators, we posit new
5
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facts which may help them to revisit their preconceived notions about fund activism and
expected regulations to align their working with broadly financial system.
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ABSTRACT. This study extends the empirical evidence of hedge fund activism impact
on target firm performance. We investigate whether activism strategies as well as their
effects have changed following the recent financial crisis of 2007–2008. The analysis is
based on the U.S. data covering 112 hedge funds, 551 target firms, from 2000 to 2013.
We find that returns to activism accrue to approximately 5% during the (–20, +5) event
window. Activism–related categories that generate significant and positive abnormal returns
include capital structure, business strategy, and general undervaluation. Since the financial
crisis, business-related activism generates the highest returns, followed by activism in
financially depressed firms. We also find significant cross-sectional abnormal returns, both
before and during the crisis, for hedge funds who do not pre-specify an objective. One year
post–activism performance suggests that target firms experience substantial improvement in
value, profit margin, and investment.
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1.1 Introduction
While the hedge fund industry has made tremendous growth in the post–crisis period, merely
a few attempts have been made empirically to gauge the impacts of crisis on hedge fund–
target firms. Since the recent financial crisis has likely challenged the traditional approach to
activism and introduced new paradigm shifts, it would be interesting to examine whether and
how activists have changed their targeting patterns of influncing firms. This study is among
the first ones which attempts to assess the recent financial crisis (2007–08) impacts on active
hedge funds’ strategic behaviour towards targets and investigates the targets’ performance in
the short–term and in the long-term.1
In their seminal study, Berle and Means (1932) point out that dispersed shareholders
holding negligible ownership stake in largely diffused U.S. corporations less likely make
any significant difference in the internal governance of firms by their monitoring. To have
an adequate due diligence on firms’ management, a number of systematically well-defined
mechanisms have been introduced in corporate finance literature. In these mechanisms,
much emphasis is given to align the manager’s interest with those of shareholders in order
to alleviate the associated agency issues; however, empirical evidence suggests that so far
these measures have appeared less successful in mitigating the agency problems (Baker
et al., 1988). Of these monitoring measures, the inclusion of large stockholder is proposed
on behalf of dispersed shareholders (Jensen, 1986); however, the evolved outcomes have
been economically insignificant (Black, 1998; Carleton et al., 1998; Karpoff et al., 1996;
Romano, 2001; Wahal, 1996). The limited role of such monitoring has been subjected to
free riding (Black, 1998; Kahan and Rock, 2007; Partnoy and Thomas, 2007; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1986), high cost (Black, 1998; Kahan and Rock, 2007), limited investment (Black,
1998; Karpoff, 2001; Parrino et al., 2003), weak financial incentives (Rock, 1990), regu-
latory constraints (Romano, 2001), conflict of interest (Davis and Kim, 2005), among others.2
Contrary to aforementioned limitations, however, the documented literature in hedge
fund suggests that characteristics of hedge fund portray it as an ideal candidate to perform
monitoring role as an activist (Armour et al., 2009; Bratton, 2006; Briggs, 2007; Kahan and
Rock, 2007; Partnoy and Thomas, 2007). Hedge fund, so far, has been relatively preferred
over non-hedge fund due to fewer regulations (Ackermann et al., 1999), relaxed taxations
1According to Hedge Fund Research (HFR) report, a leading research firm in hedge fund, the assets under
management in industry has reached to $2.85 trillion in fourth quarter of 2014 for about 8,000 funds, of this
activist funds are 71 (less than 1%) and manage about $120 billion which account for a large part in total assets.
[1]https://www.hedgefundresearch.com/
2These shortcomings or constraints have been widely discussed in non-hedge fund literature.
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(Jaeger, 2003), sophisticated investment strategies including leverage, short selling, deriva-
tives, and concentrated portfolios (Partnoy and Thomas, 2007), (Jaeger, 2003, p. 133), and
performance–based incentives (Ackermann et al., 1999). Despite the crisis period, hedge
fund activisim has been persistently generating positively significant abnormal returns for
its investors (Becht et al., 2014). These returns are arguably attributed to the organizational
characteristics of the fund. To revisit this phenomenon, we investigate whether regulatory
framework is underlying source of generating distinguishable returns from non–activist hedge
fund particularly during the crisis period.
The impact of hedge fund activism on target firms’ performance has been rigorously
discussed and studied in recent decades (Bebchuk et al., 2014; Boyson and Mooradian, 2011;
Brav et al., 2008; Greenwood and Schor, 2009; Klein and Zur, 2006). The empirical findings
of largely documented studies provide evidence that hedge fund activism generates positively
significant abnormal returns around the announcement of Schedule 13D Disclosures in the
short–run and mixed results in the improvement of targets’ performance in the long-term.
Numerous studies in hedge fund literature find general consensus that stock market
favourably reacts to the announcement of funds’ involvement in targets and as a result gener-
ates positively significant abnormal returns (Boyson and Mooradian, 2011; Brav et al., 2008;
Klein and Zur, 2006). In pre-crisis sample studies, Klein and Zur (2006) report 10.3% abnor-
mal returns over relatively longer (–30, +30) event window including the date of notification.
In another study, Greenwood and Schor (2009) utilizing long-horizon data (1993–2006),
document 3.5% abnormal returns in 15 days event–window. To add more evidence, Brav
et al. (2008) show 7 percentage points abnormal returns in excess of matching firms based on
size/book-to-market/industry in (–20, +20) event window and find no reversal in prices in the
succeeding year of activism. The announcement related positively significant returns have
signaled the market participants to reconsider traditionally prevailing thinking on activist
investing. Recently, Becht et al. (2010) analyzing stock performance across regions including
Asia, Europe, and North America and report that the US market responds most to fund
disclosures which is 6.9% for (–20, +20) event window or 41 days.
Related with long–term targets’ performance, the empirical evidence is however, mixed
and largely depends on the sample frame and composition. In a seminal study, Brav et al.
(2008) analyze the two years post-activism changes in targets and find that in terms of
profitability and payout, targets have outperformed the nontargets when matched at indus-
try/size/book to market value. In addition, they also find that at governance level, targets
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experience higher CEO turnover following activism. Boyson and Mooradian (2011) using
relatively a longer panel over 1994–2007, document that target firms’ value improved when
measured in terms of Tobin’s Q over the course of activism. Another equally important find-
ing is that targets significantly reduced the excess cash holdings thus showing the consistency
in the widespread idea that activits reduce the agency costs of managerial discretion. Contrary
to these findings, a number of studies report either adverse effects or no improvement in
targets following activism. Klein and Zur (2006) do not find evidence of improvement in
firms’ accounting measures of performance. Instead targets experience decline in earnings
per share (EPS), return on assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE) in the succeeding fiscal
year. However, ex-post activism targets’ excess cash reduced substantially and distributed
among shareholders as dividends. These mixed findings together with significant abnormal
returns in the short-run around Schedule 13D filing suggest that the shareholders perceive
benefits to reducing agency costs of excess cash and short-term investments.
Using a hand collected data for 112 hedge funds, 551 event firms over the period of 2000
to 2013, we study the impact of activism in two broadly distinctive perspectives, in general
for the entire sample period and in particular for the crisis period. Related with activism,
we are interested in to investigate whether the targeted firms are valued or growth stock. In
addition, how activists do attempt to impact the internal governance of targets by influencing
their managerial decisions? Are there any observable changes to targeting patterns following
the crisis? Does crisis affect the returns to activism? In case of a visible significant change
in targeting trends, we extend to investigate how does activists’ target perform differently
than non–hedge funds’ target? Some of these concerns have been partly discussed in prior
fund-related literature (Boyson and Mooradian, 2011; Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2006).
In this study, we emphasize on addressing these questions with crisis effect in particular.
Hedge funds hold largely concentrated ownership stake in their targets in order to assert
their influence in firms’ management. To do so, they normally target small and medium
size firms. Targeting firms with small market capitalization allow hedge funds to acquire
meaningful stake and to induce pressure on management to consider their suggested measures
in serious manners. In this study, we find that the characteristics of the targets demonstrate
that the firms are, on average, small and medium in size. In addition, they resemble value
stock, however financially profitable and operationally stronger than peers in industry. More-
over, target firms are highly leveraged and hold liquid assets compared to matching firms.
Previously documented studies including Boyson and Mooradian (2011); Brav et al. (2008)




Activists target firms with a pre–specified plan of actions. When a fund exceeds a thresh-
old of 5% or more ownership stake in a firm, it reports a mandatory file known as Schedule
13D to the Securities and Exchange Commission of the US. In 13D notification, it explicitly
proposes the anticipated changes to the firm. Targets have been experiencing positive and
constructive support from activists during the course of activism. These interventions are
positively perceived by the market and as a result, market appreciates the stock price in the
short–run. The empirical findings of this study are consistent with the prior literature on
documenting the short-run value creation around the announcement window. We find that in
the short–run target firms’ cumulative abnormal returns around the longest (–20, +5) event
window exhibits 5.34% appreciation in stock returns which is in line with prior documented
studies on fund activism.
We examine the market reaction to various types of activism and analyze the cross-section
of short–run abnormal returns. We find that market appreciates most the intervention by an
activist suggesting change to capital structure in target. The announcement-related returns
(12.2%) accrue more to capital structure activism in which a fund initially intends to reduce
the firm’s excess cash holdings to mitigate the agency-related issues or repurchases of out-
standing stocks and restructuring of the debts. This finding is consistent with crisis period and
suggests implicit potential in targeting financially depressed firms. Following restructuring
capital in targets, funds who seek to change the targets business course including operational
efficiency or to gain favorable terms for mergers and acquisitions (in target) manage to earn
9.2% returns in excess of the matching peers. In addition to these proposals, fund filing 13D
announcement without pre-specifying plan are rewarded by 2.8% returns which indicate that
market considers the activist involvement as a positive signal for the target. We do not find
meaningful reaction of the market to the type of activism which relates to sale of target. In
the wake of the recent financial crisis, spinning off some business segment or whole firm is
seen as the norm for fund activism, however, we do not find any statistical significant impact
for such activity. The type of activism which improves the govrenance issues generates
positive returns, however, we find once again lack of statistical significance. In sum, market
responds more to funds’ pre-specified plan as compared to non-confrontational approaches.
Since the financial crisis, the business–related activism promises the highest returns,
approximately 15% which is statistically significant at 5% level. Funds who intervene in
targets’s business by suggesting measures to improve their operational efficiency which may
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include restructuring of business or recommending feasible terms for anticipated merges and
acquisitions during the crisis, generate most returns. Another notable finding is financially
depressed firms in which fund activism is positively responded by market. In cases where
activists target firms which have filed their cases in bankruptcy courts under Chapter 11
during crisis period, appeared potential venue to generate approximately 10% abnormal
returns, however merely marginally significant. In a relatively short–period (–10, +10) event
window, funds without any intent of serving active role earns more than 9% which is highly
significant. Unlike previously gained results, we do not find any statistically significance for
the abnormal returns for capital structure–related activism.
While analyzing the long–term one year performance of the target firms, we use two
distinctive apporaches including propensity score matching and difference-in-difference
approach on both dimensions; time-series and cross-sectional settings. The initial findings
for entire sample period suggest that targets outperform their matching firms in terms of valu-
ation, profitability, and in prospects of investment. One year after activism, targets experience
substantial improvement in Tobin’s Q and this increase in also evidenced by book–to–market
value for which the difference in median observation is statistically distinguishable from
zero. We also find that targets partly reduced their leverage. These finding are consistent with
the documented literature and support the view that fund suggested measures in targets lead
the stock price to reflect its fundamentals and thus help to enhance the firm value in long-term.
The targets long-term performance yield mixed results when we account for crisis effect
in our analysis. Using difference–in–difference approach, we examine the crisis impact on
firm’s performance for entire sample and for a subsample of targeted firms during 2006
and 2007. For full sample analysis, we find that targets on average experience significant
increase in measures for size, valuation, and investment. However, following crisis, targets
suffer in terms of profit margin coupled with increase in debt capacity. For a subsample
of firms targeted during 2006 and 2007, the two years long–term performance in 2008 and
2009 demonstrate that firms experience on average increase in profitability, and investment
in first year following the fund activism. However, in second year of activism, we observe
significant fall in dividend yield and investment.
The study contributes to the existing literature on several fronts. It primarily addresses the
fundamental question of the impact of hedge fund’s activism on the target firm’s performance,
and attempts to explore whether activism strategies as well as their effect changes following
the financial crisis of 2007–2008. There has been growing literature on fund activism in
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recent decades including Bebchuk et al. (2014); Becht et al. (2010); Boyson and Mooradian
(2011); Brav et al. (2008); Clifford (2008); Klein and Zur (2006) examining the impact of
activist’s proactive role on targets’ short–term and long–term performance. However, these
studies only examine pre– crisis period (except (Bebchuk et al., 2014)) when markets were
normal and fund activism was widely appreciated. Since the recent financial crisis might
have changed the traditional course of activism, so it would be interesting to reexamine the
patterns in targeting firm and to analyze the cross–sectional distribution of evolved outcomes
to different types of activism.
Prior studies on fund activism generally characterize a firm selection as a random pro-
cedure (Brav et al., 2008). The samples studied in existing literature however suggest that
targeted firms are typically financially and operationally strong and hold excess cash. Thus,
critics raise a fundamental question on targets post–activism performance and argue that
target’s better performance is arguably subject to fund good choice rather than fund activism.
Contradicting on this view, this study counterintuitively argues that a target selection is non-
random and base on observable features indicating that data experience an implicit selection
bias. Our analysis of firms’ characteristics in the year before activism evidently supports
this argument suggesting that activists’ target firms are small in size, cash rich, profitable
and highly paying out compared to their matching firms. Thus, to mitigate potential issue
of endogeneity occuring because of possible sample selection bias, we use propensity score
methodology. Using matching approach, we compare each target with controlling firm and
estimate the probability of being selected for activism.
This study adds more evidence to the empirically documented literature on fund activism,
in particular, considering the crisis effect. Regarding short-run performance, the studies have
consistently been reporting abnormal returns around the announcement of 13D filing with no
reversal in prices; however, results on targets long–term performance vary significantly.
In addition, activism–related studies have been analyzing a limited sample period. Differ-
entiating on this aspect, this study considers relatively a longer panel covering from January
2000 to December 2013. The large sample frame permits to analyze two important elements:
first, to examine how the hedge fund strategic patterns have evolved over the activism period,
particularly following the crisis, and second it allows to obtain well diversified additional
observations to our sample.
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The rest of the paper proceeds in the following way: Section 1.2 discusses the formation
of the sample. In section 1.3 presents the summary statistics on fund tactics and the targets’
characteristics. Section 1.4 presents analysis about the short-run returns around 13D filing in
the overall sample in general and compares it with crisis period. Section 1.5 analyzes the
long term performance of targets for full sample period and relates it with prior documented
studies. Section 1.6 examines the impact of recent financial crisis on accounting performance
of target firms in the long term. Section 1.7 using different specifications analyzes the
sensitivity of the results, and section 1.8 concludes the paper.
1.2 Data collection and variable construction
1.2.1 Hedge fund sample
Primarily, a sample of 200 hedge funds is obtained upon request from Barclayhedge.com
(private) database with assets under management (AUM– hereafter) and monthly net returns.
Of this, funds functioning only in the U.S. are chosen. At next stage, the funds investing
in equities under various categories including global macro, global, event driven, market
driven among others are shortlisted. To this sample, we add more funds found in hedge
fund literature and on related websites. A list of at least 500 randomly chosen funds is
assembled. To this extent, the details about fund holdings (AUM) and acquired stakes in
firms are unknown. To make it further diversified and well-balanced sample, we perform a
search test in the Securities and Exchangd Commission’s EDGAR search file with the first
name of fund in our list and retrieve additional funds. This process helps in to add more funds
to the list which precisely marks about 800 activist hedge funds. From these 800 funds, we
drop a large number of funds functioning as abitrageurs or taking positions for short period
trading purposes. This leaves our initial activist sample to 127 funds involved in activism. To
avoid any possible selection bias, we choose funds regardless of their characteristics e.g. fund
size (AUM), previous filing record, performance, and characteristics about fund managers.
At next stage, each fund is searched in EDGAR system for its record from January 2000
to December 2013. Funds usually report several mandatory files during the period, they
operate. When a hedge fund acquires 5% or more ownership stake in a publicly listed firm
with intent to intervene in the business course of a firm, it is officially required to report the
13D Schedule within 10 days to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC henceforth)
of the U.S. under the ’Securities Exchange Act of 1934’ in order to regulate the transaction
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for certain purposes in the secondary market.3 The Schedule 13D indicates the filer as an
activist and provides the details about filer name, the issuer name and identity as an asset
class (bank, money manager), the number of total shares outstanding and their form (ordinary
or preferred stock), payment methods and related costs, the purpose of transaction, filer
holdings in total outstanding shares, and other necessary documentation in the course of
transaction’s proceedings.4
The Schedule 13D discloses essential information about filer’s identity. Item 2 entitled
as "Identity and Background" describes the reporting person’s business address and type,
record about filer’s, if any, criminal and civil proceedings in last five years. However, it
does not mention explicitly the filer’s type whether it is hedge fund or non-hedge fund.
Thus, to clarify any doubts about fund’s identification and position, we examine thoroughly
each fund’s personal webpage and verify it with Factiva and other related websites. Dur-
ing this systematic search process, some funds are found offering services simultaneously
for hedge funds as well as for private equity funds. We trace the parent investment com-
panies which manage these funds and check for their identification. If the filer is found
non-hedge fund, we simply exclude it. To give an example from the list of activist funds,
Deephaven Capital Management LLC, which manages hedge funds and invests in fixed
income securities and in private equity funds. To make sure whether it is classified as hedge
fund, we check its website and record on past transactions in SEC to confirm its identification.
Using EDGAR’s system to retrieve 13D filings could possibly bias the sample toward
big funds and small firms. To acquire a meaningful stake in a firm for activism, a fund is
required to invest a substantial part of holding capital. However, some activist funds have
involved in target firms with ownership stake less than 5%, thus do not appear in EDGAR’s
system. For example, in recent period, Sandell Asset Management after acquiring merely
2% stake in JDS Uniphase Corp. (operating in networks and optical products), urged the
target to consider a proposal of divesting some subsidiary assets. Following this suggestion,
JDS announced its plan saying "This is a strategy our board has been actively considering
for some time, ..." The effectiveness of proposal in short period is manifested by fund’s
3The Schedule 13G is a mandatory disclosure statement for the persons subject to Section 13(g). The
qualified institutional investor is requiresd to meet two core elements. First, the institution must have acquired
the ownership stake in an ordinary course of business and not with the purpose of influencing the control of
issuing authority. Second, the issuer must belong to a specific regulatory institution e.g. bank, insurance firms,
saving association under Federal Act, registered investment bank among others. The filer (qualified institutional
investor) of 13G Filing is required to report within 45 days of the end of calendar year in which the beneficial
owner holds more than 5% or within 10 days of the end of the calendar year in which filer holds more than 10%
onwership stake.
4Schedule 13D and other filings can easily be downloaded through EDGAR filings search on [1]www.sec.gov.
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reputation and its active role in another firm namely Bob Evan Farms Inc., where it acquired
four board seats and urged the firm to spin–off particular assets.5 These events account for
a significant portion of the fund-activism. We gather information about such events using
various sources including financial press and related websites.6
Activist funds file initial Schedule 13D and then frequently report changes to it known
as amended file (13D/A). In some cases, these amended files are not reported after first
announcement to EDGAR’s system. The amended files are used to follow the developments
on fund activism during a specific period. In addition, to know how long the fund stayed in
firm (in later part of analysis, these amended files are well explained). A notable example
is Del Mar Asset Management, LP when it acquired 4.38% stake in Kennedy-Wilson Hold-
ings, Inc. and announced 13D Filing on November 16, 2009. However, EDGAR’s system
does not report amendments following the initial filing, thus, all such cases are not considered.
A structurally well-defined procedure of multiple cross-checking and scrutinization leaves
the sample with 112 U.S. hedge funds demonstrating the average characteristics of industry.
In comparison with seminal study by Brav et al. (2008) who analyze 236 activist hedge
funds over the period of 2001 to 2006, this study investigates 13D Disclosuers filed by 112
activist funds for a wide period starting from January 2000 to December 2013. Our sample
composition in terms of activists’ distribution resembles to Boyson and Mooradian (2011)
study who investigate 111 activist hedge funds owned by 89 hedge fund management firms
over the period of 1994 to 2005.7 Table 1.2 presents the distribution of the activist funds
over the period of 2000–2013. An overview of the sample depicts the monotonic trend. The
number of activist funds on average do not vary from 2002 to 2005, however, just before
crisis and in following years, an increasing trend is observed. Table 1.3 provides details about
activist funds and their targets. Out of 760 fund and firm pairs (repeated in some cases), we
have 688 firms uniquely targeted by 112 funds. On average, each activist fund targets 6 firms
over the sample period. However, some funds exceptionally (e.g. Harbinger Capital Partners
5[1]http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/09/10/activist-sandell-urged-jds-to-explore options/?KEYWORDS=hedge+fund+2+equity+stake.
6An important criticism is drawn on activist’s successful campaign by seeking insights to know how activists
systematically gain board seats or influnce firm to implement their suggested plan by holding even less than 5%
ownership stake. To gain insights into this puzzle, activists normally propose their agenda to inclined but reluc-
tant large shareholders including pension funds, mutual funds, private equity funds, and more possibly with other
hedge funds with whom they can find common grounds. Activists lead the campaign on behalf of other institu-
ional sharedholders by dividing the monitoring cost proportionately. [1]http://business.financialpost.com/2014/11/15/how-
activist-hedge-funds-on-steroids-have-become-a-boardroom-enemy/
7How well our sample is diversified and representative of the industry? According to global research firm
Preqin [1]https://www.preqin.com/, currently more than 400 activist hedge funds functioning worldwide. Of
these 400 active funds, 60% are US based thus comprising 240 funds from which we assemble our sample with
112 activist funds (47%).
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Master Fund, Carl Ichan C, Jana Partners LLC, and VP Partners LLC, among others) engage
in, on average, more than 20 firms in sample period which demonstrates their wide activist
role.
1.2.2 Target firms sample
For a comprehensive list of 760 Schedule 13D events with the announcement dates, we
retrieve 688 firms which are uniquely targeted by 112 activst hedge funds over the period of
January 2000 to December 2013. For about 9% cases (760–688), some firms are targeted
repeatedly in similar months, so therefore in order to avoid repeatition in analyses, we
drop the firm occuring twice, however we strictly consider the purpose of transaction for
which firm is targeted. At next stage, these firms are searched into the Thomson Reuters
Datastream for their DS Mnemonic Codes (identification codes). During search process,
about 20% firms do not appear in Datastream, thus we drop them from our sample. Our
well–defined search process shortlists 551 U.S. firms, ultimately. These firms are publicly
traded at NY SE/AMEX/NASDAQ exchanges.
For a sample of 551 target firms, we extract data on their stock prices and for accounting
figures from their balance sheets, income and cash flow statements, respectively. Stock prices
are daily based and start prior to the January 2000 to December 2013. Table 1.1 provides in
details the definition on variables used in analysis.
Of these 551 firms, a large number of target firms (about 36%) are reported as either dead
or completely buyout, merged, or delisted from Datastream during the course of activism.
Given that, the database does not explain any reason for disappearing firms. The missing
annual accounting figures account for approximately 20% of entire sample. However, these
caveats have been noticed by priorovious studies. Among others, Greenwood and Schor
(2009) reduce their sample size approximately half to the firms available in Compustat but
find it upward biased to small firms.
During the course of activism, a hedge fund keeps on following with the target firm and
files several amendments known as 13D/As. These amended files reveal the fund’s consid-
eration about the target contemporary performance and its strategic plans regarding future
policies. In the majority of these cases, a fund demands merely a formal communication
for investment purpose, however, sometimes, it recommends an entire change in the course
of actions including displacement of CEO, board management, making or blocking new
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mergers and acquisitions (M&As), corporate and governance matters. In order not to miss any
important information, I go through these amended files in particular and gather all theoretical
information on relevant items. In case of a significant change to the previously submitted
purpose of the transaction (e.g., if a fund initially purchases the stock for portfolio investment
by having no intention of playing an active role at managerial level and later on alters it to
participate in corporate activities as an aggressive/hostile investor) then this amended file
would be considered as a separate case. However, earlier studies report that these follow
up events do not affect the significance of the overall results (see, e.g., (Greenwood and
Schor, 2009)). In this sample, 3500 amended files out of total 4260 (6 amendments per initial
announcement) constitute about 80% of the total sample.
1.2.3 Matching firms sample
As discussed in the section 1.2.1 that when an investor or activist acquires 5% or more
ownership stake and explicitly reveals interest not to influence the control of firm, then it is
mandatory for the acquirer to report Schedule 13G within 45 days at the end of calendar year
in which the investor holds ownership. In case of holding 10% or more stake, the duration to
file 13G Announcement restricts to 10 days at the end of calendar year. We experience that an
activist also acquires firm for longer period with nonactive purpose by filing 13G to the SEC.
This intuitively motivates to a comparative analysis and raise question to investigate whether
firms actively targeted perform better than non–actively targeted firms. In other words, to
evaluate the performance of firms reported in 13D Schedules, we use the firms reported in
13G Announcements. We gather all reported 13G disclosures for the similar set of hedge
funds for which we collect 13D files over the period of January 2000 to December 2013.
From these 13G Files, we gather all relevant information including firm name, percentage of
holding to total ownership, and type of shares (common versus preferred stock). Unlike 13D
Schedule, 13G Announcement is distinctively exempted from several clauses to report.8
Initially we collect 955 firms from 112 hedge funds who report 13G Announcements
over the period of January 2000 to December 2013. At next stage, we search these firms in
Thomson Reuters Datastream database to retrieve their DS Mnemonic Codes (Identification
codes) in order to collect data. For a small number of firms, which constitute approximately
6% of entire sample, however we do not find codes, thuse these firms are dropped from our
sample. For the rest of 898 firms, we extract data on daily and monthly stock prices and
8In some cases, funds initially report 13D Schedule to the SEC, however later on they are observed to
change the status to 13G depending on investment strategy.
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annual accounting figures from using Datastream. All matching firms are US based and
listed at NY SE/AMEX/NASDAQ exchanges.
1.2.4 Crisis definition
For the analyses of daily and monthly stock returns, we divide the data into two sub-groups,
for the period before crisis, it starts from January 2000 to July 2007, and for the period during
and after crisis, it begins from July 2007 and lasts until December 2013. For the annual
accounting analyses, the observations for the crisis begin from 2007 and onward.9
For stock returns, the crisis is measured by means of a dummy variable which takes
value one, if Schedule 13D is filed from July 2007 and ends at 2013. In similar fashion, for
accounting analyses, crisis is equal to one, if Schedule 13D is reported in year 2007 and
onward. Prior studies considering recent crisis impact have been using a similar definition
(For detail, e.g., see, Becht et al. (2010); Ben-David et al. (2012); Maier et al. (2011)). In the
sample, one third observations fall in the period following the financial crisis.
1.2.5 Event definition
We define an event in our analysis as when an activist hedge fund acquires 5% or more
ownership stake in a publicly listed firm with an intention to influence firm’s internal gov-
ernance by a well stated plan of objectives. On crossing the threshold of 5% the fund is
required to report a mandatory file known as 13D Schedule to the SEC of the US within 10
days. We gather dates on these reported announcements by two ways; first, the day when a
fund acquires ownership and does not disclose to the SEC (its initial holdings), in case of
unavailability of first reported date, we consider the date available with the SEC.10
9The crisis in sub-prime sector which started in early 2007 subsequently trickled down to the financial
institutions including banks, holding companies, investment banks, and brokerage houses in the mid of 2007. A
general concensus among academicians define the recent financial crisis period from July 2007 till December
2009. Maier et al. (2011) explain the definition of crisis by stating "at the end of June 2007, hedge funds of the
investment bank Bear Stearns, which had invested overwhelmingly in the sub-prime mortgage market, were
among the first to struggle". (see, for details, ’Bear Stearns says battered hedge funds are worth little’, New
York Times, July 18, 2007., [1]http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/18/business/18bond.html?_r=0.
10In section 1.2.2, we describe in detail the procedure of gathering information on announcement dates.
Since our analysis is sensitive (particularly in short-run) to the fund announcement, thus we are preferably
focused on exact dates when a fund acquires stake. To do so, we match dates reported on the SEC website with
the ones available in financial press about fund’s transaction. In case, a date is found in press reported earlier
and mistmatch with SEC, we replace it with officially reported date.
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1.3 Summary statistics of activism–based events
1.3.1 Hedge fund intention towards target
Table 1.2 exhibits the distribution of hedge funds over the period of 2000–2013. Interestingly,
the number of funds does not vary significantly though relatively a small degree of spike is
observed in the closing years of financial crisis.
Table 1.4 delineates the chronological distribution of the events over the sample period.
Each event represents a Schedule 13D filing whether it is several times filed by an individual
fund or separately filed by different funds. An overview of the figures reveals that there
is a steady growth in activism events prior to the onsetting of the financial crisis. The
overwhelming majority of the events take place during early 2000 and before financial crisis
which is consistent with pre–crisis events’ distribution documented by Greenwood and Schor
(2009) and Boyson and Mooradian (2011). A potential factor for the significant increase
in activist events is well motivated by Greenwood and Schor (2009) by arguing that hedge
funds might have replaced the role of pension and mutual funds once occupied in 90s and
early 2000s. Another reason could be the expansion in the hedge fund industry in post 2000s
when investment was comparatively better rewarded by fund–related activism. A notable
downfall in the events following the crisis is attributed to the outflow of capital from hedge
fund industry and prudent behaviour of the investor (for detail, see, (Bolliger et al., 2011).
In Schedule 13D form, a filer provides detailed information about the transaction. Item 5
titled as "Interest in the Securities of Issuer" normally discloses information on beneficiary
entity individually as well in a group, date of transaction, number of stocks held by each
beneficiary, if applies then share class (type A or B). Item 3 known as "Source and Amount
of Funds or other Consideration" of 13D filing describes the information on the amount paid
on purchasing the stock and sources of payment.
Table 1.5 summarizes the percentage of the shares held by an activist and the related cost
incurred on its purchasing. Out of 760 fund–firm pairs, for 733 events (more than 96%) we
have details on stocks held by an activist. Mean ownership holding at initial filing is 13%
which is in line with Boyson and Mooradian (2011) reported figure. However, quantitatively
(in dollar terms) it is many times larger than theirs which indicate that targets in our analysis
are much larger in size. Regarding the fund’s costs of purchasing stocks, the available
information is limited to about 50% firms approximately. The mean cost of the transaction,
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by marking the threshold of 5% or above, is about 77 million dollars.
The Schedule 13D file essentially provides the details about filer and target firm. Among
others, the Item 4 entitled as "Purpose of Transaction," in which a filer explicity discloses
the objective of acquiring stake. These stated objectives declare the intent of filer about
target firm whether firm has undervalued stock or requires to be enacted in business or
management. Table 1.6 reports the theoretical information gathered from Item 4. To sort
out the information, we follow partly the patterns built by Brav et al. (2008) into seven
different categories as general undervaluation or maximization of the shareholder value,
capital structure, business strategy, sale of the firm, and governance matters, financial distress
or bankruptcy and arbitrage.
Consistent with previous studies (Boyson and Mooradian, 2011), an overwhelming ma-
jority of cases in our sample demonstrate that an activist fund initially acquires the target
firm for value maximizing purpose considering either target is undervalued compared to its
peers or contains potential to raise price to demonstrate the true intrinsic value. Aside from
active role, a fund whether it files Schedule 13D or 13G, always starts participating in target
firm by engaging with management with a central goal of value maximization.
A considerable majority of the cases indicates that funds view their target current busi-
ness strategy flawed and operationally inefficient, illustrated by an approximately 16 percent
of the transaction purposes. A business strategy might involve restructuring, spinning off
some assets, blocking mergers and acquisitions or negotiating for better terms of deal and
alike. A well proportion of events (11%) demonstrate that funds are concerned over poor
corporate governance in target companies. Acquiring a meaningful stake (5% or more) in
target firm presumably empowers the activist to get representation on board and to influence
the aforementioned managerial decisions. Prior studies ((Boyson and Mooradian, 2011; Brav
et al., 2008; Greenwood and Schor, 2009) favourably support this assumption and provide
a fair amount of anecdotal evidence from industry. The aggregate of all events classified
in table 1.6 exceeds the total reported events is because of non–mutually exclusive stated
goals of the funds. Activists generally suggest multiple changes in targets simultaneously, for
instance, an activist can involve in ousting CEO along with involving in firm to spin off some
noncore asset. Thus, in such cases, each statement is placed into different type of activism.
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1.3.2 Hedge fund techniques to influence the target
In this section, we collect and compile the information on fund techniques by which it intends
to influence the targets at initial level of activism. These tactics are ordered according to the
course of actions. The tactics are 1): The hedge fund conducts preliminary meetings on a
regular basis with the target management to get involved with the ongoing business activities.
About half of the cases reveal that funds start active role by negotiation with the management
(53.6%). 2): A considerable majority of funds seeks to get board representation (12.25%).
3): A small number of hedge funds plan to withdraw their board nominees (2.24%). 4): The
funds intend to prevent the target to make any unfavourable decision regarding shares selling
at discount (2.24%). 4): Hedge fund asks the target to change the course of business on
proposal of shareholders (8.56%). 5): Funds performing individually, if unsuccessful then
seek the collaboration with other institutions or block holders (5.40%). 6): The hedge fund
threats, confronts, or compel to restructure the target’s prevailing course of business (9.09%).
7): The hedge fund individually or as a group, plans to have a proxy contest against target’s
merger or acquisition for better negotiation (4.08%). 8): The hedge fund legally sues the
company in bankruptcy court (2.24%). 9): Hedge fund completely buys out the firm or merge
it with other target firm (1.58%).
1.3.3 Characteristics of target firms
Prior literature on fund–related activism argue that fewer regulatory bindings, acquiring
large concentrated stake, and using complicated nexus of investment strategies allow fund
to assert its influence to alleviate the agency issues associated with managerial discretion
(Bratton, 2006; Kahan and Rock, 2007). To do so, what types of firms are included into
fund’s portfolio? The activist funds preferably target companies with potential prospects in
terms of returns and financial performance. The selection of a target is subject to a fund’s
intended period of holding stake in a target, capital–lockup period, fund and firm operational
and financial characteristics. In this section, we investigate the fundamental question of
interest, what kind of firms do hedge funds target for activism?
Following prior activism–related literature (Boyson and Mooradian, 2011; Brav et al.,
2008), we adopt two distinctive approaches to compare the characteristics of target firms
with a sample of matching firms in the year before activism. In first approach, we compare
the target firms with their peers based on firm size, book-to-market value, and industry classi-
fication. Initially, we sort out all target and non-target firms on 2–digit SIC industry codes.
The nontarget firms, which do not match with target firms on 2–digit industry codes are
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dropped from sample. For each target firm, at least one matching firm is found. At next stage,
we choose the non-target firms whose market value of equity fall between 70% to 130% of
market value of the target firm a month before being included into the sample. All target and
non-target firms with missing observations are dropped. Finally, we compare the non–target
firms with book-to-market closest to the book-to-market value of event-firms. Doing this
continuous procedure of matching and scrutinizing reduces the sample considerably (by
52%).
Table 1.8 exhibits the summary statistics of the characteristics of the target companies in
the year before activism. We report mean, median, and standard deviation of both target and
matching sample firms. To mitigate any non–normality which may arise because of outlier
in variables, we follow the prior fund–related literature (Boyson and Mooradian, 2011) and
winsorize all variables at the threshold of 1%. The last two columns report the Wilcoxon
signed rank test for the difference in the medians between targets and matching sample firms.
All figures are annual and retrieved from using Datastream. We compute the essential list of
ratios including proxies for firm size, operating and financial performance, debt capacities,
profitability, investment, and valuation.11
To demonstrate the significane in average differences in the characteristics of target and
matching sample firms, we report the difference in medians. Brav et al. (2008) motivate the
use of medians difference by arguing that Wilcoxon signrank test characterized as exhibiting
asymptotically normal distribution and provides better statistic in situations when variables
largely display fat tails in their distributions. Column 8 reports the p-values for the difference
in medians.
Starting with the firm size which is proxied by market capitalization, the median dif-
ference between the target and matching sample is approximately negatively 13 million
dollar, which is insignificant and in line with previous studies stating that hedge funds target
small size firm. To look into the details, we gather qualitative information from 13D Filings
(section 5 & 6), on firm transaction size and total outstanding shares. On average (median), a
fund holds 46.1 (9) million shares in a firm, which constitutes a mean (median) percentage
of 13.3 (7.75%). The incurred cost on these transactions are on average (median) 77.7 (16.1)
million dollar. Thus, this information provides enough evidence to the typical notion of a
fund acquiring substantial stake in the target by spending a large amount of its portfolio
capital. However, it is also consistent with the idea that hedge funds normally do not target
11For definitions and computation of ratios, table 1.1 is provided.
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large firms, for which they need to spend a large part of their capital. Brav et al. (2008) argue
that acquiring a significant size in large firm may induce the idiosyncratic portfolio risk for
the fund.
Regarding firm valuation measured by Tobin’s Q (long-term debt + the market value of
equity/ long term debt + the book value of equity) is significantly higher than the matching
sample firm by 0.78 points at 1%. In an unreported result, book–to–market ratio (book value
of equity/ market value of equity) is positive and exceeds the matching firm by 0.02 points
and is significant at 5%. These values clearly demonstrate that undervalued stock is more
prone to fund–activism. Evidently, about 60% of funds stated explicitly in Schedule 13D
’Purpose of Transaction’ that the targets are undervalued.
Related with firms operational performance which is scaled on sales growth, returns
on assets, and profitability are strongly consistent with the previously documented figures.
Discussing return on assets, which is much higher for target (0.029) as compared to match-
ing firm (-0.010) and differ from zero significantly. To obtain more evidence from other
measures, we examine the (sales) growth prospects of targets. Surprisingly, the target firms
outperform the matching firm by 0.03 points which is significant too at 5%. These results are
in contrast with Boyson and Mooradian (2011); Brav et al. (2008), who document negatively
significant difference in medians. Return on assets and growth coupled with profitability
might explain the entire pre-activism targets performance. To assess the ex-ante target’s
profitability (measured as net income / net sales or revenues), we find that difference in
medians is approximately 0.03 points which is marginally different than zero. In a nutshell,
targets operational performance portray them attractive for fund activism.
In terms of debt capacities, the book leverage of target (matching) (defined as debt /
(debt + book value of equity)), leverage (total debts / total equity), and market leverage (
expressed as debt / debt plus + market value of equity) are 0.29 (0.77), 0.27 (0.16), and
0.19 (0.06) respectively and are distinguishable from zero at 1%, 10% and 1% respectively.
Except for book leverage, rest of the measures exhibit higher ratios than matching firms
which are consistent with the increasing trend in firms leverage in post–crisis period. 12
To look into the details, one can isolate the firms targeted in post-crisis period to exam-
ine whether higher leverage is driven primarily by firms in ex-post crisis. These figures
differ from Boyson and Mooradian (2011) reported numbers who find target firms with
lower leverage ratios as compared to their peers using data before crisis. We may attribute
12See e.g. R. Vincent. Leverage ratio surge at large companies. CFO.com, April 10, 2013.
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the difference to crisis effect. Some variation in leverage difference can be explained by
Fed’s new policy of quantitative easing which led to upsurge in firms increased borrow-
ings. Summarizing the firms debt burden, the targets are relatively financially depressed firms.
To examine whether the target firms are capital intensive and technology centered, we
assess their investment aspects. Capital expenditure (measured as a percentage of total assets)
and research and development (R&D, measured as percentage of total assets) are 0.01(0.01)
and 0.02(0.01) respectively. Unlike Brav et al. (2008), the firms in our sample spend relatively
more than their matching firms in industry. To explore further the sources of deriving higher
capital spendings, we look into the industry classfication and find that 40% of the sample
comprises of firms belonging to manufacturing industry.
Activist funds pay particular attention to firms provision for liquidity and distribution
policy. Target payout policy and excessive cash holding likely increase the probability of
being targeted by fund. One of main reason among stated objective of fund is to distribute
the excess cash in firm. By doing so, fund achieves two goals; first, to mitigate any agency
issue associated with excess cash hoarding, second, to increase payout for its sharedholders.
In our sample, the median value (0.08) for cash (percentage of assets) in target firms is lower
and significantly different than the median value (0.21) of matching firm sample indicating
that targets hold less cash. These findings are in contrast with previously documented studies
(Boyson and Mooradian, 2011), who find that matching firms, on average, hoard more cash
than targets. Related with cash distribution in terms of payout policy, our median observa-
tions for both samples are zero. However, alternatively we compute the test in difference
in averages. The dividend yield for target firms significantly differ from matching firms at 1%.
To examine the impact of crisis on the activist’s choice of targeting firms, we analyze the
characteristics of firms targeted in the year 2007 and onward. Table 1.10 presents summary
statistics including mean, median, and standard deviation for targets and matching firms for
five years from 2007 to 2013. In comparison with table 1.8 which provides summary results
for the entire period, some results are interesting.
An important trend which evidently emerges from crisis period is that activists less likely
target highly leveraged firms. Our three separately well–defined measures for debt capacities
namely Book Leverage (defined as debt/(debt + book value of equity)), Leverage (total debts
/ total equity), and Market Leverage (expressed as debt / debt plus + market value of equity)
are no more significant (except ML which is marginally significant at 10%) in contrast with
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results exhibited in table 1.8 for full sample period.
Summarizing the characteristics of the target companies by a set of conventionally defined
ratios, we demonstrate that the activists in this sample target relatively small size, under-
valued and financially profitable firms. Our findings also hold with the prior documented
studies which find that targets are usually highly leveraged, investment oriented with good
distribution policy.
1.3.4 Likelihood of fund–activism
1.3.4.1 Sample selection bias
In section 1.3.3, the characteristics of target firms are compared with those of matching
sample firms to examine the targets’ performance in the year prior to fund activism. By
analyzing the target’s features, we attempt to show whether differential effects between a
target and a nontarget might explain some potential reasons for a firm to be targeted for
activism. However, critics arise fundamental question on fund choice and argue that an
activist likely targets a firm which is financially strong, well performing and has potential to
reflect its intrinsic value if firm’s fundamentals are aligned.13 Thus, target’s outperformance
in post–activism period remains controversial and not credited to the fund activism rather
subjects to the activist good choice.14 This raises an underlying issue of sample selection
bias primarily occurring because of nonrandomness of targeting patterns and selection on
observable covariates. Prior literatrue in fund activism has paid relatively less attention to
this potential issue.15 Apparently, it appears due to the choice–based sampling, in which
an activist fund chooses a potential target and not because the analyst (see, e.g., Heckman
13In section 1.3.3, the plausibility of nonparametric analysis favourably supports this argument.
14To counter this argument, in later analysis, we thoroughly examine the fund suggested measures and
following actions in targets to see the real impacts of fund activism on firm’s performance.
15Recently in a critical study on fund activism, Coffee and Palia (2014) hightlighted this issue by raising
serious concerns over formation of matching sample in evaluating activist performance.
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(1979)).16
Given the nonrandom selectivity, the probability of being selected for fund activism
could possibly be discussed using propensity score approach which has gained considerable
attention in recent decades (Coffee and Palia (2014); Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004);
Heckman and Vytlacil (2007); Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)). Heckman and Todd (2009)
propose for propensity score methodology in a setting (experimental studies) where members
of the treatment group are over or under represented relative to their frequency in the pop-
ulation. As discussed in section 1.2.1 that our analysis include likely those cases in which
an activist files Schedule 13D (acquires ≥ 5%) and ignores all such potential cases, where
activism takes place with less than 5%, thus considers the treatment group under–representing
the total population and fits to the setting to use propensity score methodology.17
In this section, we use propensity score approach to a setting where we conjecture that
firms are targeted on some observable characteristics for activism. Imbens and Wooldridge
(2009); Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propose matching sample strategy to encounter con-
foundedness. 18 It primarily allows to obtain the uniform distributions of target firms with
matching sample firms, and thus helps yield possible unbiased estimates. We begin to
construct a vector of common characteristics on which we match the targets with control-
ling firms to assess the probability of a firm to be a potential target. Prior literature on
propensity score matching suggest to use all concerned variables which may affect both
treatment selection and the outcome (Austin et al., 2007). Thus, we include all possible
characteristics which can explain the probability of a firm selection. At next stage, using a
logit regression model upon multivariates in lagged period, we examine the probability of
16Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004) model this issue as an economic choice by considering two potential
outcomes (Y0, Y1). δ =1 if Y1 is selected and δ = 0 if Y0 is selected. Activists pick their respective outcome
based on utility maximization (which would be treatment effect in case of choosing good target firms). Let V
be utility which is formulated as:
V = µV (Z,UV ) D = 1(V > 0)
Where Z are factors (observed by the analyst) determining choices, UV are the unobserved (by the analyst)
factors determining choice and 1 is an indicator function. We emphasize on two different information sets —
information set which an activist has and basis on certain observables— information set which an analyst has
and is restrained with information about activist’s choices.
Another reason for not likely considering issue of selection bias in previous fund-related studies could be that
researchers manually construct sample and thus presumably avoid any non–random sampling errors (see, e.g.,
seminal study of Brav et al. (2008)).
17In later analysis, we introduce model to examine the causal effects of fund activism on target firms.
18In popular term, this strategy is known as nearest neighbour (NN) matching, based on treatment probabilities.
The attractive feature for which Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008); Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) argue that it
initially helps to reduce bias rather than variance in estimates.
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each covariate in explaining the variation in firm selection.19 In addition, we show whether
our results show persistency with those obtained from nonparametric analysis in section 1.3.3.
Table 1.9 exhibits the effects of covariates on the likelihood of fund activism. We compare
sample of target 551 firms with nontarget 898 firms based on propensity score matching.
20 Using logit regression setting, the dependent variable being dummy set to 1, if a firm is
targeted in the year before activism. The independent variables include vector of firm salient
features.21 The results are presented. To control for fixed effects, we include industry and
year dummies. All variables are winsorized at 1%.
Table 1.9 reports the coefficients of the multivariate regression model results. We discuss
some noteworthy results. The market capitalization (in natural logarithm) is distinguishable
from zero and provides some explanation for the variation in fund decision whether to target
the firm for activism. In table 1.8, a fund choice of targeting firm for activism has also been
discussed using non-parametric test. Fund essentially takes into account the size of firm and
uses the mode of activism which might affect the firm governance in immediate future.
Firm valuation parameter (indicated by Tobin’s Q) is consistent with the result presented
in section 1.3.3 and is in-line with prior documented findings (e.g., (Boyson and Mooradian,
2011; Brav et al., 2008)). The coefficient on Tobin’s Q is negatively significant at the level of
5%. We interpret it as one standard deviation decrease in Q is associated with 0.55 percentage
points increase in the probability of a firm being targeted by an activist. It implies that fund
includes undervalued stock into its portfolio.
Regarding firms’ debt capacities, the coefficient on book leverage explains the cross–
sectional variations in fund objective when targeting a firm. For instance, one standard
deviation increase in book leverage increases the probability of firm being targeted with 0.58
points, if other things remain the same. This leaves enough potential for activists to target
19In principle, any discrete model can be used to estimate the propensity score. The preference for logit
or probit models is highly derived from the unlikeliness of the functional form when the response variable is
highly skewed and predictions are outside the [0, 1] bounds of probabilities (e.g., see, Smith (1997). For binary
treatment cases, where we estimate the probability of target vs. nontarget — logit or probit models yield almost
similar results, however Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) argue for logit model since it demonstrates more density
mass in the bounds.
20Alternatively, we can match each target firm with nontarget based on marke value, book-to-market ratio,
and 2–digit SIC codes.
21Each target firm is checked in the SEC Ledger Filing system, where firm is reported with acquirer upon
holding 5% or more stake. We consider only those cases, in which a firm has filed 13D in year following
activism.
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highly leveraged firms to generate value through restructuring their debts.
The patterns emerging from logit regression are consistent with the non-parametric anal-
ysis in section 1.3.3 and suggest that activists in general target small size, undervalued and
highly leveraged firms to create value for its shareholders.22
1.3.5 Changes in targeting patterns during and after the crisis
Following the recent financial crisis, we analyze the activist’s behaviour to investigate whether
there is any significant change in targeting patterns of fund activism. To examine the changes
theoretically, particularly in post–crisis period, we go through the Schedule 13D filings
mainly Item 4 to obtain information on activist purpose of transaction. In addition, to gain up-
dates on fund activism in target firms, we further search for related development in financial
press. While analyzing theoretically, we emphasize on two aspects; first, following the crisis,
what are those potential venues which an activist identifies for value generation? Second,
given the restrained circumstances for liquidity, how an activist manages its financing for
activism?23
To analyze changes in targeting patterns empirically, we examine the event data by
generating a dummy variable for the crisis which takes value 1 if a certain type of activism
occurs during the period starting from July 2007 to December 2013. In table 1.6, the event
summary is decomposed for the periods before and after the crisis into two separate panels.
A comparative overview of panel B and panel C depicts an even distribution of the events.
To test whether a specific type of activism is exercised relatively more following the crisis,
we carry out nonparametric analysis by using Wilcoxon signrank test for the statistical
significance for difference in medians in pre– and post-crisis period.
To begin with target’s capital structure, we test whether crisis has affected the activists’
approach in targeting firm to intervene in capital structure, we find that the median difference
between events in crisis period marginally differs than the events before the crisis. For
post–crisis Schedule 13D reported events which account for 38% of entire sample period, of
22In an auxiliary tabulated result, we find that average probability of a firm being selected for fund activism
is approximately 30%.
23Since the financial crisis, a paradigm shift has been experienced in fund activism. There are certain
components which are more exposed to activists, for example, lack of leverage, M&As, governance issues. On
the other hand, funds are also facing shortage of liquidity to acquire large stake in firms for longer period. Thus,
to investigate these aspects in the wake of crisis would be an interesting subject.
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them 40% cases of capital structure come from post–crisis period. This figure is economically
justifiable. Since financial crisis, the target firms experienced high leverage and constraints in
financing their business, thus appeared as a potential target for activism. In addition, we also
find significant change in patterns for the activists targeting firms’ internal governance during
crisis. Ousting CEOs, formation of boards, and aligning performance–based compensation
were norms of financial crisis. For the activists who do not intend to intervene in targets at
managerial level proactively, are found distinguishably different than pre–crisis period at 1%
level. The activists intervening in targets to reform their businesses including operational
efficiency, to make better deals in M&As show no significant difference even during crisis.
Next we discuss the firms characteristics targeted during and after the financial crisis
in the year before activism. Table 1.10 provides the results obtained from nonparametric
analysis for the firms targeted during the period from 2007 to 2013. We report mean, median,
and standard deviation of both target and matching firms sample. The last two columns report
the Wilcoxon signed rank test for the difference in the medians between targets and matching
sample firms. All figures are annual and retrieved from using Datastream. We compute
proxies for firm size, operating and financial performance, debt capacities, profitability,
investment, and valuation.24
The characteristics of target firms in the year before activism during crisis period demon-
strate that firms are small in size when measured in terms of market capitalization. The
median difference between target and nontarget is negatively 3.71 million dollar, which
is distinguishably different from zero at 5% level of statistical significance. In terms of
valuation, the difference in medians for Tobin’s Q is positive which 0.85 points and signifi-
cant at 1% level indicating that following the financial crisis, activists targeted valued stock.
Looking at operational performance measured by net sales and sales growth, we find that
nontarget firms are outperformed by target firms during and post crisis period. The median
difference in net sales is approximately 163 million dollar, which is statistically significant
at 5%. During this period, targets sales growth positively increased by 4%, however, the
difference is not statistically significant. In addition, target firms reduced excess cash by 7%
as compared to nontarget firms in the year before activism. We also find that during this
period, target firms highly paid their investors in terms of dividend yield, thus the reduction
in cash could be used in paying dividends. Target firms are relatively more leveraged in the
year before activism as shown by market leverage ratio which is marginally significant at 10%.
24Variables are well-defined in table 1.1
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To measure the conditional probability of each covariate in firm selection, we compute
the propensity score for each firm characteristic using logit p-score model within year. To
do so, we primarily start our both samples for targets and nontargets from year 2007 to
2013. Then we extract observations for firm accounting measures in lagged year before fund
activism. To facilitate our matching procedure, we also include 2–digit SIC codes, and year.
In order to mitigate any possibility of outliers, we winsorize variables at 1% level. Of 551
target firms from 2000 to 2013, approximately half of the firms (263) fall during crisis period
from 2007 to 2013. On the contrary, in nontarget firms sample, roughly about 61% firms
(545) constitute crisis period. Thus, we find at a minimum one matching firm for each target
firm.
Table 1.11 presents estimates on targeted firms characteristics in comparison with nontar-
get firms using propensity score matching during crisis period. An overview of the results
depict that using propensity score, we possibly obtain closed matches between two samples
as shown by the differences between treated and control. However, using score matching
to reduce selection bias and differences may not hold for some characteristics, for instance,
difference between treated and control for ROA and R&D is exceptionally large enough to
influence the treatment probability. To test the hypothesis whether target firms during crisis
do not differ in terms of characteristics from matching sample firms, we use t-statisics using
pstest procedure in an untabulated results and find that target firms during crisis differ from
matching sample firms. Moreover we also find that the average probability or propensity
score for a firm to be a target for fund activism based on characteristics is 32%. We also
observe that by excluding cash variable for which we have less observations in sample,
this increases to 38%. In addition, the number of exact match also varies depending upon
covariates to measure the propensity score.
1.4 Fund activism and stock returns performance
To address the principal question of value creation through activism is our primary concern.
In this section, we investigate how activists strategically target the firm in order to extract the
returns and whether activism actually produces value for the shareholders. Second, how does
the market perceive and reacts to the suggested measures of the activists? In answering these
questions, we analyze the target firms performance in short–run and as well in the long–term.
In the short-run, the impacts of activism–related measures are assessed by the market reaction
and proxied by stock returns around the announcement date. In the long–term, the activists
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impacts are examined by improvement in accounting and finacial performance in targets.
1.4.1 Short–run announcement returns for targets
To measure the immediate reaction of market to the activist’s announcement, we utilize
an event study approach. Numerous studies have used this methodology to empirically
examine the effect of corporate events on a firm’s stock price around the announcement
days. A well-developed literature begins with Dolley (1933) study of examining the effect
of stock split in nominal price. In the late decade of 1960s the seminal studies by Ball and
Brown (1968), and Fama et al. (1969) introduced improvements which provide foundation
for today’s methodology.
Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) investigate the issues which are related with violation of
statistical properties in event studies methodologies. A key issue with daily stock returns is
non–normality as identified by Fama (1976) and as a consequence the distribution of daily
stock returns tends to fat–tailed compared to normal distribution. Brown and Warner (1985)
find similar evidence in excess returns by examining the properties of small sample. To
this specific problem, Billingsley (1979) proposes Central Limit Theorem and argues that
if the cross–sectional excess returns in securities are drawn from independent and identi-
cally distributed samples from finite variance distributions, then the distribution of mean
excess returns converges to normality as the size of sample increases. To the fact that non–
normality does exist in event studies, our sample size is large enough to rule out such problem.
Prior fund activism-related studies have used rigorously event study methodology to
examine the effect of fund announcement on the target firm stock price around the notifica-
tion dates (for details, see, (Boyson and Mooradian, 2011; Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur,
2006)).25
To compute the abnormal returns in target firms around the annoucement days, Fama
and French (1993) three factor model is preferred over the returns from passively targeted
matching firms. Two important reasons are argued; first, by matching on these three attributes,
we control for systematic risk associated with stock returns and financial characteristics
related with firm-type (see, e.g., Klein and Zur (2006)). Second, this approach provides a
25In recent periods, the application of event study approach could be seen in various fields of Economics and
Finance; In Financial Economics (Brav and Gompers (1997)), Accounting performance (Bhagat et al. (2001)),
and Finance and Law (Bhagat and Romano (2002)).
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comparative analysis for our results with prior fund activism-related studies who have used
equally or value-weighted market index or portfolios to compute abnormal returns.
The adaptation of event study approach in fund activism analyses is critically viewed as
it contrasts with the essence of methodology which necessarily requires that the event should
be unpredictable by the market. In other words, the critics argue that fund announcement
in target firm is a likely event which is perceived in well–advance before the disclosure of
notification date, thus this approach is subject to misspecification. To counter this narrative,
we argue that our suggested relatively longer estimation window should induce all such
information and as a result, the market reaction to the event date should be neutral. However,
we show that prior to the fund announcement, the market behaves normally and reacts to the
fund notification overwhelmingly.26 In addition, it is the activist who evaluates the target
and declares the intent to intervene in firm’s ordinary course of business which is completely
indepedent from market assessment. Thus, market is most likely unawared by the fund
announcement and unanticipated course of action.
In order to prevent the event from influencing the normal performance model parameter
estimates, we construct an estimation window of 120 days as suggested by MacKinlay (1997).
For each target firm, we extract daily stock price 150 days prior to the event date and restrict
it to 30 days before the given filing or announcement date. An estimation window of four
months or (–150, –30) 120 days will likely account for any non-linearity in time series
patterns in normal return fluctuations.27
Building on the methodologies proposed by Greenwood and Schor (2009); MacKinlay




Where RTargetiτ is (logarithmic) normal return on the target firm security and R
Match
τ is
the (logarithmic) return on the matching portfolio security. To compute abnormal return
for each target firm, we use Fama and French (1993) well-constructed six valued–weighted
portfolios formed on size, and book-to-market value. These Fama and French (1993)
26In later analysis, we show the patterns in market behaviour by constructing multiple event–windows to
demonstrate that as soon as the information content is perceieved by the market, it begins to discount all factors
associated with the event and reflects into the firm stock price around the annoucement days.
27In sample, a small number of target firms (approximately 6%) do not provide an array of stock prices
for 150 days prior to the event date for certain reasons. To such insignificant cases, we generate surrogate
observations by taking average of closest period values.
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three factors include High minus Low (HML), Small minus Big (SMB), and market return
factor.28 We subtract each announcement observation in excess of aforementioned factors to







In the next stage, we test the hypothesis whether mean cumulative abnormal returns are
different than zero or equivalently fund announcement has no effect on target firm stock price.
To test whether these abnormal returns are statistically significant, we use standard Z test.
To examine the market reaction to fund involvement around the announcement days, we
construct event-windows of different sizes. Figure 1.1 plots mean CARs for targets over
the longest event-window of (–20, +5) or 26 days covering pre and post announcement
dates. The evolving pattern in returns reveals insignificant movements in the early days but
as market perceives the fund presence, a positive and significant response emerges from
the market. The US stock market is characterized as well-informed and highly liquid, it
immediately responses to fund’s transaction and reflects it into price level. An equally
important question arises that up to what extent market reacts to this transaction or in other
words how much CARs in aggregate are fully realized. There is price run-up which keeps on
rising sharply and as a result, there is realization of more than 5% CARs for event window of
(-20, +5) days. Figure 1.2 and figure 1.3 decompose the total CARs in pre and post–crisis
period to know which part of observations is mainly deriving positive returns. A depiction
of figure 1.2 clearly demonstrates that pre–crisis fund announcements are well-rewarded
by market long before the fund notification by generating about 7% CARs, however, on the
contrary, in post–crisis period, only positive CARs are realized merely one day before the
fund notification and hardly marks 3%. These results are in line with Becht et al. (2010)
who find a sharp fall in CARs approximately by half (10.5% - 5.8%) over the period 2006 -
2010. To significant shortfall in abnormal returns during the crisis period, they argue for the
potential collapse of the takeover markets and liquidity.
There is a general concensus over positive response of market to fund announcement.
The short-run performance is consistent with prior research on fund activism. As Brav
et al. (2008) document an aggregate of 7.2% buy-and-hold returns (BHARs) in excess of
buy–and–hold returns on the value weighted NY SE/AMEX/NASDAQ index over an event
28Portfolios formed on size and book to market can easily be downloaded from [1]Fama-French web-
site.[http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html]
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window of (–20, +20) 41 days. Using a longer panel of targets over the period of 1994 to
2005, Boyson and Mooradian (2011) find similar results and report 9% to 11% for filing and
event date respectively. In an recent study, Becht et al. (2010) analyze market response to
fund disclosure and report that for a relatively longer event window of 41 days, about 6.9%
abornormal returns are generated. In contrast with positive response, an early study by Klein
and Zur (2006) documents some mixed findings. Their reported figures suggest an array
of different ranges of CARs from 5.0% to 10.3% over multiple period event windows when
abnormal returns are computed using market index. However, when event firms are matched
on industry/size/book-to-market, the size-adjusted mean returns are negatively significant.
To identify the early –10 (–20, –10) days effect, we break-up the event window to (–10,
+5) days to capture the close impacts of 13D filing on stock prices. Interestingly, there is no
significant change to CARs. This finding suggests that fund’s intent of acquiring firm has been
conveyed to the market and thus the information content has been discounted long before the
fund formal notification about activism. Table 1.12 illustrates the various event windows and
their subsequent CARs. Reviewing the aggregate returns for each window, it appears that a
large portion of returns accrue just prior to the event or announcement date. The run–up spike
follows early days which is depicted by (–10, +5) event window. A drastic change in trading
volume is observed in (-10, +5) day event window generating 5.14% CARs in excess of the
market returns demonstrating an immediate outcome of acquiring a substantial stake in the
target in the short-run. However, post-announcement day scenario differs. We observe that
the CARs reduce approximately by half in (0, +10) event window which indicates that market
has exhausted all available information about volume of transaction and activist explicit
purpose of targeting firm.
1.4.2 Types of activism and event–days abnormal returns
In previous analyses, enough light has been shed on how activist proposes the purpose of
transaction in Schedule 13D filing. These stated objectives are classified broadly into two
types; active versus non-active role. Activists identify potential venues for improvement in
target firm’s value and specify a plan of action. We gather the qualitative information from
13D Filings Section 4 known as "Purpose of Transaction" about fund’s type of action and
classify them into five widely well–defined categories partly following Brav et al. (2008). In
this section, we examine the heterogeneity in market perceptions about fund’s particular type
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of activism and investigate that which type of activism generates more returns for the fund
by constructing univariate settings:
CARsi = αi+βiTypei+ εi (1.3)
Where CARsi presents abnormal returns for firm i in aggregate manners obtained from mul-
tiple event windows, and only explanatory variable Typei indicates the well–defined type
of activism based on fund initial stated objective. Table 1.13 explains the cross–sectional
distribution of expected CARs accruing to various types of activism.
In table 1.13, column I to IV illustrate the regression results after regressing CARs of
multiple event–windows against well-defined types of activism. Following the prior literature
(Boyson and Mooradian, 2011), the estimated coefficients would be interpreted as market
reaction to each type of activism explicitly stated in fund purpose of transaction. In order to
control for potential unobserved heterogeneity in returns over time, we control for the target
firm size (measured as natural logarithm of market value), year and industry dummies. The
long term debt is expressed as the ratio of long term debt to the aggregate of total debt and
market value of equity. The model includes dummies for General Undervaluation, Capital
Structure, Business Strategy, Sale of Target, Governance. We winsorize firm size and long
term debt at 1% level.
Since the model mostly incorporates dummies, to facilitate the interpretation of the
coefficients on dummy variables, we follow the practice of suppressing the intercept of the
regressions as suggested in previous fund–related literature (see, e.g., Boyson and Mooradian
(2011); Brav et al. (2008)). In addition, the nondummy variables, which include the size of
the target and long term debt are demeaned and expressed in the form of deviation. As a
result, the coefficients on dummies can be interpreted as the average effect of a specific group
of type of activism on abnormal returns with the assumption that the targets demonstrate
average characteristics.
Table 1.13 presents the effects of covariates on CARs of different event windows around
the announcement of Schedule 13D. In column I, CARs from longest (–20, +5) event window
are regressed against the activism dummies, firm size, and the long-term debt. The estimates
of all dummies are positive which indicates the proportionate contribution of each type of
activism in generating the mean abnormal returns. The fund proposing as to change capital
structure of target is successful in generating highest mean CARs of 12.2 percentage which
is positively significant at 5% level. The returns to capital structure are likely justified in
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the wake of the recent crisis in which most of the targets got financailly depressed because
of imbalances in capital structure specifically in leverage ratio. Following returns to capital
structure, activists who intent to bring changes to target business strategy likewise restructur-
ing or spinning off are generating a mean CARs of 9.2% which distinguishes from zero at
5% significance level. Activists with no pre-specifying purpose of transaction are rewarded
the least with a mean CARs of 2.8% which is marginally significant in the longest (–20,
+5) event window. We critically observe another pattern in returns arising from general
undervaluation category which shows that as the news of fund notificaiton approaches to date
of announcement, the returns eventually increase.
Given the non-mutually exclusive nature of types of activism, an activist can generate an
aggregate abnormal returns by getting involved in different types of activism simultaneously.
To explain it further, for instance, a fund may suggest its initial objective to change capital
structure but later on it may propose additional measures to firm’s business strategy, thus
could cause to generate an aggregate abnormal return of 21.4% (12.2% + 9.2%). However, if
these changes are proposed in the beginning of the first filing, it is less likely to identify the
source to which suggestion market reacts most. In table 1.13 column II, CARs from relatively
shorter (-10, +5) event window are regressed on the set of similar explanatory variables. As a
result, the magnitudes of estimates reduce considerably, nonetheless, they remain persistently
significant. We explain this differential effect in returns arising from systematic intervals
in event windows as market mechanism of discounting the information long before a fund
making formal announcement. Column III, and IV explain it further by extending days
in post announcement period and show how the coefficients on types of activism become
gradually marginally significant. Summarizing the cross–section distribution of abnormal
returns, we observe that the market reacts remarkably to the anticipated changes to firms’
capital structure and business related activism and reflects an immediate positive reaction
into stock prices. On the other hand, market persistently generates abnormal returns to the
announcement of funds who merely engage with firm’s management on regular basis and do
no specify a particular course of action.
These results are in-line with the previously reported studies on activism impact on
returns. Brav et al. (2008) find that market reacts most and generates positively significant
abnormal returns of 8.54% to the announcement of fund stating its goal to spin off a certain
segment of firm and followed by fund who reveals its intent to engage with management
without any intervention. Using relatively a longer panel Boyson and Mooradian (2011)
document that the fund putting up its stated agenda as to intervene in target’s governance
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are highly rewarded by price appreciation with a significant CARs of 38.5%. The remaining
activism-motives other than governance though generate positive abnormal returns but are
not distinguishable from zero.29
In summarizing, we may conclude that in short–run market responses to the fund an-
nouncement and generates positive abnormal returns. We also find that market perceives each
type of activism distinctively different by discounting the information it receives about fund
announcement and reflects into stock price. The question of generating high abnormal returns
subjects to level and degree of activism. In general, the findings in this study are consistent
with previous studies on the aspect of positive abnormal returns in short–run, however the vari-
ations in cross–section of abnormal returns are attributed to differently composed datasets and
approaches to detect them. In addition, prior studies examining the market reaction to fund
activism have been using pre–crisis period which is distinguishable factor to be accounted for.
1.4.3 Crisis effect
1.4.3.1 Abnormal returns around the announcement days in post financial crisis
To examine the crisis impact on fund activism, we revisit the model used in section 1.4.2 and
incorporate the crisis dummy in it. In addition, we include non-dummies specifications in-
cluding size of the firm (natural logarithm of market capitalization) and long-term debt (ratio
of natural logarithm of long term debt to the sum of natural logarithm of total debt and market
value of equity). Both variables are demeaned and presented in a deviation form. The panel
regressions regress dependent variable CARs on multiple event windows against dummies of
activism, crisis dummy, and size of the firm. We control for industry and year fixed effects in
all panels. To observe the mean effect of each type of activism, we suppress the intercept term.
Table 1.14 reports the regression results after incorporating the crisis dummy. The coef-
ficient on the crisis dummy is positively significant. Unlike results reported in table 1.13,
the coefficients on stated objectives appear with mixed results (both positive and negative),
however, quite surprisingly none of the estimate is statistically significant across the event
windows of multiple lengths. Our interest, however lies in central variable of interest crisis
which is positive and in part explains variations in abnormal returns around the announcement
dates. How market responded to activist’s announcement regardless any specific objective,
29Klein and Zur (2006) report BHARs returns for activism types but in a slightly different way which are
significantly positive.
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figure 1.3 as an evidence, indicates the real effect by reflecting the downfall in returns during
the crisis period around the announcement dates.
In the next stage, we examine the cross–section of abnormal returns during the crisis
period to investigate how size of the firm in part explains the differential effect in returns.
In addition, we also create interactive terms of crisis with types of activism to analyze the
effectiveness of each type during crisis period. In general, each coefficient on the interactive
term would be interpreted as the mean effect of crisis on each type of activism. In later
analysis, we argue for the composition of these variables.
Table 1.15 revisits the previous model with interactive terms and reports the results for
multiple event windows. The activist funds proposing structural improvement in target’s
business direction earn most of abnormal returns in longest (–20, +5) event window. This
result is consistent with Becht et al. (2010) findings who report that during crisis takeovers
likewise mergers and acquisitions appeared to be a potential source of generating value. The
abnormal returns from business – related activism are competitively followed by those funds
who put forward their agenda to intervene in financially depressed firms.30 During recent
crisis, default of firm or fund appeared as norm, and forced either voluntarily or involuntarily
to be sued in courts. Given such circumstances, if fund appeared to assist and reorganize
target’s business and reduce debts, then such involvement is highly appreciated from the
market. However, approximately 10% CARs are realized merely marginally at 10% level.
In relatively shorter (-10, +5) event window, coefficient on General Undervalue becomes
significant indicating that market is more responsive to the funds aquiring firms without any
pre-specifying agenda. Funds without any specified stated goal earns more than 8% in excess
of matching sample firms. This in turn contrasts with results presented in table 1.13 which
reports that funds serving no active role are rewarded by 3.9% immediately in short period.
Interestingly, net gain to nonactive role increases during crisis.
Comparing the results obtained in table 1.15 and table 1.13, two distinct emerging trends
are observed. First, since the financial crisis, it is more popular to invest in a financially
depressed firm. Firms which experienced inadequate liquidity and operating capital to run
business are largely affected during crisis. Activists viewed such firms potential venue which
could be exploited to generate returns by appearing as collaborative force. For example when
Brookfield Retail Holdings LLC acquired General Growth Properties, Inc stating that firm
30Chapter 11 is a legal process which allows both coordiantors including firm and fund to reorganize the
target business and pay the debts over time.
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has bankrupted and it requires re-organization.
Firms which require more liquid assets and capital to run business are largely affected
during crisis. To improve on their business direction, activists find potential to provide
liquidity to restructure non-functional segments and assist firm to get on track. Contrary to
this finding, it is more profitable to restructure firms debts in full sample period which is
evidenced in table 1.13, where highest cross–sectional returns are attributed to fund whose
stated goal is to reform capital structure.
Second, regardless crisis effect, a bulk of abnormal returns are driven by business–related
activism. For full sample period, it generates more than 9% returns, which increases by
4.2 percentage points with crisis effect. It indicates that business related activities which
involve restructuring business, bargaining for better terms in mergers and acquisitions, and
emphasizing on growth opportunities are more profitable across any economic situation.
Table 1.16 presents results for model using full specifications of crisis and interactive
terms. We regress CARs obtained from three different event-windows across types of activism
and crisis interactive terms with and without industry fixed effects. From column (1) to (9),
we find that estimates for types of activism become insignificantly negative in the period
before crisis across multiple event-windows. For the firms targeted without any pre-specified
stated objective, however the effect is significantly negative without incorporating year
dummies. These results entirely contrast with post-crisis period. The coefficients on crisis
interactive terms are insignificantly positive in models when crisis dummy is used. Crisis
being highly correlated with interactive terms, we drop it from model and gain results which
are significantly positive. Results from various models suggest that market highly appreciates
the fund announcement with stated objective of influencing target’s business strategy, which
is persistently prounces without year effect. Following it, funds without pre-specifying
objective of interfering in target firms are highly rewarded from market with approximately
10% CARs.
These findings initially suggest that positively significant abnormal returns are primarily
driven by post-crisis period despite the economic downturn and heavy losses in stock markets.
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1.5 Activism and long–term performance
1.5.1 Model, notations, and analysis
The long–term impact of fund activism on target firm’s performance has been assessed
using several methodologies.31 In section 1.9 we initially established in our discussion
that an activist targets a firm based on certain observables. Thus our analysis is bounded
under assumption of unconfoundedness in which we observe some factors related with both
dependent variable and with error term (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Given this particular
setting, we identify propensity score which allows us to assess the conditional probability of
a firm being selected for activism.
In this section and in what follows, we analyze the impact of fund activism on target
firms in succeeding year using propensity score matching. Initially, the standard formation
of unit-level causal effect is modeled partly following Roy–Rubin model (Roy, 1951; Rubin,
1974) as:32
τi = Yit1−Yit0 (1.4)
Where Yit1 is a potential outcome for firm i after receiving treatment in post-activism year
1, and Yit0 is counterfactual outcome for firm i before receiving treatment in pre-activism
year 0. The potential outcome is defined as Yi(Di) for each firm i, where i = 1,2...,N and N
represents the total population. However, we observe only one outcome for each firm i, i.e.,
counterfactual outcome which is unobserved during the analysis and leading to the problem
of misevaluation. To resolve this issue, Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) suggest to concentrate
on average treatment effect rather than individual treatment effect τi.
To assess the average effects of activism for a well–constructed sample representing
entire population, generally two eminent estimators are used namely average treatment effect
(ATE), and average treatment effect on the treated (ATT or ATET). Since we are interested
in those firms which are selected on certain observables and exposed to fund activism — in
31Ideally, a standard Di f f erence− in−Di f f erence approach is considered a suitable mechanism to estimate
the average effects in a setting where the firms are targeted randomly on unobservable characteristics (Blundell
and Dias, 2009; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). In a simplest setting, the average gain over time in control
group is substracted from the gain over time in the target group. Thus, in doing so, differencing helps mitigate
biases in second period on both dimensions time wise as well as cross-sectional.
32 Roy – Robin model with trivial notations has been adopted in evaluation literature (see, Heckman and
Navarro-Lozano (2004)). In this study, the generic functional form of treatment effect is presented in similar
fashion.
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addition, the targeted firms are matched with another control group which is less likely prone
to activism— thus ATT is more relevant expression to estimate the activism impact. 33 The
average treatment on the treated is parameterized as:
τAT T = E(τ | D = 1) = E[Y1 | D = 1]−E[Y0 | D = 1] (1.5)
However Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) argue that counterfactual mean for the firms
being targeted – E[Y0 | D = 1] is not observed, so we need a proper substitute for it in order
to estimate ATT. The true parameter τAT T is only identified, if:
E[Y0 | D = 1]−E[Y0 | D = 0] (1.6)
1.5.1.1 Long–term performance using propensity score matching approach
In this section, we examine the target firms performance using propensity score matching
approach based on assumption that firms are targeted on observables.
In table 1.17, we regress the change in firm characteristic as a dependent variable against
"Activism Dummy" with using vector of control specifications. The coefficient on activism
dummy which indicates average treatment effect after being targeted and would be interpreted
as activism impact on firm’s accounting performance. To control for fixed effects, we include
firm size (measured as natural logarithm of market capitalization) both in linear and quadratic
form, industry, and year dummies. We include the observations for which we find close
match in controlling sample firms based on propensity score.
Table 1.17 presents some interesting results. The coefficient on net change in cash is
negatively significant at 1% level. This initially implies that target firms substantially reduced
the excess cash as compared to the year prior to fund activism and thus reduced the chances
of being exposed to agency issues related with holding excess cash. In addition, one year
long-term accounting performance exhibits that firms experienced overwhelmingly increased
investment and improved profitability as indicated by change in capital expenditure and profit
margin variables.
In comparison with results presented in table 1.17 in time-series setting, we are keenly
interested in long-term performance compared to matching firms. Table 1.18 presents the
33Drawing samples (target and nontarget) from similar sample of activists funds (representing sub-population)
also arise serious concerns over selection — a problem of endogeniety, which will be discussed in following
analysis.
42
Activism and long–term performance
results in excess of matching sample firms one year following the activism. In doing so, we
revisit the previous setting and substract the matching firm characteristic from target firm.
The net change in firm characteristic is regressed against Activism Dummy, and vector of
control specifications. Since for each characteristic variable, the number of matches differ
between target and nontarget firms, thus each regression experiences different number of
observations.
While discussing the results, we find that the coefficient on activism dummy is significant
for various dependent variables (change in firm characteristic). Target firms remarkably
improve market value comapred to matching sample firms post-activism one year, however
only marginally significant at 10% level. In terms of valuation, the book-to-market value
is positively significant. Moreover, the targets profitability (measured by return on assets)
also positively significant at 5% level. While comparing with matching firms debt capacity
in post-activism period, target firms experience fairly reduction in market leverage by 0.39
percentage points which is however marginally significant.
Summarizing these results obtained from using propensity score approach, target firms
experience improvement in various components which may include valuation, profitability
and investment both in time-series and cross-sectional analyses. These significant improve-
ments are initially attributed to activists suggested measures in target firms.
1.5.1.2 Long–term performance using difference-in-difference approach
In section 1.5.1.1, we primarily assume that firms are targeted based on observable character-
istics thus there is potential issue of bias sample selection. To resolve it, we evaluate the target
firms’ performance for entire period of analysis using propensity score matching approach.
In contrast with propensity score methodology, we use a standard difference-in-difference
approach by relaxing the assumption that firms are selected nonrandomly. We assume that
counterfactual levels for target and nontarget firms are different but time invariably remains
the same, and thus formulate it as:
E[Y0t1−Y0t0 | D = 1]−E[Y0t1−Y0t0 | D = 0] (1.7)
Following prior documented studies on hedge fund activism (Bebchuk et al., 2014;
Boyson and Mooradian, 2011; Brav et al., 2008; Greenwood and Schor, 2009; Klein and Zur,
2006), we extend the empirical evidence and test the hypothesis whether hedge fund activism
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actually improves the targets’ performance in the long–term.
To evaluate the long-term performance in targets, we analyze the firms characteristics
in one year following activism and compare them with matching sample firms. By do-
ing so, our analysis will provide us comparison on two dimensions; first, we compare the
results of post–activism year with the results obtained in pre-activism year (time–series
analysis), second, to compare with the performance of the matching sample firms in the
year following activism (cross-sectional analysis). As a result, the improved changes may
be attributed to the suggested measures by activist funds, assuming other factors remain equal.
To analyze the ex-post performance in target firms in succeeding year following ac-
tivism, we adopt two approaches. In first approach, we assemble a matching sample using a
benchmark of size/book–to–market value/ 2–digit SIC industry code in the same year. Then
compute the difference in means in pre and post-activism means, and medians for target and
matching sample firms. Then, a test of differences between change in medians is used as
proposed by Boyson and Mooradian (2011). In second approach using time-series setting,
we compare the characteristics of targets in pre and post activism and test the difference in
medians.
Table 1.20 presents the characteristics of targets in the year after activism and compares
them with matching firms. For the events taking place in 2013 and onward, Datastream is
unable to provide data for the next fiscal year. Thus, in such cases, sample drops firms. In
addition to this, many firms in the sample in first year of post–activism are either delisted,
acquired, merged or simply did not produce data.34 All variables are winsorized at 1%. The
entire set of variables are annual and the accounting data is extracted using Datastream.
In table 1.20 from column I to columm IV, the change in means and medians in target
and nontargets are reported respectively. Column V and IV exhibit the difference in change
in medians for the targets and report the Wilcoxon signed rank test values to demonstrate the
level of significance in the difference in medians.
34When a fund announces 13D Filing with a pre-specified purpose, it suggests measures and asserts influence
to implement its plan of actions over the course of activism. In some cases, these actions prolong and outcomes
are realized in the later period. To receive all such outcomes, fund keeps on increasing its ownership and thus
fully buyout the target. In this case, target goes private from public and get delisted. On the other hand, fund
forces its portfolio firm A to acquire another portfolio firm B to get high premium. In these cases, database
does not provide data for post-activism period.
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To assess the long–term impacts of activism on target firms’ performance, we analyze
firm valuation, operational performance, and profitability measures as argued by Brav et al.
(2008) that ROA and operating profit margin are reasonable measures which largely remain
unaffected by nonoperational factors such as leverage and corporate taxes. Starting with
difference in medians for target firms Tobin’s Q has reduced merely by 7% as compare to
80% in matched firms, which suggests that targets have gained much appreciation in value
compared to their peers during the course of activism. The net value of Tobin’s Q in excess
of matched sample is 0.73 points which is undistinguishably different than zero at the level
of 5%. This finding is strongly supported by the change in book–to–market value. Activists
targeted firms improve their book to market value by 0.03 in contrast with 4% reduction in
nontargets value. The net value of 7% is positively significant at 1%. These results provide
explanation to the activists pre-activism intentions which describe their targets undervalued
in most cases and suggest that activists are much successful in improving the targets value.
The reason why many targets become delisted following activism is largely explained by the
improvement in their value. Activists capitalize on their value and sell them at premium to
potential acquirer (for details, see, Greenwood and Schor (2009)).
In analyzing the targets operating profit margin (expressed as ratio of earnings before
interest and taxes by net revenues) and growth (percentage change in sales), the findings
are interesting. Activists are much successful in maintaing the level of profit margin to the
year before activism. Viewing the difference in targets profitability in pre and post period
might induce perception that the firms merely sustain the pre-activism profit margin, however
they have indeed outperformed the nontargets matched at size/book to market/2 digit SIC
industry. Decomposing this ratio (EBIT / Net Sales) and tracking back to the change in sales,
we can observe that difference in sales is not that large enough and not distinguishable from
zero. This finding evidently supports the view that activists’ targets perform much better than
their peers. Further extending the analysis, we examine the comparative trends in growth in
targets sales. The time-series patterns emerging from chages in growth reveal that there is a
reduction of 2 percentage points following activism. Nonetheless, targets lead their peers by
3% which is positively significant at 5% level.
On the side of investment, the capital expenditures (% of total assets) improved substan-
tially following activist involvement. On the contrary, the matched firms reduce largely their
spendings on assets. In this study, a large portion of firms is drawn from manufacturing
industry (36% and 33% for targets and nontargets respectively) and implies meaningful
interpretation of such change in capital structure. A net real effect of 4 percentage points
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which is positively significant at 5% level is attributed to the impacts of hedge fund activism.
Summarizing the post-activsm accounting and financial performance of the targets, we
may conclude that there is significant evidence that activists facilitate the poorly–performing
firms in improving their long-term value. An assessment of targets valuation, profitability,
and investment exhibit that targets outperformed their peers. These findings are in contrast
with one strand of literature which documents that activists extract short-run returns on the
cost of long–term value destruction. Instead, we find evidence that shareholders not only
benefit in the short–run but also realize value enhancement in target firms in long-term by
the measures suggested by the activists.
1.6 Long–term performance in crisis period
1.6.1 Regression analysis
1.6.1.1 Model, notations, and analysis
In this section, we test two competing hypotheses. In first hypothesis, we test whether
and how recent finacial crisis has affected the long–term performance of target firms. To
examine crisis effect, we divide target firms sample into two distinctive subgroups; in pre-
and post-crisis period. For pre-crisis period, we include all firms targeted between 2000 to
2006. For post-crisis period, we investigate those firms targeted during 2007 to 2013.
Table 1.21 demonstrate some interesting results for time-series nonparametric analysis.
We compute summary statistics for both samples before and after the crisis period. An
overview of the difference in medians depict that crisis has substantially affected the target
firms in terms of size, profit margin, leverage, distribution, and investment. Firm size which
is measured by various means including market capitalization, sales, and assets is positively
statistically significant implying that firm size being an important factor explains partly
variation in the long-term performance.
The recent financial crisis has undoubtedly affected the profitability of target firms. The
difference in medians for profit margin, measured by return on assets exhibits 4 percentage
points which is negatively significant at 1%. To add more evidence, profit ratio also reduce
by 2% for the firms targeted during the crisis period. To examine the crisis impact on target’s
debt capacity, our book and market leverage values suggest that firms reduce their leverage
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during crisis period, however, the difference in medians are statistically insignificant. On the
contrary, the leverage ratio (measured by total debt to total assets) indicates that target firms
have remarkably increased their leverage following the financial crisis. To investigate the
underlying factors for deriving higher leverage in firms, we look into the investment measures
by assuming that higher leverage might have used to initiate new investment projects. We find
that target firms experience increase in research and development and capital structure by 2.4
percentage points and 2% respectively which are positively significant at 1%. To investigate
how distribution policy is affected by crisis in target firms? We observe that the median obser-
vations for dividend yield are zero for both samples before and after the crisis. To evaluate it,
alternatively, we test the difference in means which is negatively statistically significant at 5%,
thus showing that target firms following crisis period reduce paying dividends to shareholders.
These results are partly consistent with those obtained in table 1.19, in which we analyze
the firms’ performance one year before and after the activism in time-series analysis without
considering the crisis effect. We find that size, profitability, and leverage (market leverage)
behave in similar way. The differential effect in both section of analyses suggest the part of
sample deriving significant results.
In table 1.22, we evaluate the target firms’ performance in excess of matching firms
before and after the crisis period.35 The differences in medians suggest some mixed findings.
Firm size in excess of matching sample firms is larger by 1.4 percentage points which is
significant at 5% level. We experience positive effect for size when measured by net revenues
and assets, however statistically insignificant.
In terms of valuation, targets outperform the nontargets in post-crisis period which is
significant at 1% level. In addition, target firms find remarkable increase in investment
measured by capital expenditures in the post-crisis period. However, following crisis, targets
experience higher leverage which is strongly evidenced by positively significant difference in
medians for book leverage and leverage ratio. We also find that targets profit margin reduce
35The change in firm characterisitc is computed for both target and nontarget before and after the crisis
period. To simplify it by an example, we assume the change in market capitalization, i.e., MV:
∆Characteristic = MV t2007−13−MV t2000−06−MV m2007−13−MV m2000−06 (1.8)
Where MV t2007−13 is the average market value for target firms sample during 2007 to 2013, MV
t
2000−06 is the
average market value for target firms sample during 2000 to 2006, MV m2007−13 is the average market value for
matching firms sample during 2007 to 2013, MV m2000−06 is the average market value for matching firms during
2000 to 2006.
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in the post-crisis period which is marginally significant at 10%.
In comparison with results in table 1.20, the findings in this analysis partly share some
commonalities. For instance, the target firms experience improvement in valuation, invest-
ment, and distribution.
To test our second hypothesis, we examine the performance in a similar set of firms
which are targeted in pre-crisis period and remain target for fund activism in next two years
following the crisis. We evaluate these firms’ performance in two years before and after
the crisis. By doing so, we expect that change in performance may allow us to attribute it
to the fund activism in excess of matching firms during the crisis period. Initially we have
a setting, where target and nontarget firms are exposed to an exogenous shock i.e., crisis
and we address the fundamental question whether target firms perform better than matching
firms during the crisis period. Instead of evaluating the outcome variable before and after the
treatment, we evaluate the change in outcome variable before and after the activism in pre
and post crisis period. To make our analysis simple, we relax the assumption that targets are
selected on observables.36
Our difference-in-difference setting initially parameterizes the crisis effect in a simple
regression model as:
∆Characteristicsit = αi+βiPresence+ γiDummyi+θiControli+ εi (1.9)
Where ∆Characteristics is the change in a specific characteristic before and after the
crisis period in excess of matching sample firm. The explanatory variable Dummy takes a
value of 1 if a firm is targeted during that year (during the period when we analyze the change
in characteristic) by any other activist. Presence is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if
activist fund is still present in firm in the year after crisis. The variable Control is the vector
of specifications which control for size, indebtedness, age, year and industry fixed effects.
Following Bebchuk et al. (2014), we measure the change in firm characteristics for a
subsample of firms targeted in 2006 and 2007 before and after the crisis. Activists generally
do not stay in target for longer period and reduce their ownership on average after two years.
To account for activist presence in target, we have incorporated dummy namely Presence.
36A similar question partly has been discussed in Bebchuk et al. (2014) work. They use pre–crisis data to
examine the impact of crisis on target’s profit margin and valuation measures, however, in their setting — the
sample selection is considered randomly.
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We examine change in performance on both dimensions; time variate (across the years) and
as well as cross-sectional (difference with matching firm). However, there is possibility that
the coefficient β on dummy variable can be biased, particularly when firm characteristic
is likely correlated with dummy. To simplify it with an example, we assume that a firm
is targeted whose debt is lower than the matching firm in 2007 and we are interested in to
examine the target’s leverage position in one year post–activism. Now suppose that in year
2008, another activist hedge fund acquires a meaningful stake (≥ 5%) and suggests some
measures which may lead the target’s leverage either to increase or decrease, thus this may
cause the coefficient β to produce some spurious effect – especially, it may tend to overval-
ued the performance of Dummy variable in increasing or decreasing the leverage during the
crisis – thus without taking these considerations into account, we may report biased estimates.
Table 1.24 illustrates the estimates on different dummies when change in firm char-
acteristic (after minus before) is regressed. For each regression, we control for firm size,
age, year and industry fixed effects. As we have relaxed the assumption of biased sample
selection, thus we compare the target firms with a matching sample firms using a benchmark
of size/book-to-market value and 2-digit SIC industry codes. By matching targets on well-
defined benchmark reduce our sample drastically. In addition to it, we are evaluating firms
targeted during 2006 and 2007, therefore, lower number of observations (11%) is inevitable.
In comparison with Bebchuk et al. (2014) documented findings, the coefficient on vari-
able "Fund Presence" is negative in first year implying that firm value reduced in first year
of activism during crisis period which is statistically insignificant. In second year of fund
activism, however, it becomes insignificantly positive. Following first year of activism,
targets improved in terms of profitability as measured by return on assets and profit margin
(at 5% and 10% respectively) and investment (indicated by research and development) which
is positively significant at 10%. These results, however become significantly negative in
second year of activism during crisis period. We do not find any evidence that presence
of another activist fund (outside sample) impact on firm performance. These results partly
provide evidence that target firms enhanced their earnings and investment even during the
crisis period.
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In table 1.24, we regress the change in firm characteristic (after minus before) in excess
of matching firms against a vector of dummies, and control variables.37 The results obtained
in cross-sectional analysis, interestingly do not deviate much from those in table 1.23. The
estimated coefficients on change in profitability and investment are positively marginally
significant. Thus, we may conclude that during crisis firms targeted by activists performed
relatively well in comparison with their industry peers and we do not find evidence that
targets became more fragile and vulnerable to economic shocks compared to nontargets
during crisis period.
1.7 Robustness check
To examine whether our results for crisis effect and other types of activism hold for different
model settings, we consider several robustness checks. First, we investigate whether size
of the firm is an underlying source of surviving from getting delisted after activism. To
explain it further, a big portion of the targets got delisted following the activism in this study.
Those firms either fully acquired or went private from public, thus did not report annual
accounting and stock price data to Datastream. We check whether firm size plays any role
during the crisis. Second, we consider the liquidity of target to assess whether it explains
cross-sectional returns to firm capital structure. Third, given that the 13G and 13D Filings
are drawn from similar funds, we expect market may react differently (high or low) to those
13D announcements which are made to firms previously targeted for 13G.
37The change in firm characterisitc is computed for both target and nontarget before and after the crisis
period in following simplistic setting:
∆Characteristic = MV t2008−09−MV t2006−07−MV m2008−09−MV m2006−07 (1.10)
Where MV t2008−09 is the average market value for target firms sample during 2008 to 2009, MV
t
2006−07 is the
average market value for target firms sample during 2006 and 2007, MV m2008−09 is the average market value for




1.7.1 Firm and fund size explaining the cross-section of abnormal re-
turns in targets
Table 1.25 presents cross-section of CARs for multiple event-windows by introducing Sched-
ule 13F and six-months pre-activism daily returns to our settings.38 In our sample, large
amount of activist funds hold concentrated ownership in target firms and have filed Schedule
13F along with 13D. Given that, we are interested in to analyze the impact of such large
stakeholding on market perception and subsequent impact on initial stock price.
An overview of the estimates reveal that the coefficients on types of activism change
across multiple event-windows. In the longest event-window of 26 days, the estimates on
General Undervaluation, Capital Structure, and Business Strategy are positively signifi-
cant at 10% and 5% respectively. In comparison with results presented in table 1.13, the
magnitude on coefficients reduce, however remain statistically significant.39
1.7.2 Impact of firm size and liquidity on CARs during crisis period
Table 1.26 presents results regressing CARs obtained from various event-windows against
types of activism and crisis-interactive terms. We examine the market responses to the
activist certain stated objective given the firm size and liquidity during the crisis period.
By introducing firm size and liquidity interactive-terms into our settings, we attempt to
decompose CARs and measure the differential effect in types of activism perceived by the
market. To do so, we construct size (firm) interactive terms with all types of activism during
crisis period. In constructing leverage interactive terms, we argue that activists suggesting
changes to target’s capital structure may involve restructuring of the debts particularly duing
crisis period, thus market perceives such changes positively. To the funds getting involved
with firms being financially depressed also primarily requires to restructure the debts.
In table 1.26, using full model specificaitons and vector of control variables, we find
that the estimates with interactive terms involving leverage are positively significant across
various event-windows. These findings support the view that market positively responded to
38Institutional investment manager is required to report Schedule 13F to the SEC within 45 days of calendar
year after having an aggregate market capitalization of at least $100 million.
39In an auxiliary regression, we substitute firm size which is measured in market capitalization with net sales
and total assets to check whether different measures explain the cross-section of abnormal returns.
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the activist fund’s involvement in a firm capital structure during the crisis period.
1.8 Concluding summary
This study examines hedge fund activism impact on target firms performance with a largely
hand–collected unique dataset consisting of 112 activist funds targeting 551 firms over the
period of January 2000 to December 2013. An activist hedge fund is defined as when a
fund accumulates 5% or more ownership stake in a firm with an intent to influence firm’s
internal governance and announces it with filing Schedule 13D Form to the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission.
The study investigates the fundamental question whether the recent financial crisis has
affected the hedge fund activism. Since the crisis, critics have been questioning the effective-
ness of hedge fund monitoring in target firms. Thus, we are also interested in to examine
whether crisis might have changed the traditional approach to activism and introduced new
paradigm shifts, making it interesting to investigate whether and how firms have accordingly
shaped their strategic patterns of impacting the target companies.
The study thoroughly examines the funds’ objectives, targeting tactics, target firms’
responses, and the evolving outcomes. In comparison with previous studies, it investigates
the emerging trends in strategic ways of impacting target firms before and after the crisis.
The study identifies pre-crisis period starting from January 2000 to June 2007 and post-crisis
from July 2007 to December 2013.
The targeted firms in our analysis share features which are partly in line with previously
documented studies. These firms are small and medium in size with undervalued stock, and
operationally profitable compared to the matching firms in the year prior to activism. To
generate returns in the short-run and to improve value in the long-run in target firms, activist
hedge funds normally acquire large concentrated stake, suggest measures, and assert force
on the firm’s management to follow their proposed agenda. To pursue their stated objectives,
the firm’s management is tactically interacted. In some cases, they interact with management
in friendly way, and on various occasions they confront them in an aggressive manner.
The findings of this study are partly consistent with the prior documented literature on
fund activism. In short–run, market reacts positively to the hedge fund activism around the
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announcement of 13D filings. The longest (–20, +5) event-window generates a mean CARs
about 5.34% which is in line with previous studies. A large part of variation in cross-sectional
CARs accrues to the activists targeting firms with objective of restructuring the debts fol-
lowed by business-related activism. Since the crisis, funds targeting firms to change the
business-strategy earn more than 15% returns which is followed by funds targeting financially
depressed firms.
We also test the competitive hypothesis whether short-run abnormal returns are generated
on the cost of long-run value destruction. The long–term accounting performance of the
targets after one year of activism suggest mixed results. Target firms substantially find
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Figure 1.1: CARs (–20, +5)
Cumulative abnormal returns are plotted over the longest event–window of (–20, +5) days for a sample of 551
firms targeted by 112 hedge funds over the period of January 2000 to December 2013. To compute CARs
for each target, we use Fama and French (1993) well–constructed six value–weighted portfolios formed
on size, and book to market value. 0 indicates the announcement date, when an activists formally files
13D Schedule to the Securities and Exchange Commision of the US within 10 days of acquiring ownership
stake in firm. We consider 20 days prior to the event date and extend to 5 days in succeeding announcement date.
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Figure 1.2: Pre–crisis CARs (–20, +5)
Figure 1.2 plots CARs for pre–crisis period. We measure pre-crisis period which begins by January 2000 and
ends at June 2007.
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Figure 1.3: Post–crisis CARs (–20, +5)
Figure 1.3 exhibits the CARs performance in post–crisis period which starts by July 2007 and lasts until
December 2013.
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Table 1.1: Variable definitions
Variable Description
Market value Total number of outstanding shares times price per share.
Net sales Firm’s annual sales in dollars.
Tobin’s Q Aggregate of long term debt and the market value of equity




Firm book value of equity/market value of equity.
Growth in sales Annual percentage growth in sales.
Cash flows Cash as percentage of total assets.
Book leverage Total debt divided by aggregate of total debt plus book value
of total equity.
Market leverage Total debt divided by aggregate of total debt and market value
of equity.
Cash Aggregate of cash and cash equivalents divided by total as-
sets.
New equity Amount of new equity issued during the year divided by the
lagged assets.
Dividend yield Aggregate of common dividend and preferred dividend di-
vided by aggregate of market value of common stock and
market value of preferred stock.
Payout Total dividend divided by net income before extraordinary
items.
Capital expenses Capital expenses as percentage of total assets.
Research and
development
Research and development as percentage of total assets.
Return on equity Net income divided by total equity.





Profitability Earnings before interest and taxes divided by net sales.
Liquidity Cash and short term assets divided by current liabilities.
Growth ratio Retention rate which is equal to 1 minus dividend declared
divided by net income
Return on equity Net income divided by total equity.







Re Cost of equity
Rd Cost of debt
E Total common shareholders equity
D Total debt
V Total value is an aggregate of total equity and total debt.
Cost of equity Dividend per share divided by current market value of stock
multiplied by growth rate of dividends.
Cost of debt Annual interest payment of total debt divided by market
value.
Industry 2–digit SIC industry codes of each firm
Data sources: All accounting and financial figures are extracted from the annual reports of target firms
using Datastream.
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Table 1.2: Chronological distribution of funds
The table represents the chronological distribution of the activist hedge funds over the period
of January 2000 to December 2013.


















Table 1.3: Number of hedge funds and their target firms
This table summarizes in detail the total events, and number of firms targeted by activist hedge funds over the
period of 2000 to 2013.
Fund / Firm pair Number
Total fund/firm pairs 760
Individual fund/target firm pair 760
Number of individual targets 688
Number of individual funds 112
Number of hedge fund management companies 86
Number of firms targeted once 398
Number of firms targeted twice 114
Number of firms targeted thrice 27
Number of firms targeted four times 12
Number of activist hedge funds with 1 target 18
Number of activist hedge funds with 2 targets 13
Number of activist hedge funds with 3 targets 11
Number of activist hedge funds with 4 targets 15
Number of activist hedge funds with 5 targets 11
Number of activist hedge funds with 6 targets 13
Number of activist hedge funds with 7 targets 15
Number of activist hedge funds with more than 8 targets 16
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Table 1.4: Chronological distribution of target and matching firms
The following table represents the chronological distribution of firms drawn from Schedule 13D Files, and
Schedule 13G Files from EDGAR search system in Securities and Exchange Commission of the US. These
files are reported by a similar set of activist US hedge funds over the period of January 2000 to December
2013. A 13D Disclosure indicates intent of an activist to influence the internal governance of target firm
whereas a 13G Disclosure shows a fund has no intention to play an active role. All firms are publicly traded at
NY SE/AMEX/NASDAQ exchanges.
Year No. of targets % of sample No. of matching % of sample
2000 23 4.24% 12 1.34%
2001 30 5.52% 28 3.12%
2002 33 6.08% 35 3.90%
2003 28 5.16% 78 8.69%
2004 38 7.00% 106 11.80%
2005 68 12.52% 76 8.46%
2006 67 12.34% 148 16.48%
2007 77 14.18% 122 13.59%
2008 55 10.13% 83 9.24%
2009 23 4.24% 55 6.12%
2010 48 8.84% 87 9.69%
2011 32 5.89% 42 4.68%
2012 10 1.84% 9 1.00%
2013 11 2.03% 17 1.89%

















Table 1.5: Percentage of ownership held by fund and firm
The table represents the summary statistics of the information gathered from Schedule 13D Filing using several items, in particular, Item 5 known as "Interest in
the Securities of the Issuer". This statistics provides averages about 760 events filed by 112 activist hedge funds over the period of January 2000 to December 2013.
Initial Filing Mean Median Sd. Min Max Obs.
Shares held by hedge fund ($mil.) 46.1 2,600,329 626 147 12200 733
Total outstanding shares by the target 410 28 7930 363 210000 717
Percentage of ownership held by fund 13.13% 7.75% 15.87% 5.71% 100.00% 717
Cost(incl./excl.commission)($mil.) 77.7 16.1 222 7794.2 2310 433
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Table 1.6: Categories of activism
This table summarizes the stated objectives and categorizes them into well–defined types of activism for the
760 events reported over the period of January 2000 to December 2013. The types of activism are classified
partly following the specifications of Brav et al. (2008). Each type of activism is a dummy which takes value 1 if
a specific objective falls in a certain category. The categories are non-mutually exclusive. Panel A summarizes
types for entire set of events. Panel B presents the summary of activism types for pre–crisis period which begins
from January 2000 to until June 2007. For one–third observations which fall in post–crisis period between July
2007 to December 2013, panel C illustrates the information on types of activism.
Panel A: Types of activism for entire sample period
No. Category Stated Objective Number of Events % of Total
1 CAT1 General Undervaluation 601 79.3%
2 CAT2 Capital Structure 51 6.7%
3 CAT3 Business Strategy 119 15.7%
4 CAT4 Sale of Target Firm 41 5.4%
5 CAT5 Governance 85 11.2%
6 CAT6 Bankruptcy/ Chapter 11 10 1.3%
7 CAT7 Arbitrage 2 0.3%
Panel B: Types of activism before crisis Jan 2000 - June 2007
No. Category Stated Objective Number of Events % of Total
1 CAT1 General Undervaluation 381 68.16%
2 CAT2 Capital Structure 32 5.72%
3 CAT3 Business Strategy 68 12.16%
4 CAT4 Sale of Target Firm 23 4.11%
5 CAT5 Governance 52 9.30%
6 CAT6 Bankruptcy/ Chapter 11 3 0.54%
7 CAT67 Arbitrage 2 0.3%
Panel C: Types of activism during and after crisis July 2007 - December 2013
No. Category Stated Objective Number of Events % of Total
1 CAT1 General undervaluation 221 63.14%
2 CAT2 Capital Structure 20 5.71%
3 CAT3 Business Strategy 51 14.57%
4 CAT4 Sale of Target Company 18 5.14%
5 CAT5 Governance 33 9.43%
6 CAT6 Bankruptcy/ Chapter 11 7 2.00%
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Table 1.7: Fund techniques to influence the target
The following table summarizes the qualitative information about an activist fund on how it plans to carry
out agenda of influencing the target firm. Activist describes its reason of targeting firm in Item 4 known as
"Purpose of Transaction," along with precise plan of action to implement the course of agenda in target firm.
These suggested measures could be of multiple-tasking in nature simultaneously. We collect this information
from 760 Schedule 13D reported to the SEC and filed by 112 activist hedge funds over the period of January
2000 to December 2013.




1 Meeting with the management on preliminary
basis in order to get involve with business
activities / negotiation
408 53.62%
2 Seeking board seat for better representation of
shareholders interest and to maximize the value
through large stake
93 12.25%
3 No more board representation / withdrawal of
board seat
17 2.24%
4 Negotiation over limiting poison pills 7 0.92%
5 Shareholder proposal for business structure
changes
65 8.56%
6 Negotiation with the larger shareholders in order
to change managerial or corporate policy
changes
41 5.40%
7 compel to restructure/working with other
shareholders
69 9.09%
8 Solicitation/ proxy contest for board replacement
or other managerial changes / preventing from
acquiring or merging
31 4.08%
9 Legal Suing /sues in the bankruptcy court to
fulfill the legal requirements
17 2.24%
10 Acquiring of the total firm/ complete buyout /




Table 1.8: Target characteristics in year before activism
This table reports the characteristics of target firms for the year before activism and compares it with a matching sample based on size/book-to-market/2-digit
SIC industry. The sample consists of 551 firms targeted by 112 hedge funds over the period of 2000 to 2013. Market Value is a firm stock price times number
of shares outstanding and is measured in dollars. Sales represent a firm annual sales in dollars. Tobin’s Q is defined as (long term debt + the market value
of equity/ long term debt + the book value of equity). Book to Market ratio of a firm is expressed as book value of equity/market value of equity. Growth in
sales is annual percentage growth in sales. Book Leverage is defined as debt/(debt + book value of equity), Leverage is measured total debts / total equity,
Market Leverage is defined as debt/ (debt + market value of equity), Cash as a percentage of assets is defined (cash + cash equivalents)/assets, Dividend Yield is
defined as (common dividend + preferred dividend)/(market value of common stock + market value of preferred stock), Payout is defined as total dividend / net
income before extraordinary items, Capital Expenses are measured as a percentage of assets, Research and Development is measured as a percentage of assets,
Profitability is operating profit margin and measured as EBIT / Net sales. The entire set of data is derived from Thomson Reuters Datastream. We report the
mean, median, and standard deviation for both target and nontarget samples. Column VII exhibits the difference in medians between target and matched firm, and
column VIII reports the p-value to demonstrate the level of significance in medians. All variables are winsorized at 1%.
Characteristics Target firms Matching firms Median comparison
1
Mean Median Sd. Mean Median Sd. Difference p-val
Market Value ($mil.) 987.86 257.78 2,257.88 936.22 270.33 2,066.06 -12.55 0.2003
Sales ($mil.) 869.22 279.20 1,568.37 613.68 92.36 1,268.47 186.84 0.0001
Tobin’s Q 2.56 1.55 4.01 2.13 0.77 5.62 0.78 0.0000
Growth 1.11 1.04 0.67 1.10 1.02 1.24 0.02 0.0454
ROA -0.04 0.03 0.43 -0.18 -0.01 0.50 0.04 0.0000
Book Leverage 0.46 0.29 1.03 2.13 0.77 5.62 -0.48 0.0000
Leverage 0.83 0.27 4.86 0.41 0.16 2.52 0.11 0.0942
Market Leverage 0.26 0.19 0.27 0.18 0.06 0.24 0.13 0.0022
Cash 0.15 0.08 0.19 0.30 0.21 0.29 -0.13 0.0000
Dividend Yield 0.45 0.00 1.35 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.0041
Payout 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.17 0.00 2.01 0.00 0.4575
Capital Exp. 0.13 0.01 0.23 0.12 0.01 0.25 0.00 0.6390
R& D 0.10 0.02 0.23 0.12 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.0403
Profit -2.62 0.04 17.04 -6.32 0.01 32.17 0.03 0.0792
Assets ($mil.) 1,426.21 356.61 4,021.32 919.04 120.43 2,670.10 236.18 0.0000
1 Wilcoxon signed rank test for differences in medians between the target and the matched firms.
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Table 1.9: Logit regression – likelihood of fund activism
The table reports the effects of covariates on the probability of being targeted by hedge fund in the year before
activism. The dependent variable is a dummy which takes value 1 if firm had been a target in the previous
year. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Column I reports the coefficients and column II reports
marginal probabilities. All data is extracted from Datastream. We winsorize all variables at 1%. *, **, ***
indicate the level of significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
Characterisitcs Coefficients Marginal Probabilities
Market Capitalization -2.962** -0.414*
-1.439 0.232




Return on Assets -0.679* -0.095*
(0.397) 0.057
Tobins Q -0.540** -0.075***
(0.217) 0.023
Book to Market value 0.169 0.024
(0.108) 0.016




Dividend Yield -0.795 -0.111
(0.727) 0.089
Research Development -0.000 -1.51e-07
(0.000) 0.000




# of Observations 88
Pseudo R-squared 0.211
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Table 1.10: Target characteristics in the year before activism - Crisis period 2007 -2013
This table presents the characteristics of firms targeted during 2007 to 2013 in the year prior to activism. We decompose our full sample (2000–2013) into two
parts; before and after the crisis period. For crisis period, we include the years from 2007 to 2013. Target firms’ characteristics are compared with a matching
sample using benchmark of size, book–to–market value, and 2–digit SIC codes. Table 1.1 provides detailed definition about the variables. The data on accounting
measures is extracted from using Thomson Reuters Datastream. We report summary statistics including mean, median, and standard deviation for both target and
nontarget samples. Column VII exhibits the difference in medians between target and matched firm, and column VIII reports the Wilcoxon signedrank test
p-value to demonstrate the level of statistical significance in medians. All variables are winsorized at 1%.
Characteristics
Target firms Matching firms Median comparison1
Mean Median Sd Mean Median Sd Difference p-val
Market Value ($mil.) 961.75 257.78 2527.90 1068.63 261.49 2420.86 -3.71 0.0237
Sales ($mil.) 862.22 260.02 1694.81 830.87 97.13 1607.09 162.89 0.0210
Tobin’s Q 2.15 1.48 2.00 1.78 0.63 4.23 0.85 0.0046
Book-to-market 0.69 0.54 0.79 0.57 0.59 1.54 -0.05 0.3878
Growth 1.17 1.05 0.89 1.17 1.01 1.42 0.04 0.1578
ROA -0.003 0.03 0.19 -0.15 -0.00 0.62 0.03 0.0034
Book Leverage 0.54 0.39 0.69 1.78 0.63 4.23 -0.24 0.3709
Leverage 1.37 0.52 7.76 0.22 0.16 1.91 0.36 0.2364
Market Leverage 0.31 0.26 0.23 0.22 0.07 0.26 0.19 0.0635
Cash (% Assets) 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.29 0.16 0.29 -0.07 0.0157
Dividend Yield 2.33 1.73 1.98 0.02 0.00 0.12 1.73 0.0077
Payout 0.05 0.06 0.69 -0.01 0.00 0.47 0.06 0.6245
R&D 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.30 0.08 0.9443
Profit -0.69 0.03 2.71 -0.07 0.03 0.37 0.00 0.2636
Assets ($mil.) 1670.56 380.50 5242.40 1364.16 162.03 3203.39 218.47 0.0108
1 Wilcoxon signed rank test for differences in medians between the target and the matched firms.
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Table 1.11: Firm characteristics during crisis period 2007 - 2013 using propensity score
matching
This table reports the results gained using propensity score matching approach. For a set of 263 target firms,
we match them with 545 non-target firms using propensity score during 2007 to 2013. In model, we include
firm characteristics, industry, and year. All variables are well-defined in table 1.1. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%,
and 10% level of statistical significance.
Variables Sample Treated Control Difference S.E. T-test
LMV
Unmatched 4.898 6.588 -1.689 0.304 -5.54
AT T 5.283 5.62 -0.342 0.476 -0.72
LSales
Unmatched 18.63 20.232 -1.599 0.347 -4.60
AT T 18.811 19.57 -0.762 0.556 -1.37
Growth
Unmatched 2.123 1.275 0.848 0.433 1.96
AT T 1.145 1.421 -0.275 0.231 -1.19
Profit
Unmatched -0.964 -0.159 -.804 0.288 -2.79
AT T -0.052 -0.633 0.580 0.414 1.40
ROA
Unmatched -0.228 0.0155 -0.244 0.074 -3.26
AT T 0.008 -0.106 0.114 0.087 1.32
Tobin’s Q
Unmatched 2.22 2.811 -.587 0.426 -1.38
AT T 2.476 2.302 .173 0.891 0.19
Book/Market
Unmatched 0.342 0.576 -0.233 0.189 -1.23
AT T 0.530 0.693 -0.163 0.164 -0.99
Book
Leverage
Unmatched 0.503 0.328 0.175 0.085 2.13
AT T 0.274 0.390 -0.116 0.113 -1.03
Market
Leverage
Unmatched 0.268 0.193 0.074 0.045 1.63
AT T 0.148 0.218 -0.070 0.068 -1.02
Leverage
Unmatched 2.700 2.509 0.191 0.347 0.55
AT T 3.252 3.330 -0.078 0.800 -0.10
Dividend
Yield
Unmatched 0.282 0.260 0.022 0.149 0.15
AT T 0.201 0.00 0.201 0.121 1.65
R&D
Unmatched 0.194 0.072 0.122 0.048 2.53
AT T 0.103 0.116 -0.0131 0.051 -0.26
CapEx
Unmatched 4.938 5.692 -0.754 1.406 -0.54
AT T 5.371 5.36 0.0111 2.828 0.00
LAssets
Unmatched 19.037 20.387 -1.350 0.3134 -4.31
AT T 19.046 19.749 -0.702 0.487 -1.44
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Table 1.12: CARs for multiple event windows and statistical significance
The table reports cumulative abnormal returns for multiple event–windows and their statistical significance for
a sample of 551 firms targeted over the period of January 2000 to December 2013. The longest event window
spans over (–20, +5) or 26 days. The event-date is the day when an activist officially announces its holding in
target firm upon crossing 5% or more ownership stake. The price data to compute daily returns is extracted
from using Thomson Reuters Datastream. ***, **, * indicates 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance.
Event Window CARs






Table 1.13: Cross-section of CARs and types of activism
The following table reports the OLS regression results. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal
returns computed at multiple event-windows around the announcement dates in the short-run. We regress CARs
obtained from various event-windows against well- defined types of activism and estimates are illustrated in
four models. All regression control for size of firm, industry and year fixed effects. Firm size (logarithm of
market capitalization), and long-term debt (ratio of natural logarithm of long term debt to the sum of natural
logarithm of total debt and market value of equity) are deviated from median value. The activism categories are
general undervaluation, capital structure, business strategy, sale of the target firm, and corporate governance.
All categories are non-mutually exclusive. The types of activism are dummies; General Undervaluation is set
to 1 if fund simply states its objective in its transaction purpose to maximize value without any confrontation,
0 otherwise; Capital Structure is equal to 1, if fund targets the company with clear stated goal of changing
in capital structure in its purpose of transaction, 0 otherwise; Business Strategy is set to 1, if fund explicitly
describes its objective as to suggest changes in target’s business direction, 0 otherwise; Sale of Target is set to 1,
if fund mentions its goal to sell partially or fully its target, 0 otherwise; Corporate Governance is equal to 1, if
fund describes its objective to involve in its target governance matters, 0 otherwise. The cumulative abnormal
returns are regressed into four separate models with multiple event windows of (-20,+5), (-10,+10), (-10,+5),
and (0, +15). The standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate




CAR(-20,+5) CAR(-10,+5) CAR(-10,+10) CAR(0,+15)
MV -0.026*** -0.017*** -0.017** -0.010*
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
LEV 0.004 0.003 0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
General Undervaluation 0.028* 0.039*** 0.042*** 0.019*
(0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
Capital Structure 0.122** 0.095** 0.077 -0.028
(0.050) (0.047) (0.050) (0.065)
Business Strategy 0.092** 0.075** 0.079** 0.033
(0.038) (0.034) (0.039) (0.028)
Sale of target 0.044 0.015 0.031 0.046**
(0.035) (0.025) (0.027) (0.019)
Governance 0.019 0.011 0.008 0.004
(0.048) (0.028) (0.041) (0.049)
Year Y Y Y Y
Industry Y Y Y Y
Observations 355 355 355 355
R2 0.090 0.108 0.082 0.027
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.094 0.068 0.013
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Table 1.14: Cross–section of CARs and types of activism – crisis effect
This table reports the OLS regression results for cross–section of CARs as dependent variable against the well
defined categories of activism for various event windows. Following the specification of Maier et al. (2011), the
crisis dummy is set to 1 if the observation falls in the period from July 2007 to December 2013. We incorporate
crisis dummy. All regression control for size of firm, industry and year fixed effects. Firm size (logarithm of
market capitalization), and long-term debt (ratio of natural logarithm of long term debt to the sum of natural
logarithm of total debt and market value of equity) are deviated from median value. The activism categories are
general undervaluation, capital structure, business strategy, sale of the target firm, corporate governance, and
Chapter 11. All categories are non-mutually exclusive. The types of activism are dummies which take value
1 if an activist explicitly states its objective to intervene in firm with pre–specified purpose. The cumulative
abnormal returns are regressed into four separate models with multiple event windows of (-20,+5), (-10,+10),
(-10,+5), and (0, +15). The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and reported in parentheses for
each coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance.
Ind. Variables
Dependent Variable: CARs
CARs (-20, +5) CARs (-10, +5) CARs (-10,+10) CARs (0,+15)
Crisis 0.102*** 0.119*** 0.124*** 0.139***
(0.030) (0.023) (0.025) (0.029)
MV -0.013** -0.011* -0.013* -0.015**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
LEV 0.141*** 0.040 0.049 0.083
(0.051) (0.040) (0.039) (0.051)
General Undervaluation -0.052 -0.004 -0.043 -0.045
(0.044) (0.040) (0.041) (0.045)
Capital Structure 0.023 -0.019 -0.019 0.004
(0.061) (0.061) (0.063) (0.067)
Business Strategy 0.033 0.048 0.050 0.013
(0.036) (0.034) (0.037) (0.039)
Target Sale 0.001 0.047 0.041 0.036
(0.065) (0.058) (0.053) (0.071)
Governance -0.037 -0.017 -0.029 -0.034
(0.045) (0.042) (0.047) (0.046)
Chapter 11 -0.043 -0.062 -0.079 -0.150**
(0.075) (0.064) (0.064) (0.071)
Year Y Y Y Y
Industry Y Y Y Y
Observations 355 355 355 355
Adjusted R-squared 0.095 0.172 0.165 0.104
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Table 1.15: Cross–section of CARs and activism types – Crisis interactive terms
This table reports the OLS regression results for cross–section of CARs as dependent variable against the
well defined categories of activism for various event windows. Following the specification of Maier et al.
(2011) study, the crisis dummy is set to 1 if the observation falls in the period from July 2007 to December
2013. To assess the crisis effect, we create crisis interactive dummies for each category. All regression control
for size of firm, industry and year fixed effects. MV (logarithm of market capitalization), and LEV (ratio of
natural logarithm of long term debt to the sum of natural logarithm of total debt and market value of equity) are
deviated from mean value. The activism categories are General Undervaluation, Capital Structure, Business
Strategy, Target Sale, Corporate Governance, and Chapter 11. All categories are non-mutually exclusive. The
types of activism are dummies which take value 1 if an activist explicitly states its objective to intervene in
firm with pre–specified purpose. The cumulative abnormal returns are regressed into four separate models with
multiple event windows of (-20,+5), (-10,+10), (-10,+5), and (0, +15). The standard errors are adjusted for
heteroskedasticity and reported in parentheses for each coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1%
level of statistical significance.
Ind. Variables
Dependent Variable: CARs
CARs (-20, +5) CARs (-10, +5) CARs (-10, +10) CARs (0, +15)
MV -0.012* -0.011* -0.011* -0.014**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
LEV 0.131*** 0.041 0.041 0.085
(0.048) (0.039) (0.039) (0.051)
General Value* Crisis 0.043 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.078**
(0.031) (0.025) (0.025) (0.032)
Capital Structure* Crisis 0.122 0.001 0.001 0.132
(0.097) (0.089) (0.089) (0.105)
Business Strategy* Crisis 0.134** 0.137** 0.137** 0.124*
(0.059) (0.061) (0.061) (0.067)
Target Sale* Crisis 0.070 0.092 0.092 0.131*
(0.066) (0.057) (0.057) (0.071)
Governance* Crisis 0.025 0.050 0.050 0.042
(0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.062)
Chapter 11* Crisis 0.097* 0.053 0.053 0.019
(0.052) (0.042) (0.042) (0.049)
Year Y Y Y Y
Industry Y Y Y Y
Observations 355 355 355 355
Adjusted R-squared 0.091 0.170 0.170 0.092
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Table 1.16: Cross-section of CARs and activism types with crisis interactive terms using full model specification
We regress CARs obtained from multiple event-windows against types of activism with crisis interactive terms in three separate models. Following the specification of Maier et al. (2011), the crisis
dummy is set to 1 if a firm is targeted during the period from July 2007 to December 2013. In model I, column (1), we regress CARs for 26 days using full specifications including crisis, industry and
year fixed effects. For column (2), we do not include crisis since it is highly correlated with types of activism, and year fixed effects. In column (3), we do not include crisis dummy, industry, and year
fixed effects. We exercise similar model specifications for CARs for (-10, +5), and (-10, +10) event-windows. All regressions control for size and leverage which are not reported for the sake of space.
The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and reported in parentheses for each coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance.
Ind. Variables
Dependent Variable: CARs
CARs (-20, +5) CARs (-10, +5) CARs (-10, +10)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Gen. Undervaluation -0.032 -0.090** -0.011 -0.015 -0.062 0.019 -0.027 -0.107** -0.007
(0.052) (0.045) (0.032) (0.045) (0.041) (0.029) (0.053) (0.049) (0.035)
Capital Structure 0.044 0.003 0.030 0.015 -0.006 0.027 0.016 -0.034 0.004
(0.062) (0.069) (0.065) (0.078) (0.077) (0.074) (0.082) (0.084) (0.079)
Business Strategy -0.013 -0.045 0.000 0.005 -0.030 0.016 -0.016 -0.064 -0.010
(0.048) (0.044) (0.042) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.049) (0.045) (0.044)
Target Sale 0.004 -0.024 0.001 0.037 0.019 0.036 0.026 -0.012 0.022
(0.063) (0.078) (0.069) (0.070) (0.075) (0.062) (0.066) (0.087) (0.074)
Governance -0.043 -0.053 -0.010 -0.051 -0.061 -0.019 -0.042 -0.060 -0.013
(0.054) (0.062) (0.061) (0.046) (0.042) (0.041) (0.060) (0.066) (0.064)
Chapter 11 -0.027 0.016 0.013 -0.054 -0.000 0.032 -0.144 -0.080 -0.057
(0.093) (0.071) (0.046) (0.091) (0.062) (0.047) (0.096) (0.070) (0.050)
Crisis 0.114 - - 0.020 - - 0.145 - -
(0.114) - - (0.100) - - (0.125) - -
Gen. Value* Crisis 0.035 0.061* 0.061* 0.022 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.035 0.097*** 0.094***
(0.083) (0.034) (0.034) (0.078) (0.027) (0.026) (0.089) (0.035) (0.035)
Capital Structure* Crisis 0.005 0.070 0.068 0.068 0.026 0.037 0.028 0.107 0.106
(0.129) (0.116) (0.107) (0.126) (0.114) (0.103) (0.141) (0.128) (0.121)
Bus. Strategy* Crisis 0.079 0.155** 0.126* 0.090 0.151** 0.123* 0.058 0.159** 0.128
(0.074) (0.071) (0.072) (0.071) (0.068) (0.071) (0.081) (0.077) (0.079)
Target Sale* Crisis 0.021 0.045 0.064 0.002 0.038 0.063 0.005 0.082 0.101
(0.111) (0.091) (0.090) (0.103) (0.084) (0.080) (0.122) (0.101) (0.095)
Governance* Crisis 0.019 0.038 0.027 0.069 0.084 0.073 0.022 0.054 0.050
(0.084) (0.084) (0.081) (0.084) (0.068) (0.071) (0.094) (0.089) (0.087)
Industry Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N
Year Y N N Y N N Y N N
Observations 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355

















Table 1.17: Long-term performance in target firms – Time series analysis
We report the results obtained from using propensity score matching approach in time-series setting. Target firms are matched with industry peers based on firm
characteristics, 2-digit SIC codes in similar year using propensity score. The dependent variable is the net difference between the firm characteristic in year after
activism minus year before activism. The independent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if a firm is targeted in the year before activism, 0 otherwise. The
coefficient on Activism Dummy is interpreted as average effect of activism after one year. For each regression, we use vector of control variables including
industry, and year fixed effects. Firm characteristics are well-defined in table 1.1. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and reported in




Change in firm characteristic one year after activism
Size Valuation Operational Efficiency Distribution Investment Profitability
MV Sales Q BM Growth Cash DY Payout R&D CapEx Profit Margin




-685.6 52.27 -2.139 -0.876 -0.287 -0.227*** -0.484 -2.552 -0.0765 1.727*** 10.33*
(741.0) (568.0) (1.460) (0.625) (0.393) (0.080) (0.383) (4.653) (0.085) (0.505) (5.692)
# Observations 121 122 118 121 115 51 188 102 97 110 113
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Table 1.18: Long-term performance of target firms after activsim – Cross-sectional analysis
The following table presents one year performance in target firms using propensity score approach in cross-sectional setting. Each target firm is matched with
nontarget firm using propensity score. The dependent variable is change in firm characteristic in excess of matching firm in one year after the activism. The
independent variable is Activism Dummy which takes value 1 if a firm has been targeted in year before activism. To control for fixed effects, we include firm size
(measured as natural logarithm of market capitalization) both in linear and quadratic form, industry, and year dummies. We winsorize size variable at standard





Change in firm characteristic after one year compared to matching firm
Size Valuation Profitability Leverage Distribution Investment
MV Sales Assets Q BM Growth ROA Profit LEV ML Cash Divid. Yield Payout CapEx R&D




1,739.880* 79.750 -757.301 -3.958 2.972* -1.119 53.456** 12.686 -2.439 -0.385* -0.418 -0.900 -1.812 1.792 0.010
(1,041.461) (293.164) (466.532) (4.113) (1.615) (0.949) (21.125) (11.605) (1.777) (0.230) (0.468) (0.628) (7.109) (17.662) (0.136)

















Table 1.19: Characteristics of targets in first year post-activism — Time series analysis
The table reports the characteristics of target firms for the year after activism and compares it with a matching sample based on size/book-to-market/2-digit
SIC industry. The sample consists of 551 firms targeted by 112 hedge funds over the period of 2000 to 2013. Market Value is a firm stock price times number
of shares outstanding and is measured in dollars. Sales represent a firm annual sales in dollars. Tobin’s Q is defined as (long term debt + the market value
of equity/ long term debt + the book value of equity). Book to Market ratio in a firm is expressed as book value of equity/market value of equity. Growth in
sales is annual percentage growth in sales. Book Leverage is defined as debt/(debt + book value of equity), Leverage is measured total debts / total equity,
Market Leverage is defined as debt/ (debt + market value of equity), Cash as a percentage of assets is defined (cash + cash equivalents)/assets, Dividend Yield is
defined as (common dividend + preferred dividend)/(market value of common stock + market value of preferred stock), Payout is defined as total dividend / net
income before extraordinary items, Capital Expenses are measured as a percentage of assets, Research and Development is measured as a percentage of assets,
Profitability is operating profit margin and measured as EBIT / Net sales. The entire set of data is derived from Thomson Reuters Datastream. We report the
mean, median, and standard deviation for both target and nontarget samples. Column VII exhibits the difference in medians between target and matched firm, and
column VIII reports the p-value to demonstrate the level of significance in medians. All variables are winsorized at 1%.
Characteristics
Target firms Matching firms Median comparison1
Mean Median Sd. Mean Median Sd. Difference p-val
Market Value ($mil.) 982.66 257.78 2,332.29 828.22 194.16 2,032.86 63.62 0.0675
Sales ($mil.) 880.09 273.44 1,672.67 550.80 66.35 1,172.26 207.09 0.0000
Tobin’s Q 2.90 1.48 6.28 3.15 1.57 8.42 -0.090 0.4687
Book-to-market -2.74 0.48 41.01 0.18 0.47 5.63 0.01 0.0000
Growth 1.10 1.02 0.81 1.15 1.07 1.06 -0.05 0.3178
ROA -0.10 0.03 0.76 -20.42 0.00 74.41 0.03 0.0037
Book Leverage 0.58 0.31 1.77 1.58 0.91 3.74 -0.6 0.0000
Leverage 0.32 0.24 0.41 0.33 0.19 0.71 0.05 0.1913
Market Leverage 0.27 0.21 0.27 0.19 0.03 0.25 0.18 0.0005
Cash (% Assets) 0.14 0.07 0.17 0.30 0.18 0.27 -0.11 0.0000
Dividend Yield 0.46 0.00 1.35 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.0143
Payout 6.09 0.00 17.19 3.51 0.00 13.55 0.00 0.2740
Capital Exp. 4.14 1.90 6.52 42.86 2.12 99.27 -0.22 0.1573
R&D 0.10 0.01 0.24 0.13 0.01 0.27 0.00 0.0916
Profit -1.90 0.04 12.07 0.86 1.00 1.93 -0.96 0.0000
Assets ($mil.) 1,466.47 297.97 4,209.40 906.89 114.48 2,774.57 183.49 0.0001
Liquidity 8.83 2.06 60.39 3.39 2.03 4.63 0.030 0.8697
1 Wilcoxon signed rank test for differences in medians between the target and the matched firms.
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Table 1.20: Changes in characteristics in year before and after activism — Cross-sectional analysis
This table presents the difference in medians of targets and nontargets in year before and after activism. The targets are matched with peers based on
size/book-to-market/2-digit SIC industry. The sample consists of 551 firms targeted by 112 hedge funds over the period of 2000 to 2013. The entire set of data is
retrieved from using Thomson Reuters Datastream. We report the mean, median, and standard deviation for both target and nontarget samples. Column I and II
report the differences in means and medians for targets, column III and IV presents differences in means and medians for nontarget firms. Column V exhibits the
difference in change in medians and VI reports the Wilcoxon signrank test p–values to demonstrate level of significance in medians. All variables are winsorized
at 1%.
Characteristics
Target firms Matching firms Median comparison1
(After-Before Activism) (After-Before Activism) Wilcoxon signrank test
∆Mean ∆Median ∆ Mean ∆Median ∆ Difference p-val
∆Market Value (mil.) -5.20 0.00 108.00 76.17 -76.17 0.2565
∆Sales (mil.) 10.87 -5.76 62.88 26.01 -31.77 0.6875
∆Tobin’s Q 0.34 -0.070 -1.02 -0.80 0.73 0.0282
∆Book-to-market -1.64 0.03 -1.55 -0.04 0.07 0.0085
∆Growth -0.01 -0.02 -5E+14 -0.05 0.03 0.0190
∆ROA -0.06 0.00 20.24 -0.01 0.01 0.0510
∆Book Leverage 0.12 0.02 0.55 -0.14 0.16 0.3148
∆Leverage -0.51 -0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.00 0.2112
∆Market Leverage 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.7394
∆Cash (% Assets) -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.04 0.7275
∆Dividend Yield 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.8139
∆Payout 6.09 0.00 -3.34 0.00 0.00 0.7749
∆Capital Exp. 4.01 1.89 -42.74 -2.11 4.00 0.0108
∆R&D 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.8347
∆Profit 0.72 0.00 -7.18 -0.99 0.99 0.0000
∆Assets (mil.) 40.26 -58.64 12.15 5.95 -64.59 0.9341

















Table 1.21: Impact of crisis on target firms performance – time series analysis
The table reports the difference in medians between two sub-groups in target firms before and after the crisis period. For pre-crisis period, we include all firms
targeted during 2000 to 2006. For post-crisis period, we include firms targeted within 2007 to 2013. The data on accounting measures is retrieved from using
Thomson Reuters Datastream. We report the mean, median, and standard deviation for both subsamples. Column I to III report the mean, median, and standard
deviation for target firms before crisis period, and from column IV to VI mean, median, and standard deviation for target firms during and after crisis period are
presented. Column VII exhibits the difference in medians and VIII reports the Wilcoxon signed-rank test p-values to demonstrate level of significance in medians.
All variables are winsorized at 1%. Firm characteristics are well-defined in table 1.1.
Characteristics Post-crisis target firms Pre-crisis target firms Median comparison
1
Mean Median Sd. Mean Median Sd. Difference p-val
Market Value ($mil.) 5.77 5.61 2.12 5.27 5.28 1.83 0.33 0.0877
Sales ($mil.) 5.81 5.91 2.38 5.55 5.70 1.87 0.21 0.0861
Tobin’s Q 1.88 1.51 2.08 1.72 1.41 1.17 0.1 0.7609
Book-to-Market 0.58 0.52 1.54 0.53 0.51 1.05 0.01 0.4527
Growth 1.15 1.05 0.62 1.12 1.04 0.44 0.01 0.8995
ROA -0.22 0.01 1.04 -0.00 0.05 0.20 -0.04 0.0092
Book Leverage 0.54 0.37 1.03 0.47 0.39 0.54 -0.02 0.7567
Leverage 2.74 1.97 2.34 0.31 0.28 0.27 1.69 0.0000
Market Leverage 0.31 0.21 0.30 0.34 0.27 0.30 -0.06 0.2653
Cash (% Assets) 0.68 0.08 2.05 0.70 0.01 2.53 0.07 0.1123
Dividend Yield 0.30 0.00 0.87 0.54 0.00 1.32 0.00 0.0260
Capital Exp. 5.95 2.43 11.72 0.05 0.03 0.07 2.4 0.0000
R&D 0.15 0.02 0.38 0.04 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.0020
Profit -0.50 0.03 1.80 -0.11 0.05 1.16 -0.02 0.0059
Assets ($mil.) 6.23 6.34 2.17 5.92 5.93 1.52 0.41 0.0297
1 Wilcoxon signed rank test for differences in medians between the target and the matched firms.
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Table 1.22: Impact of crisis on target firms performance — Cross-sectional analysis
The table reports the difference in medians between two sub-groups in target firms before and after the crisis period in excess of matching sample firms. We
compare target firms with matching sample firms based on size/book-to-market value/ 2-digit SIC industry codes. For pre-crisis period, we include all firms
targeted during 2000 to 2006. For post-crisis period, we include firms targeted within 2007 to 2013. The data on accounting measures is retrieved from using
Thomson Reuters Datastream. We report difference in means, medians, and standard deviations for both subsamples. Column I to III report the difference in
means, medians, and standard deviations for target firms for the period ((2007–13) - (2000–06)) and from column IV to VI difference in means, medians, and
standard deviations for nontarget firms for the period during ((2007–13) - (2000–06)). Column VII exhibits the difference in medians and VIII reports the
Wilcoxon signed-rank test p-values to demonstrate level of significance in medians. All variables are winsorized at 1%. Firm characteristics are well-defined in
table 1.1.
Characteristics
Target firms Matching firms Median comparison1
Wilcoxon signrank test
∆Mean ∆Median ∆Sd ∆ Mean ∆Median ∆Sd ∆ Difference p-val
∆Market Value (mil.) 1.26 1.64 2.89 0.29 0.24 2.43 1.40 0.0164
∆Sales (mil.) 1.17 1.21 3.51 1.20 0.81 3.20 0.40 0.8490
∆Tobin’s Q 0.36 0.29 2.70 -1.12 -0.37 2.97 0.66 0.0023
∆Book-to-market 0.56 0.50 1.55 0.51 0.51 1.04 -0.01 0.4679
∆Growth -0.21 -0.05 1.72 -0.11 0.01 1.21 -0.06 0.9916
∆ROA -0.22 -0.01 1.13 -0.03 0.04 0.22 -0.05 0.0860
∆Book Leverage 0.52 0.36 1.04 -0.69 0.00 1.89 0.36 0.0000
∆Leverage 2.29 1.60 2.49 0.06 0.07 0.41 1.53 0.0000
∆Market Leverage 0.10 0.10 0.40 0.17 0.13 0.39 -0.03 0.2419
∆Cash (% Assets) 0.43 -0.11 2.56 0.02 -0.11 1.08 0.00 0.4997
∆Dividend Yield 0.36 0.00 0.95 0.50 0.00 1.26 0.00 0.1898
∆Capital Exp. 4.10 2.37 5.07 -0.03 -0.00 0.14 2.37 0.0000
∆R&D 0.02 0.00 0.54 -0.05 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.3841
∆Profit -1.75 -1.10 2.33 -1.32 -0.98 1.86 -0.12 0.8367
∆Assets (mil.) 1.16 1.32 2.86 1.14 1.00 2.41 0.32 0.4459

















Table 1.23: Performance of target firms before and after the crisis – Time series analysis
We regress change in characteristics in firms targeted during 2006 and 2007 after two years of activism (i.e., in years 2008 and 2009) against a set of dummies
and vector of control specfications. In vector of dummies we include ′Fund Presence in Yeart – is dummy which is equal to 1 if an activist exists in target
firm in first year of activism. Fund Presence in Yeart+1 — is dummy which takes value 1 if activist fund exists in target firm in second year of activism.
Activist Hedge Fund – is dummy which is equal to 1 if another activist fund (fund out of sample) targets the firm during 2006 and 2007. In vector of control
variables, we include firm size which is measured as natural logarithm of market capitalization. Firm age is measured using Compustat definition; firm year
minus year of first stock price and incorporated into the model in natural logarithm form. Q and Book/Market value indicate firm valuation, ROA and Profit
Margin show firm profitability, debt capacity is represented by Book Leverage, firm distribution policy is illustrated by Dividend Yield, and investment in target
firm is measured by means of Research and Development, and Capital Expenditure. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects. The standard
errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and reported in parentheses for each coefficient. ***, **, * indicates the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of statistical significance.
Variables
Valuation Profitability Debt Distribution Investment
Q Book/Market ROA Profit Margin Book Leverage Divid. Yield R&D CapEx
Fund Presence
in Yeart
-1.332 1.430 0.711** 1.636* 0.108 0.264 0.463* 0.052
(1.431) (1.761) (0.305) (0.865) (0.414) (0.334) (0.227) (0.050)
Fund Presence
in Yeart+1
1.086 -0.006 -0.171 -0.215 -0.174 -0.468** -0.338* -0.005
(0.845) (0.629) (0.178) (0.183) (0.271) (0.178) (0.192) (0.021)
Activist Hedge
Fund
-0.571 -1.131 0.120 0.262 0.176 0.070 0.222 -0.017
(0.668) (0.904) (0.194) (0.282) (0.310) (0.132) (0.199) (0.020)
MV -0.319 -0.248 -0.091 -0.246 0.167 0.021 -0.044 -0.001
(0.313) (0.477) (0.081) (0.209) (0.126) (0.075) (0.096) (0.010)
Firm Age 1.546 -1.695 -0.253 -0.784 0.119 -0.534*** -0.096 0.004
(1.083) (1.371) (0.201) (0.624) (0.266) (0.184) (0.194) (0.025)
Constant -6.012 5.389* -0.022 0.481 0.240 1.772*** -0.054 -0.105
(3.495) (2.920) (0.463) (1.079) (0.553) (0.426) (0.572) (0.073)
Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 26 30 30 29 30 30 26 30
Adjusted R2 0.098 0.355 -0.069 0.168 -0.128 0.525 -0.125 0.184
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Table 1.24: Performance of target firms before and after the crisis – Cross-sectional analysis
The table reports the estimates for net change in characteristics in firms targeted in 2006 and 2007 after two years of fund activism (i.e., in years 2008 and 2009) against a set of dummies and vecotor
of control specfications. In vector of dummies we include ′Fund Presence in Yeart – which is equal to 1 if an activist exists in target firm in first year of activism. Fund Presence in Yeart+1 – is
dummy which takes value 1 if activist fund exists in target firm in second year of activism. Activist Hedge Fund– is dummy which is equal to 1 if another activist fund (fund out of sample) targets
the firm during 2006 and 2007. In vector of control variables, we include firm size which is measured as natural logarithm of market capitalization. Firm age is measured using Compustat definition
which is firm year minus year of first stock price and incorporated into the model in natural logarithm form. We regress two separate models for each firm characteristic; first with industry and
year fixed effects, second, without industry and year effects. Variables with subscript ind indicates the results without industry and year dummies in regression. Q and Book/Market value indicate
firm valuation, ROA and Profit Margin show firm profitability, debt capacity is represented by Book Leverage, firm distribution policy is illustrated by Dividend Yield, and investment in target firm
is measured by means of Research and Development, and Capital Expenditure. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and reported in parentheses for each coefficient. ***, **, *
indicates the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of statistical significance.
Independent
Variables
Profitability Valuation Debt Investment
ROA ROAind Profit Profitind Q Qind BM BMind BL BLind RD RDind CapEx CapExind
Fund Presence
in Yeart
0.36 -0.21 4.39* -0.59 0.67 0.23 0.97 0.85 -0.88 -0.81 0.88* 0.38 0.11 0.21*
(2.23) (1.12) (2.12) (1.71) (0.77) (0.38) (1.01) (0.55) (1.03) (0.67) (0.45) (0.28) (0.09) (0.10)
Fund Presence
in Yeart+1
-0.84 -0.72 -0.79 0.28 0.18 0.48 0.48 0.53 -0.70 -0.44 -0.45 -0.35 -0.03 -0.03
(1.41) (0.93) (1.43) (1.11) (0.37) (0.47) (0.41) (0.33) (0.52) (0.41) (0.28) (0.34) (0.05) (0.04)
Activist Hedge
Fund
-0.37 -0.01 0.57 -0.98 -0.03 -0.13 -0.39 -0.47 -0.21 -0.31 0.69 0.29 -0.06 -0.03
(1.10) (0.89) (1.44) (1.50) (0.61) (0.35) (0.37) (0.30) (0.73) (0.42) (0.58) (0.39) (0.05) (0.03)
MV -0.78 -0.43 -1.67 -0.71 -0.38 -0.24 0.16 0.14 -0.31 -0.36 0.05 0.08 0.01 -0.00
(0.91) (0.51) (1.04) (0.61) (0.57) (0.32) (0.24) (0.19) (0.31) (0.21) (0.31) (0.16) (0.02) (0.02)
Firm Age 0.84 0.87 -2.67* -0.43 0.12 0.29 0.02 0.18 -0.56 -0.35 -0.42 -0.12 0.08 0.04
(1.35) (0.98) (1.48) (1.03) (0.42) (0.46) (0.65) (0.48) (0.59) (0.42) (0.28) (0.27) (0.05) (0.04)
Constant -4.13 -2.52 2.89 0.81 -2.04 -0.93 0.22 -0.28 1.80 1.81 1.28 0.03 -0.37** -0.29**
(3.84) (2.58) (4.70) (2.90) (2.85) (1.15) (1.58) (1.28) (1.55) (1.15) (1.78) (0.69) (0.15) (0.13)
Industry Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N
Year Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N
# Observations 25 25 30 30 30 30 29 29 30 30 26 26 30 30
Adjusted R2 -0.30 -0.05 0.11 -0.01 -0.19 -0.01 -0.09 0.10 0.14 0.10 -0.17 -0.03 0.19 0.18
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1.25: Abnormal returns and types of activism – Impact of large holding in firm
The table reports the coefficients for types of activism by regressing CARs obtained from multiple
event-windows. We present type of activism by means of dummy which takes value 1 if an activist fund
explicitly describes its purpose of transaction in Schedule 13D filing. Variable 13F is a dummy which is
equal to 1 if a fund holds more than $100 million in target firm prior to filing Schedule 13D to the SEC of
the US. The variable pre-activism return presents the six-months daily average returns’ performance prior to
Schedule 13D filing. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and reported in parentheses for




CARs (-20, +5) CARs (-10, +5) CARs (0, +15)
MV 0.004 0.000 -0.003
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
LEV 0.156*** 0.038 -0.009
(0.052) (0.037) (0.037)
Pre–activism Return 4.594 -0.910 -5.348*
(4.765) (3.412) (3.412)
13F 0.003 -0.002 -0.021
(0.032) (0.023) (0.023)
General Undervaluation 0.072* 0.049** 0.046*
(0.054) (0.038) (0.036)
Capital Structure 0.041** 0.002** 0.053*
(0.076) (0.054) (0.049)
Business Strategy 0.026** 0.023** 0.024**
(0.047) (0.034) (0.032)
Target Sale -0.027 0.033 0.005
(0.077) (0.055) (0.051)
Governance -0.043 -0.058 -0.058
(0.057) (0.041) (0.027)
Chapter 11 -0.056 -0.128 0.352**
(0.287) (0.206) (0.177)
Industry Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y
Observations 324 324 297
Adjusted R-squared 0.170 0.237 0.100
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Table 1.26: Size and leverage effect on cross-section of abnormal returns during crisis
period
We regress multiple event-windows against a set of activism types with crisis interactive terms. Types of
activism and crisis are represented by means of dummy. Crisis period covers from July 2007 to December 2013.
We do not report vector of control variables which includes size, leverage, average 6-months daily pre-activism
returns, Schedule 13F, industry and year fixed effects for the sake of space. Firm size and leverage are in
natural logarithmic form and demeaned. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and reported in





Crisis 0.189 0.128 0.128
(0.154) (0.117) (0.117)
General Undervaluation -0.026 -0.005 -0.005
(0.070) (0.058) (0.058)
Capital Structure 0.044 -0.002 -0.002
(0.090) (0.109) (0.109)
Business Strategy -0.014 0.006 0.006
(0.069) (0.048) (0.048)
Target Sale -0.022 0.046 0.046
(0.085) (0.085) (0.085)
Governance -0.056 -0.064 -0.064
(0.083) (0.061) (0.061)
General Value* Crisis -0.094 -0.102 -0.102
(0.116) (0.094) (0.094)
Capital Structure* Crisis 0.011 0.003 0.003
(0.133) (0.127) (0.127)
Business Strategy* Crisis 0.148 0.077 0.077
(0.105) (0.082) (0.082)
Target Sale* Crisis 0.026 -0.099 -0.099
(0.148) (0.124) (0.124)
Governance* Crisis 0.004 -0.019 -0.019
(0.128) (0.092) (0.092)
General Value* Crisis* MV -0.027 -0.024 -0.024
(0.019) (0.016) (0.016)
Business Strategy* Crisis* MV 0.003 0.010 0.010
(0.024) (0.020) (0.020)
Target Sale* Crisis* MV 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Governance* Crisis* MV 0.000* 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Default* Crisis* MV -0.000 -0.000* -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capital Structure* Crisis* Lev 0.824*** 0.437** 0.437**
(0.296) (0.215) (0.215)
# Observations 324 324 324
Adjusted R-squared 0.119 0.185 0.185
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TEST SPECIFICATIONS, CORRECT MODELLING, AND SENSI-
TIVITY OF LONG–RUN ABNORMAL RETURNS IN HEDGE FUND
TARGET FIRMS
Zazy Khan
ABSTRACT. Following the literature on test–specifications, correct modelling, and
detectability of long-run stock performance in event study framework, this study tests the
performance of monthly stock returns of 589 firms targeted by 112 hedge funds over the
period of January 2000 to December 2013. For an estimation window of (–12, +36) months,
it addresses two fundamental questions; first whether active targets (13D) outperform the
passive targets (13G) in recent financial–crisis; and second whether long–horizon abnormal
returns still pronounce when corrected for biases and test-specifications. To investigate
these concerns, a number of methodologies including cumulative abnormal returns,
buy–and–hold abnormal returns, and calendar–time portfolio approach using various
matching criteria are applied. Our initial findings suggest that 13D firms perform relatively
better than 13G firms, however, underperform the PE targets. Moreover, when matching
criteria are well-defined, then estimates appear generally significant with improved power
of the tests.
Keywords: Hedge funds, event studies, test–specifications, correct–modelling, biases,
long–run returns
JEL classification: G12; G14
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2.1 Introduction
A well established body of literature has been consistently analyzing the long–run perfor-
mance of the stock returns following the major corporate events in the last three decades.1
The reported findings in this literature initially suggest a great deal of potential synergies
and wealth effect for the investors; however abnormality in returns is critically viewed as
market inefficiency as pointed out by Fama (1998). He argues that when approaches to
measure long–run abnormal returns are controlled for various statistical tests then as a result
abnormality either becomes marginal or disappears.
The commonly used methods to detect abnormality in long-term returns are subject to
various biases and yield misspecified test-statistics as emphasized by Lyon et al. (1999), and
returns are likely subject to bad-modelling (Fama, 1998). One of the severe outcomes emerg-
ing from misspecified test statistics is that probability of empirical rejection rate exceeds
from the theoretical rejection rate in testing the abnormality. Earlier studies by Barber and
Lyon (1996, 1997); Lyon et al. (1999), and Kothari and Warner (1997) have shed enough
light on these biases including measurement, new listing, rebalancing, and skewness bias
among others.
The documented literature in fund activism suggests that fund related activism has
promised positively significant daily returns in the short–run around the announcement dates,
and partly monthly returns in the long-term to associated investors. However, so far there has
been no peculiar attempt to test the long-run performance in targets, particularly in the wake
of recent financial crisis. Recently, Bebchuk et al. (2014) using a sample covering period of
1994–2007, analyze the long–term stock performance of the target firms in subsequent three
and five years event-window following the fund-activism and find that targets long term value
is not deteriorated as propagated by critics. In addition, their findings suggest that market
initial appreciation in stock prices is a good anticipation of long-term intervention’s effect.
However, on methodological grounds, their research is likely subjects to the aforementioned
biases and test-specifications.
1These corporate events include mergers and acquisitions (Agrawal et al., 1992), (Bessembinder and Zhang,
2013), dividend initiation, omission, and reduction (Boehme and Sorescu, 2002; Michaely et al., 1995), initial
public offering and seasonal equity offering (Bessler and Thies, 2007; Brav and Gompers, 1997; Eckbo et al.,
2000; Jegadeesh et al., 1993; Loughran and Ritter, 1996; Ritter, 1991), share repurchase (Ikenberry et al., 1995),




The approaches to detect abnormality in returns normally include cumulative abnormal
returns (MacKinlay, 1997), buy-and-hold abnormal returns (Lyon et al., 1999), and calendar–
time portfolio abnormal returns (Fama, 1998; Lyon et al., 1999). These approaches typically
use carefully constructed benchmarks either using well-defined firm-specific characteristics
or reference portfolio. However, the outcomes from using different methodologies vary
and subject to researcher’s choice. Cumulative abnormal returns approach suffers from
compounding effect (Barber and Lyon, 1997), and upwardly biased (Kothari and Warner,
1997). Buy-and-hold returns approach is occasionally preferred over cumulative abnormal
approach due to better statistical properties, however the documented results in Eckbo et al.
(2000) study suggest that buy–and–hold returns also suffer from bad modelling and yield
misspecified test-statistic in norandom samples (Lyon et al., 1999). In addition, holding
period methodologies ignore cross-sectional dependence among event firms abnormal returns
which are overlapping in calendar-time and likely produce overstated test-statistics (Fama,
1998). Calendar-time portfolio approach is considered more reliable measure since it sys-
tematically avoids biases, e.g., new listing and rebalancing, and in addition it resovles partly
cross-sectional dependence among firm’s abnormal returns. However, calendar-time portfolio
approach also suffers from underweighting (overweighting) observations from periods with
large (small) cross-section in unbalanced panels (Hoechle et al., 2009). Given these issues
related with each approach, we fundamentally question which one approach would be better
to analyze target firms long-run returns performance following the fund announcement?
In addition, how an appropriate choice of methodology can possibly reduce the associated
biases and provide approximately precise estimates?
To answer these questions, this study aims to test the abnormality in target’s returns over
the long–horizon following fund activism before and after the recent financial crisis. Using a
universe of uniquely hand collected data consisting of 589 actively targeted firms extracted
from Scheduel 13D, and 898 passively targeted firms retrieved from Schedule 13G with an
additional sample of 273 private equity firms to evaluate the monthly stock performance in
actively target firms. To test the significance of long–term abnormal returns in targets with
improved test-specifications, this study attempts to examine whether target firms perform bet-
ter than nontargets in pre and post-crisis, and whether abnormality in returns still pronounces
when approaches to measure them are corrected for several biases and test-specifications. In
addition, this study attempts to explain the cross-sectional variation in target firms’ abnormal
returns arising because of applying different matching criteria and sample composition.
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Test-specifications using cumulative abnormal returns approach tends towards negative
bias implicitly induced by cross-sectional returns accumulation. Our initial finding suggests
that using Fama-French three-factor model yields positively skewed estimates which contrasts
with (Barber and Lyon, 1997) who document that cumulative abnormal returns experience
significantly negative biases in test-statistics when returns are computed in excess of a refer-
ence portfolio. However, using carefully constructed benchmak based on well-defined firm
characteristics yield negative test-statistics. In our analysis, skewness bias is identified as a
reason to yield negative cumulative abnormal returns and as a result it leads the empirical
rejection rate to exceed the theoretical rejection rate. The specifications of test-statistics using
buy-and-hold returns yield negative estimates in aggregate. Using Fama-French three factor
model as a reference portfolio yields increasingly negatively skewness biases in estimates.
The study analyzes the long-run stock performance broadly into two stages. In first
part, we construct a wide array of benchmarks which allow us to test the power of test-
statistics using various approaches for multiple monthly event-windows. In second part, we
compute mean monthly abnormal returns by employing several methodologies on different
event-windows using event-study framework. The results are interesting and carry novelty in
the sense that results yielding from different methdologies using various matching criteria
vary substantially. The CARs over (–12, +36) month longest event-window indicates that
target and nontargets significantly negatively underperform the returns on a value-weighted
reference portfolio of Fama–French three-factor model including market index, size, and
value. When comparing targets’ performance with nontargets, the target firms yield better
performance than nontarget firms from hedge fund but underperform matching firms from pri-
vate equity sample. When these results are controlled for crisis effect, no significance change
is observed. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns approach produces persistently significantly
negative results. The mean monthly abnormal returns in excess of reference portfolio which is
Fama–French three-factor model yields significantly negative abnormal returns for 12-month,
24-month and 36-month event-windows. However, in comparison with nontarget firms (13G),
significantly positive abnormal returns are realized which increase for longer event-window.
The estimates for mean monthly abnormal returns using calendar-time portfolio approach
appear in line with other approaches. Using reference portfolio of Fama-French three-factor
model, we experience significantly negative results, however magnitude on these estimates
reduce over the subsequent longer event-windows.
This paper contributes on several fronts to the ongoing debate on hedge fund activism
and uncovers some related insights. First, it leads the hedge fund research on analyzing the
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long-run abnormal returns in target firms for activism. The documented hedge fund literature
so far has not enough explored the detectability of misspecifications of implied test-statistics
thus accuracy of produced estimates in long–run event studies remain yet unquestioned. Prior
studies have been mainly concentrating on either cumulative or holding-period methodol-
ogy focusing trivially on matching criteria. Nonetheless; these studies have been yielding
significant returns. To critically question the robustness of previously documented findings,
this study investigates by taking into account all possible test-statistics and hence suggests
reasonable remedy to reduce these issues in future research.
The study potentially draws a distinction from the prior literature on hedge fund activism
by extracting matching firms sample from similar set of hedge funds. Prior documented
studies have been using the matching sample constituting on firms drawn from private equity,
mutual firms, or out–of–sample nonhedge funds (for details, see, Klein and Zur (2009), Brav
et al. (2008), Greenwood and Schor (2009)). Matching firms from similar set of hedge funds
primarily allow us to control for the quantitative and qualitative characteristics associated
with funds.
In addition, this study employs a number of approaches to test for the long–run abnormal
returns. These approaches are cumulative abnormal returns, buy–and–hold abnormal returns
and the calendar–time portfolio returns among others within event-study framework. More-
over, these methodologies are carried out by using various models demonstrating specific
test–power. To evaluate the long–run abnormal returns of the target/event firms, we construct
the matching criteria on several firm–specific characteristics for a matching event firm and
reference portfolios. By doing so, we control for the well-known biases in existing studies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature
on biases. Chapter 3 explores the prevalent methodologies to mitigate the biases. Chapter 4
focuses on data construction, and chapter 5 identifies the methods to construct the matching
criteria. Chapter 6 presents analysis and the results, and finally chapter 7 concludes the paper.
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2.2 Literature review
2.2.1 Various biases and their treatment
The event studies of long-run abnormal returns typically suffer from various types of bi-
ases. These biases arise due to mis-specifications in applying bad / incorrect modelling,
test-statistics, and evaluating benchmarks. As a result the empirical rejection rate likely
exceeds the theoretical rejection rate and consequently leads to type I and type II error. In
this section, we uncover several biases arising primarily because of incorporating different
methodologies, deficiencies in data sources, and in particular, due to estimation techniques.
2.2.2 Measurement bias
Barber and Lyon (1997) document that cumulative abnormal returns are biased estimator
of the long–run buy–and–hold abnormal returns. On the grounds of statistical properties
and better characteristics, they prefer to use buy-and-hold returns over cumulative abnormal
returns in detecting abnormal returns, and hence define it measurement bias.
2.2.3 New listing
New listing bias arises in the long–run event studies because of new entrants in the reference
portfolio. The event firms generally have long post–event history of returns, whilst the firms
which constitute the index, include new firms, in particular begin their trading subsequent to
the event month. With new entrants, Ritter (1991) argues that firms that go public normally
underperform the equally–weighted market index, however Brav et al. (2000) find that this
underperformance is confined to small high–growth firms. Over the longer period of analysis
following event, it is likely that firms going public constituting overwhelming portion of the
newly listed firms, thus the result is downwardly biased estimate of the long–horizon return
from investing in a passively holding reference portfolio. Thus, therefore, it leads potentially
to new listing bias.
2.2.4 Re–balancing bias
This type of bias occasionally arises when the compounded returns of a reference portfolio,
such as an equally–weighted market index, are typically calculated assuming periodic; for
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example monthly rebalancing, while returns on sample firms are compounded without rebal-
ancing. Constructing referene portfolios as described usually do not accurately reflect the
returns earned on a passively buy–and–hold strategy in investing equally–weighted portfolios.
Lyon et al. (1999) argue two reasons for inaccuracy; first, the underlying portfolio return
assumes periodic rebalacing, say monthly, to maintain equal weights. This procedure of
rebalancing leads to an inflated long-horizon return on the reference portfolio, which can
likely be attributed to bid–ask bounce and nonsynchronous trading.
2.2.5 Skewness bias
Normally such biases appear in inferences drawn from applied approaches; for instance,
cumulative abnormal returns usually report positive skewed inference compared to negatively
biased results by buy–and–hold abnormal returns. This occurs because of other biases in-
cluding new listing, rebalancing among others as argued by Barber and Lyon (1997).
2.2.6 Sampling bias
Sampling bias arises when data is attributed to different deciles using the benchmark of size
and other target firm characteristics. Barber and Lyon (1997) argue that categorizing the data
into different size and book–to–market deciles may cause the reference portfolios and three–
factor model to yield misspecified test statistics. Additionally, using size/book–to–market
value matching firm approach yields well–specified test statistics in all types of size and
book–to–market deciles except for large size firms.
2.3 Approaches to compute the abnormal–returns
A number of methodologies consistently applied to measure the long–term performance in
target’s stock following the corporate event. As discussed in section 2.2.1, these approaches
are subject to several statistical properties, biases, and test-specifications. In this section, we
discuss the applied methodologies and will draw the inferences in a more precise way.
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2.3.1 Cumulative abnormal returns
To compute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs-henceforth) for a target firm i after observing
an event of interest for a specific period of time, say 12 months, the abnormal return ARi,
which is the difference between security Ri less expected return ERi is aggregated for the




Fama (1998) advances three factors to favour CARs. First, asset pricing models com-
monly assure that normally distributed returns and normality is a better approximation for
shorter horizons than longer ones. In a recent study by Knif et al. (2013) advocating CARs
over buy–and–hold returns and calendar–time portfolio approach by arguing that CARs
yield better performance in sub–periods of investigation. Second, empirical tests of asset
pricing models in general typically use monthly returns. Moreover, there is less evidence that
asset pricing models are used to detect abnormality in longer period covering three and five
years. And the last but not least is that longitude of abnormal returns to be over-stated when
returns are compounded. Using various approaches including control firm, the bootstrapped,
skewness–adjusted t–statistic, and pseudo–portfolio approach in randon samples, Lyon et al.
(1999) conclude that all of these methods yield most likely well–specified test–statistics
for cumulative abnormal returns as well as for buy–and–hold approach. They further argue
that CARs, despite being less–skewed, the t–statistic are also yielded well–specified. And
lastly, sampling biases including size, book–to–market, pre–event returns, calendar clustering,
industry clustering, and over–lapping returns affect CARs in parallel ways to buy-and-hold
returns.
However, apart from simplicity and easiness in computation, CARs demonstrate a few
disadvantages from economic perspective. In cases, when CARs are accumulated for a
specific period of interest based on simple returns, the output yields inaccurate measures of
period. For instance, considering a period of 12 months, it produces the product of monthly
returns rather to aggregate them.
2.3.2 Buy–and–hold abnormal returns
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs-hereafter) differ from CARs while compounding the
monthly returns. As Barber and Lyon (1997) point out that CARs ignore compounding effect
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contrary to BHARs which take into account the effect of compounding and consequently
making it less reliable measure to estimate long-run abnormal returns. Adding more months
to post-event period yields more compounding difference than non-compounding (Knif et al.,
2013, see, for more details). Barber and Lyon (1997) argue that if the returns on an individual
security is more volatile than a market index returns, then CARs in terms of magnitude will be
greater than BHARs provided BHARs is less than or equal to zero. To deal with compounding
effect, Knif et al. (2013) suggest that those monthly or yearly observations appearing with
compounding effect should be tested separately.
An equally important question arises whether to use CARs or BHARs; however, as Ritter
(1991) suggests, it depends on the research question we are interested in. Barber and Lyon
(1997), for example, consider a case of twelve month CARs and an annual BHARs. Dividing
the twelve month CARs by 12 yields a mean monthly abnormal return. Thus, a test of the
null hypothesis that the mean monthly abnormal return of the sample firms during the event
year is equal to zero; is not a test of the null hypothesis that the mean annual abnormal return
is equal to zero. To test the latter hypothesis, Barber and Lyon (1997) propose to use BHARs.
Referring to the compounding effect which appears in measuring long-run abnormal
returns, Barber and Lyon (1997) name it measurement bias. Barber and Lyon (1997) find that
CARs is a biased estimator of BHARs. Kothari and Warner (1997) find that cumulated returns
are upwardly biased and describe it an increasing function of the proportionate bid-ask spread
of event firms and suggest that using BHARs approach may alleviate bias in abnormal returns
occurring due to accumulation (see Blume and Stambaugh, 1983; Roll, 1983, for more
details). In our analysis, we are interested in the wealth effect experienced by an investor
in post–activism period of 13D announcement, so therefore BHARs approach seems more
convincingly to be used.
Following the description of Barber and Lyon (1997) to compute the holding period






Where HPRit is the holding period return for firm i during the period from t to τ . Rit
represents the daily return on common stock of the firm i on day t. In next step, returns
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from this individual stock are adjusted in excess of matching sample firm or using matching










Where ERi(t,τ) indicates the excess return for security i from the period t to τ . In case,
if an event firm i is delisted (after being acquired, some firms are fully owned by activists
and do not report their pricing data to Datastream) prior to certain holding period, then an
surrogate return series is substituted into the analysis.
To compute BHARs for a firm i, the difference between return on event-firm less the
return on matching firm or a reference portfolio (equally–weighted index) is computed using










To test the hypothesis of no event effect or alternatively of no mean monthly abnormal
returns, we employ the following conventional t–statistic:
tBHAR = (BHAR)n | s (2.5)
Based on statistical distribution and inferences and cross–sectional correlation of returns
in the long–run, the use of BHARs is controversially debated among researchers. To measure
investor experience precisely, Barber and Lyon (1997) suggest BHARs over other measures,
however they find that computation of BHARs using reference portfolio such as market
index carry implicit misspecification and subjects to new listing, rebalancing, and skewness
biases. In a recent study, Knif et al. (2013) highlight the potential problem of cross–sectional
independence in long–run returns which further inflate the magnitude of variance or risk in
reference portfolios and cast doubt on the statistical inferences.
To mitigate these concerned issues, we follow the approach suggested by Barber and Lyon
(1997) and use matching sample firm based on size and book–to–market value to evaluate
the abnormal returns performance in each target firm. Using a well-constructed matching
sample firm helps to mitigate issues such as new listing, rebalancing and skewness biases. In
addition, to test the abnormality in long-run returns, we employ convential t-statistic (2.5),
since it is based on the cross-sectional standard deviations of the abnormal returns during the
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period of analysis.
2.3.3 Calendar–time portfolio approach
In section 2.3.1 and section 2.3.2, we discuss the issues of bad-modelling and misspecifica-
tions related with cumulative and buy-and-hold methodologies. Thus, statistical inferences
drawn from using these approaches are arguably less reliable. In addition, previous studies
on the detectability of abnormal returns suffer from a potential problem described as cross-
sectional dependence among sample firms. Any methodology that ignores the cross-sectional
dependence in event firms’ returns, particularly in cases in which returns are overlapped
in calendar time, are likely to produce overstated t-statisitcs (Fama, 1998). As Mitchell
and Stafford (2000) find empirical evidence that holding period methodologies are likely to
produce overstated test-statistics. To control for cross-sectional correlation in sample firms,
Fama (1998) advocates the calendar-time portfolio approach (CT PA) as proposed in seminal
studies by Jaffe (1974); Mandelker (1974).
Calendar-time portfolio approach which is also known as Jensen alpha approach statisti-
cally demonstrates properties better than cumulative abnormal returns and buy–and–hold
return approach. Lyon et al. (1999) argue that it primarily helps in mitigating the issue of
cross–sectional correlation among individual firms and yields test statistics which is more
robust in non-random samples. However, Hoechle et al. (2009) argue that such statistical
robustness is conditional to investor’s segregation and limited to the analysis of a single
binary investor characteristics.
While CT PA partly resolves the issue of cross-sectional dependence in firms’ returns, it
is likely that model using CT PA may experience misspecifications, in particular when sample
is nonrandom. Hoechle et al. (2009) propose an improved technique which generalizes the
calendar-time portfolio apporach and argue that the new technique is much capable of dealing
with continuous and multivariate investor characteristics.2
Following the specifications of Lyon et al. (1999), we use both the calendar–time port-
folios (incorporating Fama–French three–factor model) and mean monthly calendar–time
abnormal returns.
2Discussion of this generalized calendar-time portfolio and its implications are beyond our study.
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2.3.3.1 The Fama–French three–factor model and calendar–time portfolio
For each calendar month i, we form a portfolio comprising all firms that experience the same
event (in this case the announcement of Schedule 13D with the SEC) during the period of i
to j. For one year long–run abnormal returns, it will be 12 months prior to the event month.
The monthly portfolio returns are computed as the equally–weighted average of monthly
returns of all firms in the portfolio. Then these excess portfolio returns are regressed against
Fama–French three factor model as follows:3
Rpt −R f t = αi+βi(Rmt −R f t)+ siSMBt +hiHMLt + εit (2.6)
Where Rpt is the monthly return on the calendar time portfolio, R f t is the return on one
month Treasury bill rate, Rmt −R f t is the excess return on the value–weighted market index,
size factor, SMBt is the return on value–weighted portfolios of small stock less the return on
value–weighted portfolio of big stock. HMLt measures the difference between the return on
portfolios of high book–to–market stocks and low book–to–market stocks. The coefficient of
αi, the intercept, is interpreted as the mean monthly abnormal return of the event portfolio
and hypothesized as zero monthly abnormal return. Varying in number of firms in each
month, to estimate the regression coefficients, we follow Liu (2003) and use both ordinary
least squares OLS and weighted least square WLS methods.4
2.3.3.2 Mean monthly calendar–time abnormal returns
Assume that the event period of interest is three years. For each calendar month, calculate
the abnormal return (AR) for each security using the returns on the reference portfolio R:
ARt = Rit −Rpt (2.7)







3For computing Fama-French three factors model, [1]downloadable from Fama – French Database-
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
4Lyon et al. (1999) argue that variations in number of firms from month to month most probably yield
heteroskedastic error terms. To correct for this problem, they suggest to perform weighted least squraes
estimation.
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Where nt is the number of firms in the portfolio in the month t. The weight xit is 1n ,
when abnormal returns are equally–weighted, and MVit∑MVit , when abnormal returns are value








Where T is total number of calendar months. To test the null hypothesis of zero mean
monthly abnormal returns, a t–statistic is calculated using the time–series standard deviation






2.4 Data collection and variable construction
2.4.1 Hedge funds sample
Primarily, a sample of 200 hedge funds is obtained upon request from Barclayhedge.com
(private) database with assets under management (AUM– hereafter) and monthly net returns.
Of this, funds functioning only in the U.S. are chosen. At next stage, the funds investing
in equities under various categories including global macro, global, event driven, market
driven among others are shortlisted. To this sample, we add more funds found in hedge
fund literature and on related websites. A list of at least 500 randomly chosen funds is
assembled. To this extent, the details about fund holdings (AUM) and acquired stakes in
firms are unknown. To make it further diversified and well-balanced sample, we perform a
search test in the Securities and Exchangd Commission’s EDGAR search file with the first
name of fund in our list and retrieve additional funds. This process helps in to add more
funds to the list which precisely marks about 800 activist hedge funds. From these 800
funds, we drop funds functioning as abitrageurs or taking positions for short period trading
purposes. This leaves our initial activist sample to 127 funds involved in activism. To avoid
any possible selection bias, the funds are chosen regardless of their characteristics e.g. fund
size (AUM), previous filing record, performance, and characteristics about fund managers.
At next stage, each fund is searched in EDGAR system for its record from January 2000
to December 2013. Funds usually report several mandatory files during the period, they
operate. When a hedge fund acquires 5% or more ownership stake in a publicly listed firm
with intent to intervene in the business course of a firm, it is officially required to report the
105
Test specifications, modelling and sensitivity
13D Schedule within 10 days to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC henceforth)
of the U.S. under the ’Securities Exchange Act of 1934’ in order to regulate the transaction
for certain purposes in the secondary market.5 The Schedule 13D indicates the filer as an
activist and provides the details about filer name, the issuer name and identity as an asset
class (bank, money manager), the number of total shares outstanding and their form (ordinary
or preferred stock), payment methods and related costs, the purpose of transaction, filer
holdings in total outstanding shares, and other necessary documentation in the course of
transaction’s proceedings.6
The Schedule 13D discloses essential information about filer’s identity. Item 2 entitled
as "Identity and Background" describes the reporting person’s business address and type,
record about filer’s, if any, criminal and civil proceedings in last five years. However, it does
not mention explicitly the filer’s type whether it is hedge fund or non-hedge fund. Thus,
to clarify any doubts about fund’s identification and position, we examine thoroughly each
fund’s personal webpage and verify it with Factiva and other related websites. During this
systematic search process, some funds are found offering services simultaneously for hedge
funds as well as for private equity funds. We trace the parent investment companies which
manage these funds and check their identification. If the filer is found non-hedge fund, we
simply exclude it. To give an example from the list of activist funds, Deephaven Capital
Management LLC, which manages hedge funds and invests in fixed income securities and
in private equity funds. To make sure whether it is classified as hedge fund, we check its
website and record on past transactions in SEC to confirm its identification.
Using EDGAR’s system to retrieve 13D filings could possibly bias the sample toward
big funds and small firms. To acquire a meaningful stake in a firm for activism, a fund is
required to invest a substantial part of holding capital. However, some activist funds have
involved in target firms with ownership stake less than 5%, thus do not appear in EDGAR’s
system. For example, in recent period, Sandell Asset Management after acquiring merely
2% stake in JDS Uniphase Corp. (operating in networks and optical products), urged the
target to consider a proposal of divesting some subsidiary assets. Following this suggestion,
5The Schedule 13G is a mandatory disclosure statement for the persons subject to Section 13(g). The
qualified institutional investor is requiresd to meet two core elements. First, the institution must have acquired
the ownership stake in an ordinary course of business and not with the purpose of influencing the control of
issuing authority. Second, the issuer must belong to a specific regulatory institution e.g. bank, insurance firms,
saving association under Federal Act, registered investment bank among others. The filer (qualified institutional
investor) of 13G Filing is required to report within 45 days of the end of calendar year in which the beneficial
owner holds more than 5% or within 10 days of the end of the calendar year in which filer holds more than 10%
onwership stake.
6Schedule 13D and other filings can easily be downloaded through EDGAR filings search on [1]www.sec.gov
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JDS announced its plan saying "This is a strategy our board has been actively considering
for some time, ..." The effectiveness of proposal in short period is manifested by fund’s
reputation and its active role in another firm namely Bob Evan Farms Inc., where it acquired
four board seats and urged the firm to spin–off particular assets.7 These events account for
a significant portion of the fund-activism. We gather information about such events using
various sources including financial press and related websites.8
Activist funds file initial Schedule 13D and then frequently report changes to it known
as amended file (13D/A). In some cases, these amended files are not reported after first
announcement to EDGAR’s system. The amended files are used to follow the developments
on fund activism during a specific period. In addition, to know how long the fund stayed in
firm (in later part of analysis, these amended files are well explained). A notable example
is Del Mar Asset Management, LP when it acquired 4.38% stake in Kennedy-Wilson Hold-
ings, Inc. and announced 13D Filing on November 16, 2009. However, EDGAR’s system
does not report amendments following the initial filing, thus, all such cases are not considered.
A structurally well-defined procedure of multiple cross-checking and scrutinization leaves
the sample with 112 U.S. hedge funds demonstrating the average characteristics of industry.
In comparison with seminal study by Brav et al. (2008) who analyze 236 activist hedge
funds over the period of 2001 to 2006, this study investigates 13D Disclosuers filed by 112
activist funds for a wide period starting from January 2000 to December 2013. Our sample
composition in terms of activists’ distribution resembles to Boyson and Mooradian (2011)
study who investigate 111 activist hedge funds owned by 89 hedge fund management firms
over the period of 1994 to 2005.9 Table 2.1 represents the distribution of the activist funds
over the period of 2000–2013. An overview of the sample depicts the monotonic trend. The
number of activist funds on average do not vary from 2002 to 2005, however, just before
crisis and in following years, an increasing trend is observed. Out of 760 fund and firm pairs
(repeated in some cases), we have 688 firms uniquely targeted by 112 funds. On average,
each activist fund targets 6 firms over the sample period. However, some funds exceptionally
7[1]http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/09/10/activist-sandell-urged-jds-to-explore-options/?KEYWORDS=hedge+fund+2+equity+stake.
8An important criticism is drawn on activist’s successful campaign by seeking insights to know how activists
systematically gain board seats or influnce firm to implement their suggested plan by holding even less than 5%
ownership stake. To gain insights into this puzzle, activists normally propose their agenda to inclined but reluc-
tant large shareholders including pension funds, mutual funds, private equity funds, and more possibly with other
hedge funds with whom they can find common grounds. Activists lead the campaign on behalf of other institu-
ional sharedholders by dividing the monitoring cost proportionately. [1]http://business.financialpost.com/2014/11/15/how-
activist-hedge-funds-on-steroids-have-become-a-boardroom-enemy/
9How well our sample is diversified and representative of the industry? According to global research firm
Preqin [1]https://www.preqin.com/, currently more than 400 activist hedge funds functioning worldwide. Of these 400 active funds,
60% are US based thus comprising 240 funds from which we assemble our sample with 112 activist funds (47%).
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(e.g., Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund, Carl Ichan C, Jana Partners LLC, and VP
Partners LLC, among others) engage in, on average, more than 20 firms in sample period
which demonstrates their wide activist role.
2.4.2 Target firms sample
For a comprehensive list of 760 Schedule 13D events with the announcement dates, we
retrieve 688 firms which are uniquely targeted by 112 activst hedge funds over the period of
January 2000 to December 2013. For about 9% cases (760–688), some firms are targeted
repeatedly in similar months, so therefore in order to avoid repetition in analysis, we drop the
firm occuring twice, however we strictly consider the purpose of transaction for which firm
is targeted. At next stage, these firms are searched into the Thomson Reuters Datastream
for their DS Mnemonic Codes (identification codes). During search process, a large part of
firms do not appear in Datastream, thus we drop them from our sample. Our well–defined
search process shortlists 589 U.S. firms, ultimately. These firms are publicly traded at
NY SE/AMEX/NASDAQ exchanges.10
For a comprehensive sample of 589 target firms, we extract data on their stock prices
and for accounting figures from their balance sheets, income and cash flow statements,
respectively. Stock prices are daily based and start prior to January 2000 to December 2013.
Of these 589 firms, a large number of target firms are reported as either dead or completely
buyout, merged, or delisted from Datastream during the course of activism. Given that, the
database does not explain any reason for disappearing firms. The missing annual accounting
figures account for approximately 20% of entire sample. However, these caveats have been
noticed by prior fund-related studies. Among others, Greenwood and Schor (2009) reduce
their sample size approximately half to the firms available in Compustat but find it arguably
upward biased to small firms.
During the course of activism, a hedge fund keeps on following with the target firm
and files several amendments known as 13D/As. These amended files reveal the fund’s
consideration about the target contemporary performance and its strategic plans regarding
future policies. In the majority of these cases, a fund demands merely a formal commu-
nication for investment purpose, however, sometimes, it recommends an entire change in
10In comparison with first chapter, the number of firms have been improved. We correctly identify firm codes
for those companies which are merged in other firms after some period.
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the course of actions including displacement of CEO, board management, bargaining for
appropriate deals in mergers and acquisitions (M&As), corporate and governance matters. In
order not to miss any important information, we go through these amended files in particular
and gather all theoretical information on relevant items. In case of a significant change to
the previously submitted purpose of the transaction (e.g., if a fund initially purchases the
stock for portfolio investment by having no intention of playing an active role at manage-
rial level and later on alters it to participate in corporate activities as an aggressive/hostile
investor) then this amended file would be considered as a separate case. However, earlier
studies report that these follow up events do not affect the significance of the overall re-
sults (see, e.g., (Greenwood and Schor, 2009)). In this sample, 3500 amended files out of
total 4260 (6 amendments per initial announcement) constitute about 80% of the total sample.
2.4.3 Matching firms sample
2.4.3.1 Passive firms–13G filings
As discussed in the section 2.4.1 that when an activist crosses a threshold by acquiring 5% or
more ownership stake in a publicly listed firm and reveals explicitly no interest to influence
the control in firm, then it is mandatory for the acquirer to report Schedule 13G within 45
days at the end of calendar year in which the investor holds ownership. In case of holding
10% or more stake, the duration to file Schedule 13G announcement restricts to 10 days at
the end of calendar year. We experience that an activist also acquires firm for longer period
with nonactive purpose by filing 13G to the SEC. This intuitively motivates to a comparative
analysis and raises question to investigate whether firms actively targeted perform better than
non–actively targeted firms. In other words, to evaluate the performance of firms reported
in 13D Schedules, we use the firms reported in 13G Form. We gather all reported 13G
disclosures for the similar set of hedge funds for which we collect 13D files over the period
of January 2000 to December 2013. From these 13G Files, we gather all relevant information
including firm name, percentage of holding to total ownership, and type of shares (common
versus preferred stock). Unlike 13D Schedule, 13G Form is distinctively exempted from
several clauses to report.11
Initially we collect 955 firms from 112 hedge funds reporting 13G Filings over the
period of January 2000 to December 2013. At next stage, we search these firms in Thomson
11In some cases, funds initially report 13D Schedule to the SEC, however later on they are observed to
change the status to 13G depending on investment strategy.
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Reuters Datastream database to retrieve their DS Mnemonic Codes (identification codes) in
order to collect data. For a small number of firms, which constitute approximately 6% of
entire sample, however we do not find codes, thus these firms are dropped from our sample.
For the rest of 898 firms, we extract data on daily and monthly stock prices and annual
accounting figures from using Datastream. All matching firms are US based and listed at
NY SE/AMEX/NASDAQ exchanges.
2.4.3.2 Private equity target firms
To evaluate the target firms’ stock performance, we use an additional matching sample con-
sisting of firms targeted by private equity management companies. This sample comprises of
273 firms targeted by 195 US private equity companies over the period of January 2000 to
December 2013. The targeted firms are registered at NY SE/ AMEX / NASDAQ exchanges.
We gather data on these firms daily, and monthly stock prices and annual accounting figures
from using Bloomberg database.12
2.4.4 Crisis definition
For the analyses of daily and monthly stock returns, we divide the data into two sub-groups,
for the period before crisis, it starts from January 2000 to July 2007, and for the period during
and after crisis, it begins from July 2007 and lasts until December 2013. For the annual
accounting analyses, the observations for the crisis begin from 2007 and onward.13.
For stock returns, the crisis is measured by means of a dummy variable which takes the
value one, if Schedule 13D is filed from July 2007 and ends at 2013. In similar fashion, for
accounting analyses, crisis is equal to one, if Schedule 13D is reported in year 2007 and
onward. Prior studies considering recent crisis impact have been using a similar definition
(For detail, e.g., see, Becht et al. (2014); Ben-David et al. (2012); Maier et al. (2011)). In the
12Using passive firms targeted by similar hedge funds as a matching sample could possibly arise a potential
problem of selection bias and could lead to inaccurate inferences.
13The crisis in sub-prime sector which started in early 2007 subsequently trickled down to the financial
institutions including banks, holding companies, investment banks, and brokerage houses in the mid of 2007. A
general concensus among academicians define the recent financial crisis period from July 2007 till December
2009. Maier et al. (2011) explain the definition of crisis by stating "at the end of June 2007, hedge funds of the
investment bank Bear Stearns, which had invested overwhelmingly in the sub-prime mortgage market, were
among the first to struggle". (see for details, ’Bear Stearns says battered hedge funds are worth little’, New
York Times, July 18, 2007., [1]http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/18/business/18bond.html?_r=0.
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sample, one third observations fall in the period following the financial crisis.
2.4.5 Data caveats
2.4.5.1 Non–random sample selection
We extract target and matching firms from similar set of activist hedge funds which grants, in
principle an advantage that it allows to control for the quantitative and qualitative characteris-
tics of activist funds. Thus, the determinants which may affect an activist decision whether
to target a firm or not are entirely subject to firm characterisitcs and should be accounted
for. Prior activism-related literature (Boyson and Mooradian, 2011; Brav et al., 2008; Klein
and Zur, 2006) has documented on funds choice and find that target firms are generally
characterized as small in market capitalization, holding excessive cash, and operationally
well profitable in the year before activism. Fund-related activism critics (see, for detail,
Coffee and Palia (2014)) raise fundamental question on post-activism target’s performance
and argue that it may be attributed to fund’s good choice rather than fund’s suggested actions
in firm’s business course. Thus, it originates the problem of selection bias stemming from
unobservable heterogeneity. To resolve this potential issue in sample, literature (Rosenbaum
and Rubin, 1983) suggests to use an appropriate model setting e.g., propensity score matching
to analyze the conditional probability of covariates determining the firm selection.14
2.4.5.2 Missing data
Over the course of analysis, a nontrivial fraction of the both sample firms including target
and nontargets either delist, merge or stop reporting their monthly prices to Datastream and
Bloomberg respectively. In this study, 19% of the event firms and approximately 25% of
the non-event firms (conservative figures) report their monthly prices either unchanged or
missing in the subsequent years of activism. This could possibly be due to fully acquired by
the activist fund or to going private or due to bankruptcy. To construct the matching sample
using annual accounting data based on size, book–to–market value and other firm-specific
characteristics, once again we experience similar situation. Datastream and Bloomberg
provide figures either unchanged or missing which might yield inaccurate estimates and lead
to incorrect inferences.
14We have discussed this issue in detail in our first chapter about an activist’s firm selection based on
some observables, and as a result it leads to causality issue. To treat this problem, we use propensity score
methodology.
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In contrast with missing price data on delisted or dead firms, we have sufficient observa-
tions on benchmark portfolio.15 One solution could be to remove missing firms from sample,
however, it could lead to downward bias of removing small targets. An appropriate remedy
is suggested by Greenwood and Schor (2009) to form a surrogate matched portfolios, that is
to substitute the matching portfolio return with value–weighted return or vice versa.
In literature analyzing the long-run returns’ performance (not necessarily fund-related),
studies in general are carried out using relatively longer panel (normally covering two
decades). Whereas in this study, we consider comparatively a shorter period of 13 years
which yields approximately 156 monthly observations. A longer panel allows not only
more observations to be examined, but likely helps in detecting the relevant biases in data
and yields the test–statistics to identify the differences in outcomes occuring in different
methodologies. In addition, a longer panel yields the estimates which are more representative
to the population estimates.
2.4.5.3 Industry concentration and month clustering
Unlike previous studies (Brav et al., 2008), both target and nontarget firms sample mainly
drawn from few concentrated industries and both follow similar patterns of fund activism.
Firms in financial and sevices sectors are accumulated in fund’s portfolio with some marginal
differences (17% and 13% for targets, 17% and 19% for nontargets) depicting funds strategic
trend of forming portfolio for investment. However, both samples dominantly concentrate
around manufacturing industry (39% and 36% respectively). A possible outcome of concen-
tration could be that abnormal returns mainly driven from a single industry and as a result the
inferences could lead to biased estimates.16 In addition, both samples share approximately
6% firms in common. We check their announcement dates in samples and if find them
occurring simultaneously, then we test for the abnormality of returns separately.
Monthly price observations in both samples heavily cluster in months. The distribution of
activist funds can be viewed as extensively filing Schedule 13D announcements during 2005
to 2008. In contrast, this pattern begins 2 years earlier for Schedule 13G announcements
(for details table 1, panel B). Thus, the overwhelming majority of the monthly observations
cluster during this specific period which may derive the returns biasedly to specific period
15The benchmark portfolio is Fama-French three factors including value-weighted market index, SMB, and
HML.
16An additional analysis could be to analyze the cross-sectional distribution of returns across different
industry sectors and to examine the impacts of crisis on that sector.
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due to induced cross–sectional correlation.
2.4.6 Summary statistics
Figure 2.1 exhibits cumulative abnormal returns for targets and nontarget firms over the
period of 12 months prior to the announcement month and 36 months following the an-
nouncement month. CARs are compared in two ways; first, we compute abnormal returns
for target and nontarget firms in excess of Fama and French (1993) well-constructed six
value-weighted portfolios formed on size, and book-to-market value. Second, target firms’
long-run abnormal returns are compared with nontarget firms.
When comparing targets and nontargets with reference portfolio, we find that target
firms underperform the reference portfolio formed on size, and book-to-market value. The
underperformance begins from 12 months before the announcement month and steadily
increases over the period of next three years. Similar trends are observed for nontarget
firms, however the magnitude for negative returns differ. Firms targeted by private equity
underperform the reference portfolio except for a brief period (approximately for 6 months
following the announcement month).
In comparison with nontargets, firms targeted for activism show mixed performance. To
compare with matching firms targeted by private equity, target firms show underperformance
in monthly returns. Over the period of analysis, the net gap in both graphs steadily increases
which remains the same until end of three years. While matching long-run performance in
active firms with nonactive firms targeted by similar hedge funds, we find clear depiction of
better performance in firms induced by fund activism. Firms acquired by activist funds for
nonactive purpose or with intention not to influence the management, perform much poorly
than the firms targeted by activism. The incurred losses in nontargets are almost 4 times more
than target firms, thus a better performance in targets could be attributed to fund activism.
Figure 2.2 and figure 2.3 display CARs for targets and nontargets before and after the
crisis. We decompose CARs for the full sample period into pre and post-crisis period to
examine which part of analysis is inducing negativity into the returns. Figure 2.2 exhibits
CARs in target firms before and after the crisis. A comparative view depict clearly two trends;
first, target firm underperform the reference portfolio regardless the crisis period. Second
CARs in pre and post-crisis period fall, however in post-crisis period, the short fall is much
steeper. In comparison with figure 2.3, target firms perform in both period before and after
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the crisis.
Table 2.1, panel A reports the distribution of activist hedge funds over the period of Jan-
uary 2000 to December 2013. Interestingly, the number of funds does not vary significantly,
howeve a small degree of spike is observed in the years approaching to the financial crisis.
Panel B depicts the chronological distribution of the target and nontarget firms acquired
by similar activist hedge funds over the period of January 2000 to December 2013. An
overview of the figures demonstrate that there is a steady growth in activist events before
onsetting the recent financial crisis. An overwhelming majority of the events takes place
in early 2000s and steadily increase prior to financial crisis which is consistent with events
distribution documented by Greenwood and Schor (2009) and Boyson and Mooradian (2011).
One reason for the dramatic increase in activist events is well advanced by Greenwood and
Schor (2009) stating that hedge fund might have replaced the role of pension and mutual
funds once occupied in 90’s and early 2000’s. The other factor could be the expansion in
the hedge fund industry in post 2000’s when investment was comparatively better rewarded
by fund–related activism. A notable downfall in the events following the recent financial
crisis is attributed to the outflow of capital from hedge fund industry and prudent behaviour
of the investor. Panel C delineates 2-digit SIC industry classification for targets (13D) and
nontargets (13G). Firms from manufacturing sector are most likely prone to fund activism
followed by firms functioning in financial and services sector. Firms industry distribution
is partly in line with Boyson and Mooradian (2011); Klein and Zur (2006) documenting
majority of targets and nontargets from manufacturing and business services.
2.5 Methodologies
2.5.1 Test statistics, matching firm, and reference portfolios
Barber and Lyon (1997) argue that use of reference portfolio to compute CARs is severely
flawed and likely prone to measurement, new listing, and skewness biases.17 While using it
in computing BHARs may arise potential issues of new listing, rebalancing, and skewness
biases. Alternatively, a matching sample based on firm-specific characteristics is suggested
to measure the long–run performance in returns. Matching sample approach controls for
much of cross-sectional dependence in firms’ returns and improves the specifications for
17For the graphical presentation of CARs, we use reference portfolio based on Fama and French (1993)
carefully constructed six value-weighted portfolios formed on size, and book-to-market value.
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statistical test. As a result, improved power of test-specification is attributed to similarity in
return skewness both in sample and matching firms’ stocks (Cowan and Sergeant, 2001). We
use matching sample approach using well-defined firm characteristics to analyze the power
of test-specifications.
2.5.1.1 Matching firm selection
Fama (1998) explains by arguing that performance in long–run abnormal returns is sensitive
to the underlying criterion, confined to detect abnormality. A trivial change in evaluating
benchmark may cause possibly significant difference in returns. In their seminal study, Fama
and French (1992) argue that firm characteristics in general and size and book–to–market in
particular explain much of the cross-sectional and time-series variation in targets stock returns.
In this section and in what follows, to assess the abnormality in the target firms and to check
the robustness of results, we form two matching samples based on carefully well-defined firm
characteristics: (i) Size/industry/book–to–market value; and (ii) Size/industry/pre–event
stock performance.
2.5.1.2 Size/industry/book–to–market value
To detect the abnormality in long-run stock returns within event-study framework, a com-
monly well-defined benchmark is to carefully construct the matching sample based on size,
industry and book-to-market vlaue. It functions twofold; first it identifies the underlying
biases implicitly prevalent in sample composition, and second it helps in minimizing such
biases to a considerable extent (Barber and Lyon, 1997). Size-specification controls for the
biases associated with event firms sample-size. Moreover, if industry is a factor determining
cross-sectional abnormal returns, clustering or concentration in a single industry might lead
to misspecified model problem. As for industry concentration is concerned, Barber and
Lyon (1997) using simulation on randomly constructed sample, document that if sample is
mainly drawn from similar two-digit SIC codes, then empirical rejection level appears much
higher than theoretical rejection level. However their analyses reveal that if sample firms are
drawn from more than four two-digit SIC codes, it possibly eliminates the misspecification.
Matching event firms based on book-to-market value explains the cross–sectional dependence
of abnormal returns. Fama and French (1992) find a significantly positive cross-sectional
relationship between expected stock returns and book-to-market value and explain that due to
this defining feature, book-to-market ratio is subsequently added into their three-factor model
(Fama and French, 1993). In addition, we also find that firms targeted by hedge funds are
generally succeeded by improved stock performance, thus we might expect that sample firms
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on average experience lower book-to-market values than non-target firms. Thus, to narrow
down the benchmark, we add an additional firm-specification and that is book-to-market
value.
To proceed with matching criterion, initially each target firm is matched with nontargert
firm based on industry classification. Both event and nonevent firms are sorted on two-digit
SIC industry codes. In nonevent firms sample, firms whose codes are not matched with
event-firms codes are dropped from sample. At next stage, we choose the non-event firms
whose market value of equity fall between 70% to 130% of market value of the event-firm a
month before being targeted by activist fund. Finally, we match the nonevent firms having
book-to-market value closest to the book-to-market value of event-firms. In doing so, we
experience a considerable reduction to our sample.
2.5.1.3 Size/industry/pre–event stock performance
Pre–announcement returns realization is a common notion prior to event notification. Highly
liquid and efficient market likely perceives the fund anticipated movement in target and
predicts the associated potential outcomes with Schedule 13D notification. Fama (1998)
provides a comprehensive list on studies documenting major corporate events and their
pre-announcement impact on prices. In hedge fund industry, as it has seen in short-run,
market normally positively reacts to the fund announcement of filing 13D (see, for details,
Brav et al. (2008), and Greenwood and Schor (2009)).
Using a simulation model on data from 1973 to 1994, Lyon et al. (1999) calculate pre-
ceding six–month buy–and–hold returns on firms in sample and rank accordingly in size
deciles based on their prior event–announcement returns’ performance. The documented
results explain that the distribution of abnormal returns is different for high pre–event return
firms and low pre–event firms. More precisely, for the firms with high pre–event momentum,
convential t–statistics are positively biased for one–year horizon and negatively biased for
three and five year horizons. Thus, it is highly expected that pre–event stock performance
using as a measure to evaluate the target firms abnormal performance could possibly allow to
control for the misspecification in test–statisitcs.
Following the literature evaluating corporate event’s impact ((Agrawal et al., 1992;
Bessembinder and Zhang, 2013; Eckbo et al., 2000), we construct the matching sample using
pre–event stock performance 12 months prior to the event month. To do it systematically,
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we initially choose the non–event firms whose market value of equity in event month falls
between 70% and 130% of market value of the event–firm at the same time. Then at next
stage, we select the firm with the closest 12–months pre–event performance to construct the
final sample.
2.5.1.4 Reference portfolio–Fama–French three factors
In order to evaluate target firm return’s performance, we use Fama–French three factors
which are constructed using six size and book–to–market benchmark portfolios including
market return (Rmt −R f t), the excess return on the market measured as value–weighted
return on all NY SE, AMEX , and NASDAQ stocks less one-month Treasury bill rate. SMB
factors measures the average return on three small value-weighted growth portfolios minus
the average return on three big value–weighted growth portfolios. HML measures the average
return on two value–weighted high growth portfolios less return on two low growth portfolios
(see, for details, Fama and French (1993)).
From the 12–months pre–event estimation window to post–announcement 36–months, we
compute a corresponding observation for each factor matching to the observations of target
firm. For the missing or unchanged event-firm observations, we use surrogate observation by
computing average of previous observations.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Cumulative abnormal returns approach
2.6.1.1 Test specifications and biases in CARs
Table 2.2 reports t-statistics using CARs approach by employing various benchmark spec-
ifications in three separate panels. The reported figures for t-statistics are obtained using
multiple benchmarks including top deciles for market capitalization, book-to-market value,
and prior performance for 12-, 24-, and 36–months. In parenthesis, bottom 10% deciles are
also reported for size-specifications. For the benchmark using market value, book-to-market,
and prior performance, the abnormal returns are computed using matching sample drawn
from 13D files and private equity (PE) firms respectively, and their test-statistics are reported
using one sample comparison test. Remaining benchmarks are calculated using Fama-French
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three factor loadings. We report for each benchmark the mean abnormal returns, skewness,
and kurtosis on 1%, 5%, and 10% respecitvely. In all tests, the principal hypothesis is that
mean abnormal return during the event is equal to zero.18
While discussing CARs for different esimation windows, magnitude on mean abnormal
return using benchmark based on size, book-to-market and prior performance improves
significantly and tends to bias positively with larger event window. Similar patterns emerge
in skewness measure. However, kurtosis varies for different benchmarks.19 Our matching
sample approach yields well-specificied test-statistic which is in-line with Barber and Lyon
(1997) documented findings using simulation. Barber and Lyon (1997) attribute the positive
bias to positive monthly abnormal returns resulting from new listing bias. However, this
reasoning is less convincing in analyses where non-random sampling is used to compute
CARs on equally-weighted market index (for instance, in this study, matching sample firms
remain similar for all periods).
In addition, when Fama–French three–factor loadings are used in computing test-statistic
for full sample, results appear interestly different.20 Mean monthly abnormal returns even-
tually become negatively biased; nonetheless, magnitude on skewness increases on 12, 24,
and 36-month event- window. Barber and Lyon (1997) argue for negative abnormal bias
in Fama-French three-factor model by explaining that it is induced by the new listing bias.
The increased skewness bias in long-horizons is justified to the fact that when event firms
are not well matched on specific characteristics then new listing bias still exists and causes
positive skewness bias. Thus, using Fama-French three factor model approach likely to yield
well-specified test-statistics.
We explore further notable results in casese when targets are matched with nontargets
based on well-defined firm-characteristics including size, book-to-market value, prior perfor-
mance, or alternatively with industry. CARs obtained from using firm-characteristics yield
well-specified test-statisitc. Both criteria (industry/size/book-to-market and industry/size/pre-
event performance) yield increasingly negatively mean monthly abnormal returns which
significantly distinguishes from zero on all level of significance. The level of positive skew-
18In an unreported table, CARs results for 12-months pre-announcement period and for entire period of (-12,
+36) are also calculated.
19In PE sample, a big portion of firms go private after being targeted and thus does not report the accounting
figures to database which makes sample upward size-bias (big firms are partially acquired which report their
accounting data even after event). To treat this bias, we use surrogate observations taking the average of past
observations.
20The test-statistics are computed for event-firms using market index, Fama-French three factor model.
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ness arising from cross-sectional dependence using equally-weighted market index reduce
and gradually becomes negative on longer horizons.
In sum, when matching criteria are well-defined for measuring long-run abnormal returns,
then CARs using equally-weighted market index yield well-specified test-statistics which
help in mitigating new listing bias, and skewness bias.21
2.6.1.2 Cumulative abnormal returns
In the light of above discussion regarding test-specifications and matching criteria, we
move directly to our CARs results and compare them with existing studies. Table 2.9 re-
ports the CARs for the 589 target firms for 12–month pre–announcement to 36–month
post–announcement event-window over the period of January 2000 to December 2013. To
compare with nontargets, table 2.10 exhibits the CARs for 898 non-event firms over the
similar period of January 2000 to December 2013. To compute CARs, we use Fama–French
three-factor specifications for both target and nontargets. The reported t-statisitc tests the
hypothesis whether event firms outperform the non–event firms in four years or in (–12, +36)
month event-window.
Compared to fund activism-related documented CARs, however this study yields insignifi-
cantly negative CARs. For full sample, using (-12, +36) month event - window approximately
-0.80 points CARs are realized compared to 0.10 points documented by Greenwood and Schor
(2009) analyzing pre-cisis 1993 – 2006 period over 18 month event - window. In comparison
with matching sample firms, for (–12, +36) month event-window, realized CARs are –2.36
points, which is approximately three times lower (greater in magnitude) than event firms’
CARs suggesting that activist’s targets perform relatively better. This considerable difference
in CARs could be possibly attributed to size effect. In analysis of firm characteristics, the
targets on average are found two times larger than nontargets measured in market value
which may cause this difference in CARs, as CARs are likely subject to bid-ask bounce in
small firms.22 Another possible explanation to the meaningful difference in CARs is given
as the fact that firms are possibly misvalued while computing their CARs. As Loughran
and Ritter (2000) argue that while using equally–weighted benchmark to compute long-run
abnormal returns, if misvaluations in small firm pronounce more than large firm, then the
21The results for value-weighted market index are still process and are expected to explain better the
cross-sectional dependence of cumulative abnormal returns.
22 Difference between mean monthly CARs in targets and nontargets specifies that on average both mean
values are not different than each other.
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tests that weight firms equally should find greater abnormal returns than the tests that weight
firms by market capitalization. In our previous analyses we computed CARs for targets and
nontargets by using Fama–French three- factor model giving equal weights to each firm in
the sample. Thus, insignificance in CARs is economically justified. On the contrary, when
CARs are computed using matching sample firms based on size and book–to–market value
then estimates clearly demonstrate significance.23
To obtain further insights on cross-sectional variation in target firms long-run abnormal
returns, two different matching criteria are used. Prior studies documenting event impact
on long-run abnormal returns appear less successful in determining the cross-sectional vari-
ations in returns. As Fama (1998) argues that evolved outcomes from these events are
highly sensitive to trivial changes in matching criteria. In our analyses, target firms generate
negative abnormal returns in post-announcement period indicating the underperformance to
the extent that target firms are not less riskier than nontarget firms. To explain it further, each
target firm is matched with nontarget firm (drawn from private equity companies sample)
on basis of firm-specific characteristics including market capitalization, two-digit SIC code,
book-to-market ratio, and prior performance.
In an unreported table explaining CARs computed for 12-month pre-announcement to
36-month post-announcement, and using benchmark industry, size, and book-to-market
value, we find that PE firms outperform the target firms. The difference in CARs is –0.43
points, which is also statistically significant. We observe similar result for matching criterion
by replacing book-to-market value with prior performance and find that target firms are
outperformed by –0.42 points.24
23Loughran and Ritter (2000) explain statistical reasoning for the significant misvaluations in small firms
compared to large size firms, which has potential implications on this sample. Advancing their argument that a
test is likely biased towards high explanatory power with no abnormal returns if it uses a benchmark that is
contaminated with many of the firms that are the subject of the test. In our study, target and non-target firms
are drawn from similar set of funds which could cast doubts on the test power. However, only 6% firms are
commonly shared in both samples, which indeed is a meaningful portion.
24 Negative CARs are arguably because of sample composition. Our sample includes the recent financial




2.6.2 Buy-and-hold abnormal returns approach
2.6.2.1 Test specifications and biases in BHARs
Table 2.3 exhibits the specifications of t-statistics using BHARs approach in the non-random
samples based on various matching criteria for 12-month, 24-month, and 36-month monthly
event-windows. Two tailed test results for theoretical cumulative density function are reported
for each criterion. An overview of the results clearly reveal that mean average abnormal
returns in holding period are negatively biased. Barber and Lyon (1997) argue that nega-
tive biases arise due to rebalancing and skewness biases in part contributed by new listing
bias too. Using reference portfolio of Fama-French three-factor loadings on target firms’
abnormal returns, magnitude on negative skewness steadily increases over longer period as
compared to CARs results where it becomes eventually positive. Highly negatively skewed
biases likely dominate the average abnormal returns toward negative (which is evidenced by
negative mean observations), and in addition partly driven by rebalancing bias while forming
reference portfolio. An interesting aspect of sorting market capitalization and book-to-market
value observations into top and bottom size deciles is that pair-wise t-statistic for the mean
abnormal returns generate positively skewed values which in line with Barber and Lyon
(1997) simulated results on random samples.
As argued in previous analyses that using matching sample criteria to detect abnormality
yields good test-specifications and helps in mitigating the underlying biases. However, em-
ploying two carefully constructed equally-weighted criteria i.e., size/book-to-market/industry
and size/prior performance/industry upon Fama–French three-factor loadings appear less
successful in reducing biases in BHARs approach. The average abnormal returns become
relatively more negatively skewed. However, some degree of imporovement is observed in
longer-horizon (36 - months). Contrary to prior documented studies using matching firm
criteria in BHARs appraoch, we find less evidence in mitigating biases including new listing,
rebalancing, and skewness bias. One potential reason for large difference could be negative
abnormal returns driven by significant potion of observations in crisis period.
2.6.2.2 Buy–and–hold abnormal returns
In table 2.3, we discuss test-specifications using BHARs approach and investigate whether
this approach reduces the associated biases arising because of bad modelling and misspecifi-
cation. In what follows, we discuss our BHARs results obtained from using several monthly
event-windows and based on various benchmarks and then compare them with existing
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literature on fund-activism and explain the differential effects, if any.
Table 2.5 illustrates the results for BHARs for one year prior to Schedule 13D announce-
ment and three years in post–announcemnt. The specification of t–statistics using 12–month,
24–month, and 36–month event-window on the Fama–French three-factor model is presented
in all three panels respectively. We construct our settings in the following way; first, we
measure abnormal returns for targets and nontargets using Fama-French three-factor model
in panel A and B, in second step, we compute abnormal returns for targets using nontarget
firms as benchmark using different criteria. By doing so, we gain twofold objectives: first,
target and nontarget comparison with reference portfolio and second, target performance
against nontarget. In each panel, we regress target firms’ returns on reference portfolio
factors and report the results for estimates. The t–statistics tests the null hypothesis that the
annual abnormal returns during the event period is zero. The p–values are reported for each
testable hypothesis.
The results in table 2.5 are noteworthy. We highlight the important figures. In panel
A, the coefficient on abnornal returns using equally–weighted reference portfolio for pre-
ceeding 12 months is significantly positive and generates more than 7%. Similar trend is
persistently observed for succeeding 12-month, 24-month, and 36-month event-windows. In
comparison with panel B, in which nontargets abnormal returns are computed using similar
reference portfolio, the results are significantly negative. In panel C, we regress nontargets’
abnormal returns against targets’ abnormal returns to test whether target firms perform better
than nontargets. In 12-month window prior to the event-month, nontargets perform better
by generating more than 9% returns, however, in post-activism 12-month, and 24-month,
36-month event-window targets significantly perform better. An accumulated 3 years (+1,
+36) abnormal returns’ performance indicates that firms targeted actively outperformed the
firms passively targeted in longer period following the activism. These results are in line
with Bebchuk et al. (2014) documented findings who use Fama-French three-factor model
and momentum factor on equally-weighted index and report that hedge fund targeted firms
perform by 7.24% in (+1, +36) monthly window in pre-crisis period.
We are interested in to examine whether these results hold if we decompose the ac-
cumulated period into yearly horizon. To put it into simple, we want to know in which
year more abnormal returns are generated? To gain insights into the duration of long-run
abnormal returns, we analyze BHARs in each separate year from pre-announcement to post-
announcement. By doing so, we attempt to explore the cross–sectional dimensions of the
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abnormal returns for entire holding period.
Table 2.6 replicates table 2.5 in such a way that for each next 12 months, we regress
the model and test the abnormality in returns. In panel A, B, and C the results for pre-
announcemnet 12-month and post-announcement 12-month remain the same. Panel C last
two columns results are important. In panel C, target firms are matched with nontarget firms
using industry, size and book–to–market value. For the second year (during 12–month and
24–month) period, the returns are significantly positive whereas in third year (24–month -
36–month) period, the coefficient on abnormal return generates approximately half of accu-
mulated three years abnormal returns. This indicates that in each year, target firm perform
better than nontarget firm.
2.6.3 Calendar-time portfolio approach
2.6.3.1 Test-specifications and related biases in CT PA
Table 2.4 presents the test-statistics specifications using calendar-time portfolio approach
based on various benchmarks. We classify benchmark description into three precise compo-
nents: 1) size deciles, 2) reference portfolio, 3) firm-specific characteristics. Beginning with
Fama–French three-factor model, a seemingly improvement is observed in longer–horizon
skewness which primarily remains negative, however gradually reduces. Interestingly, the
mean abnormal returns remains the unchanged. Our CT PA results perform better than those
obtained in section 2.6.2.2 over the similar period of interest indicating that this approach is
likely much effective in addressing the issue of cross–sectional dependence and other associ-
ated biases. Moreover, when using size deciles specification, the results are interesting and
worthnoting. Using market capitalization top decile, t-statistic yields lower mean abnormal
returns however skewness tends to zero. In bottom decile, this outcome pronounces more
where skewness biases significantly reduces. The improved results are in part attributed to
calendar-time portfolio approach which systematically constitutes the reference portfolio in
such a way that it accounts for new listing and rebalancing biases. In contrast to this improve-
ment, t-statistic yields unfavourably skewed biased results when we use book-to-market top
deciles. Finally, our well-tested benchmark based on firm-specific characteristics does not
seem to be providing some promising results. Using size/ book-to-market/ industry bench-
mark likely increases skewness bias whereas size/ prior performance / industry benchmark
provides mix results. In second panel of 24-months, skewness increases which is possibly
driven by some large negative observations during that period. In a nutshell, the matching
123
Test specifications, modelling and sensitivity
firm approach in our analyses proves less helpful in mitigating the biasness.
2.6.3.2 Calendar–time portfolio returns
In this section, we discuss abnormal returns generated over 12-month, 24-month, and 36-
month event-window using calendar-time portfolio approach. Applying this approach may
allow us to examine the wide array of testable hypotheses as well as to explore the factors ex-
plaining the cross-sectional variations in returns arising due to various approaches. Moreover,
the appropriate applicability of this approach is veiwed as to overcome possible statistical
problems associated with CARs and BHARs approaches.
To compute abnormal returns for each firm i, we form a portfolio consisting of all j firms
experiencing similar event within τ months prior to the event month. Since for any given
month, the number of firms in reference portfolio may vary, so therefore we use both ordinary
least squares (OLS) and weighted least squares (WLS). The reported intercept is interpreted
as the mean monthly abnormal return of the event portfolio across all months.
Table 2.7 exhibits the CT PA results using equally-weighted Fama-French three-factor
model in three separate panels. Panel A using OLS and WLS for 12-month, 24-month, and 36-
month monthly event-windows for compounding effect and reports monthly abnormal returns
for target firms. Panel B uses in similar procedure however reports results for yearly horizon.
Panel C presents mean monthly abnormal returns for nontarget firms using three-factor model.
Inconsistent with what we experience using BHARs approach in table 2.5, CT PA results
show negative price drift for consecutive 12, 24, and 36 months in post-announcement
horizons in panel A. We observe across the event-windows that as post-event period extends,
lower the abnormal returns appear. The reduction in mean abnormal returns is explained by
the procedure with which these returns are computed. For each next observation in reference
portfolio, the number of firms forming portfolio increases thus as a result portfolio returns
systematically marginally reduce. However, we are less interested in magnitude rather much
in sign. The mean monthly abnormal return following event announcement significantly
negative by –1.2% on 12-month, –0.8% for 24-month, and –0.7% for 36-month period. Be-
bchuk et al. (2014) using four-factor model specifications (momentum), report significantly
positively 25% abnormal returns for (+1, +36) event-window for pre-crisis period.
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In comparison with nontarget firms, targets perform relatively better. In panel B, CT PA re-
sults for nontarget firms using Fama-French three-factor model are reported. When comparing
12-month post-event performance, nontargets mean monthly abnormal returns insignificantly
decrease by 1.5% which is lower for targets (1.2%). Thus, targets outperform nontargets by
(0.3 points) in one year. Comparing mean abnormal returns estimates and their respective
test-specifications, we observe two trends; first, when using linear OLS model settings, the
t-statistics values reject null hypothesis for all monthly event-windows which is incontrast
with nontargets estimates where we find test-statistics values of not rejecting the null hypoth-
esis. Second, this practice is reversed in WLS model setting in which test-statistics rejects
null in targets and does not reject in nontargets at standard 5% level of significance.
The empirical analysis based on calendar-time portfolio approach using Fama-French
three-factor model yields conservative results presented in table 2.7. Lyon et al. (1999) argue
with two reasonings; first, Fama-French three factor model implicitly assumes linearlity in the
components forming the portfolio, however this assumption is less likely valid particularly
between size and book-to-market factors. Second, the assumption of no interaction among
three factors is likely violated rather this interaction between returns and book-to-market
value more pronunces for small firms.
In table 2.8, using Fama-French three-factor model specifications, we compute and test
the zero mean monthly abnormal returns. The mean monthly abnormal returns for 12-month,
24-month, and 36-month event window is 0.8% and do not vary over the period. The test-
specification value for not rejecting the null hypothesis of zero mean monthly abnormal
returns is also within the bounds of 5% significance level.
2.6.4 Crisis effect
In our previous analyses, we test the hypothesis of mean abnormal returns for full sample
period using various approaches based upon several benchmarks and find negative results in
aggregate. We ask fundamental question whether these negative long-run abnormal returns
for full period are driven by the observations mainly falling in the crisis period. To test this
hypothesis, we divide the data into two sub-samples, i.e., pre financial crisis starting from Jan-
uary 2000 to July 2007, and post financial crisis beginning from July 2007 to December 2013.
Table 2.9 presents the results for CARs and BHARs when crisis dummy is incorporated
into the models. We report abnormal returns for target and nontargets in excess of equally-
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weighted Fama-French three-factor model before and after the crisis period. Panel A reports
results for full sample and decomposes them into panel B for pre-crisis and panel C for
post-crisis period.
Cumulative abnormal returns for pre-crisis period are lower (negative in magnitude)
than post-crisis period for (–12, +36) monthly event-window, however both estimates are
insignificant as indicated by t-statistic. In an unreported table, we test the mean difference
in abnormal returns before and after the crisis period and find it significant. These results
are well illustrated by graphical presentation in figure 2.2 and 2.3 where we can see CARs
underperform reference portfolio.
In contrast with CARs buy-and-hold abnormal returns reduce more in post-crisis period
than pre-crisis period as the difference can be seen. The estimate for abnormal returns in
pre-crisis period (–12.2%) is significantly negative. In an untabulated result, we test the
difference between mean abnormal returns for before and after the crisis period, and we do
not reject the null hypothesis.
These results are in line with our previous analyses. We then change the matching sample
setting to detect the abnormality and test whether these results hold when we introduce
different matching sample. To do so, we compare target sample with private equity targets
and compute CARs in pre- and post-crisis period. The abnormal returns on non-event firms
are computed using Fama French three factor loadings including market return, SMB, and
HML. In an auxiliary results, non-event firms CARs surprisingly fall upto –0.76 points, how-
ever, post-crisis returns are distributed evenly starting from negative –0.20 and going upto
maximum 0.52 points before falling down to -0.015 points. These figures are in contrast with
event-firms results which remain almost unchanged in pre- and post-crisis. In an unreported
tabular results, a pairwise non-parametric t–statistic is tested to check whether active targets
perform better than non–targets private equity firms in pre or post-crisis period. The reported
figures reveal that mean monthly abnormal difference is significant which is consistent with
the previous results.
2.7 Summary and concluding remarks
The discussion on long–run abnormal returns following the corporate event has been long
standing in literature and their statistical significance at times is controversial. These abnor-
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mal returns are subject to various biases arising from bad modeling and misspecifications in
applied tests. The relevant literature has been identifying these biases as well as proposing
reasonably remedial measures to mitigating them. The documented studies in fund-related
activism, however have been seen as paying relatively less attention to these biases and
reporting the figures which are less likely robust to these issues.
Using a uniquely hand-collected set of data consisting of 589 firms extracted from Sched-
ule 13D announcements, and 898 firms retrieved from Schedule 13G announcements by
similar set of 112 hedge funds over the period of January 2000 to December 2013, this study
centrally investigates two questions; first, whether target firms perform better than nontarget
firms in long-horizon abnormal returns before and after the recent financial crisis, second,
whether abnormality in these returns still pronounces when we control for various biases and
misspecifications in testing methodologies.
In addressing these relevant concerns, we primarily utilize the literature documented by
Barber and Lyon (1996, 1997); Lyon et al. (1999), who at great extent discuss the empirical
power and specifications of test-statistics used in event–study framework to detect the ab-
normality in stock returns following a certain corporate event. The study comprehensively
analyzes the fund-initiated events in target firms by exploring two different perspectives;
first, it examines the power of test-statistic by constructing a wide array of benchmarks.
After identifying an appropriate well-defined benchmark, at second stage, it tests for the
abnormality in monthly stock returns applying multiple approaches which include cumulative
abnormal returns, buy-and-hold abnormal returns, and calendar-time portfolio approach.
Using various benchmarks including reference portfolio, matching sample, and market
index we find that cumulative abnormal returns using equally-weighted market index yield
well-specified test-statistics which helps in mitigating new listing and skewness bias. To
test the abnormality in monthly returns we use Fama-French three-factor model and find
insignificantly negative abnormal returns for (–12, +36) month event-window. These results
invariably remain the same even when we control for crisis effect. In contrast with cumulative
abnormal returns approach, buy-and-hold abnormal returns method using Fama-French three-
factor model as a benchmark appears more effective in addressing biases. Using buy-and-hold
abnormal returns approach, we find that estimates are significantly negative for full sample
period for the (–12, +36) month event-window, however, the magnitude is lower than the
coefficients on cumulative abnormal returns. In addition, the estimates obtained in post-crisis
period are significantly different than pre-crisis period. When using calendar-time portfolio
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approach, the test-specifications are well-identified by constructing benchmark based on
size deciles. Additionally, the reference portfolio which is systematically constituted to
detect abnormality also helps in mitigating new listing and rebalancing bias. Regarding
mean monthly abnormal returns, calendar-time portfolio approach generates returns lowest
in magnitude, however significant for (–12, +36) month event-window.
An equally important finding is that over the period of (–12, +36) monthly event-window,
long-run abnormal returns in target firms relatively perform better than returns in nontarget
firms, however underperform the returns obtained from private equity firms. In general, the
results for full sample is significantly negative. We also find that our applied methodologies
partly control for the biases, however, in presence of overlapping in calendar–time and
cross–correlation in abnormal returns, the yielded estimates are questionable.
In the wake of recent financial crisis, this study suggests several methodological implica-
tions for the researchers and policy makers to reconcile their views on emerging abnormal
returns based on costly interventions. Moreover, these studies add more empirical evidence
to the existing broad literature on hedge fund impacts on target firms’ performance taking
into account the recent financial crisis.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Figure 2.1: Monthly cumulative abnormal returns for the period of (-12, +36) month
This graph plots the monthly cumulative abnormal returns for target firms (13D), and nontarget firms (13G)
and private equity firms respectively. CARs are calculated for event and nonevent firms using Fama and
French (1993) well-constructed six value-weighted portfolios formed on size, and book-to-market value.
Target firms are extracted from Schedule 13D, a mandatory file reported by activist hedge fund indicating
its intent to influence the firm’s internal governance. Non-target firms are retrieved from Schedule 13G, a
mandatory report submitted to the SEC by an activist showing no interest to influence firm’s management.
To evaluate performance in 589 target firms’ returns, we use 898 nontargets firms acquired by similar
112 hedge funds. In addition to hedge fund sample, we use an additional sample of 273 firms acquired
by private equity firms over the period of January 2000 to December 2013. An announcement date
indicates the notification day, when a fund crosses a threshold of acquring 5% or more ownership stake in
a target firm. Monthly price data is extracted from using Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bloomberg databases.
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Figure 2.2: CARs for 13D firms during (-12, +36) month event-window in pre and post
crisis
Monthly cumulative abnormal returns are decomposed into pre- and post financial crisis period. Figure 2.2
plots CARs for 551 target firms and figure 3 exhibits 898 nontarget firms over the period of January 2000 to
December 2013. We use Fama and French (1993) well-constructed six value-weighted portfolios formed
on size, and book-to-market value to evaluate the performance in targets and nontargets long-term returns.
Pre-cisis period begins from January 2000 and ends at June 2007, whereas post-crisis preiod starts at July 2007
and lasts until December 2013.




Table 2.1: Chronological distribution of sample data
Panel A: Chronological distribution of funds
















Panel B: Chronological distribution of event and non-event firms
Year No. of events (13D) % of sample No. of non- events (13G) % of sample
1999 1 0.17% 1 0.11%
2000 31 5.26% 12 1.34%
2001 36 6.11% 28 3.12%
2002 37 6.28% 37 4.12%
2003 41 6.96% 78 8.69%
2004 39 6.62% 92 10.24%
2005 64 10.87% 77 8.57%
2006 69 11.71% 148 16.48%
2007 83 14.09% 122 13.59%
2008 56 9.51% 83 9.24%
2009 26 4.41% 55 6.12%
2010 54 9.17% 87 9.69%
2011 33 5.60% 42 4.68%
2012 11 1.87% 22 2.45%
2013 8 1.36% 14 1.56%
Total 589 100% 898 100%
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Panel C: Industry representation of target and nontarget firms








Agriculture 01-09 0 0% 0 0%
Mining 10-14 35 6% 110 12%
Construction 15-17 22 4% 9 1%
Manufacturing 20-39 241 41% 327 36%
Transportation 40-49 64 11% 72 8%
Wholesale 50-51 16 3% 16 2%
Retail trade 52-59 38 6% 34 4%
Finance 60-67 98 17% 156 17%
Services 70-89 75 13% 174 19%

















Table 2.2: Test-specification using CARs in post-activism years
The table reports the specifications of t-statistics using CARs in nonrandom samples based on various matching criteria for the period of 12-month,
24-month, and 36-month of post-announcement of Schedule 13D filing in three separate panels. The CARs are calculated as CARi12 = ∑i=1 ARi12 for
each target firm matched with nontarget firm on two criteria; i) size/industry/book-to-market value; ii) size/industry/prior performance. The statistical
significance in abnormal returns is tested using parametric pairwise t-test, based on the cross-sectional standard deviations of the abnormal returns. Top-row
values are theoretical cumulative density function in percentage. The null hypothesis tested is that the average long-term abnormal stock return is equal
to zero. p-values are reported to show the significance of t-statistic. ***, **, * denote the level of significance for 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively in a two tailed test.
Panel A: 12-month CARs
Theoretical CDF 0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5.0 95.0 Mean Skew Kurtosis
Market value
Size deciles (13D-13G) 0.028 0.127*** 0.041 0.114*** 0.047 0.108*** 0.078) -0.927 2.715
(0.051) (0.153***) (0.064) (0.139***) (0.070) (0.134***) (0.102 (0.135) (2.693)
(13D-PE) -0.153 -0.046*** -0.059 -0.059*** -0.13 -0.066***) -0.099 0.458 1.639
(-0.139) (0.050***) (-0.114) (0.025***) (-0.104) (0.015*** (-0.044) (0.546) (2.076)
Book-to-market
Size deciles (13D-13G) 0.025 0.184*** 0.045 0.163*** 0.054 0.154*** 0.104 -0.188 1.600
(13D-PE) -0.079 0.075*** -0.059 0.056*** -0.050 0.046* -0.002 1.029 3.632
Prior performance
Size deciles (13D-13G) 0.144 0.502*** 0.189 0.456*** 0.221 0.435*** 0.323 -0.355 1.668
(13D-PE) 0.111 0.204*** 0.123 0.192*** 0.128 0.187*** 0.158 0.343 2.499
Market Index -0.178 -0.038*** -0.160 -0.056*** -0.152 -0.064*** -0.108 -0.038 1.862
Fama-French three-factor
model
-0.226 -0.049*** -0.203 -0.072*** -0.193 -0.082*** -0.138 -0.023 1.797
Continued on next page...
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... table 2.2 continued
Theoretical CDF 0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5.0 95.0 Mean Skew Kurtosis
Fama-French with
momentum





-0.07 -0.0275*** -0.064 -0.037*** -0.062 -0.035*** -0.048 0.449 2.340
B: Size, prior performance,
industry
-0.105 -0.032*** -0.095 -0.041*** -0.091 -0.045*** -0.068 0.536 1.821
Panel B: 24-month CARs
Market Index
Size Deciles (13D-13G) 0.123 0.316*** 0.145 0.293*** 0.155 0.283*** 0.219 0.389 2.049
(0.139) (0.326***) (0.160) (0.304***) (0.170) (0.294***) (0.232) (0.180) (1.561)
(13D-PE) -0.118 -0.065*** -0.112 -0.071*** -0.109 -0.074*** 0.092 0.562 1.957
(0.004) (0.341***) (0.042) (0.302***) (0.060) (0.285***) (0.172) (0.476) (1.98)
Book-to-market
Size decile (13D-13G) 0.142 0.402**** 0.171 0.373*** 0.185 0.359*** 0.272 0.337 1.761
(13D-PE) -0.087 0.372* -0.035 0.320* -0.01 0.296* 0.142 1.195 3.384
Market Index -0.275 -0.133*** -0.259 -0.150*** -0.252 -0.157*** -0.204 0.364 1.755
Fama-French three-factor
model
-0.359 -0.171*** -0.337 -0.192*** -0.327 -0.202*** -0.265 0.264 1.755

















... table 2.2 continued
Theoretical CDF 0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5.0 95.0 Mean Skew Kurtosis
Fama-French with
momentum





-0.156 -0.063*** -0.145 -0.073*** -0.140 -0.078*** -0.109 -0.492 1.908
B: Size, prior performance,
industry
-0.125 -0.071*** -0.119 -0.078*** -0.116 -0.080*** -0.098 0.608 2.747
Panel C: 36-month CARs
Market Value
Size Deciles (13D-13G) 0.252 0.544*** 0.284 0.512*** 0.299 0.497*** 0.398 0.352 1.725
(.172) (0.316***) (0.188) (0.30***) (0.195) (0.292***) (0.244) (0.432) (2.28)
(13D-PE) -0.087 -0.018*** -0.079 -0.026*** -0.077 -0.298*** -0.053 0.326 1.749
(.194) (0.592***) (0.237) (0.549***) (0.258) (0.528***) (0.393) (0.226) (1.84)
Book-to-market
Size Deciles (13D-13G) 0.242 0.455*** 0.266 0.432*** 0.277 0.421*** 0.349 -0.080 1.850
(13D-PE) 0.154 0.602*** 0.203 0.553*** 0.226 0.530*** 0.378 0.033 1.288
Market Index -0.335 -0.204*** -0.320 0.218*** -0.314 -0.225*** -0.269 0.572 2.106
Fama-French three-factor
model
-0.456 -0.269*** -0.436 -0.290*** -0.426 -0.30*** -0.363 0.386 1.950
Continued on next page...
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... table 2.2 continued
Theoretical CDF 0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5.0 95.0 Mean Skew Kurtosis
Fama-French with
momentum





-0.295 -0.130*** -0.275 -0.148*** -0.267 -0.157*** -0.212 -0.478 1.768
B: Size, prior performance,
industry

















Table 2.3: Test-specification using BHARs in post-activism years
The table reports the specifications of t-statistics using BHARs in nonrandom samples based on various matching criteria for the period of 12-month,
24-month, and 36-month in post-announcement of Schedule 13D filing in three separate panels. The BHARs are calculated as BHARi12 = ∑i=1 ARi12
for each target firm matched with nontarget firm (PE) on two criteria; i) size/industry/book-to-market value; ii) size/industry/prior performance. Target
firms are 589 firms, and non-event firms are 898 firms from Schedule 13G, and 273 firms targeted by private equity companies in US market. Monthly
price data for target and nontarget firms are extracted from Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bloomberg respectively. The prices are taken at the end
of each month trading day. For each pre-announcement return, the first monthly observation starts from preceeding month that is m0−m1. The similar
procedure is adopted for calculating the post-announcement returns. The statistical significance for abnormal return is tested using the parametric pairwise
t-test, based on the cross-sectional standard deviations of the abnormal returns. We test null hypothesis that the average monthly abnormal return is equal
to zero. p-values are reported to show the significance of t-statistic. ***, **, * denote the level of significance for 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively in a two tailed test.
Panel A: 12-month BHARs
Theoretical CDF 0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5.0 95.0 Mean Skew Kurtosis
Market value deciles
(13D-13G) 0.028 0.127*** 0.041 0.114*** 0.047 0.108*** 0.078 -0.927 2.715
(13D-PE) -0.159 -0.046*** -0.144 -0.060*** -0.138 -0.067*** -0.103 0.407 1.636
Book-to-market deciles
(13D-13G) -0.086 0.078 -0.065 0.057 -0.055 0.048 -0.004 -1.559 5.234
(13D-PE) -0.215 0.106 -0.173 0.065 0.155 0.047 -0.0544 -0.913 4.252
Market index -0.309 -0.121*** -0.289 -0.140*** -0.280 -0.149*** -0.215 -0.399 3.661
Fama-French three-factor model -0.035 -0.016*** -0.033 -0.018*** -0.032 -0.019*** -0.026 -1.27 11.121
Equally-weighted market index
A: Size, book-to-market, industry -0.021 -0.005*** -0.019 -0.006*** -0.018 -0.007*** -0.013 -1.890 1.062
Continued on next page...
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... table 2.3 continued
Theoretical CDF 0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5.0 95.0 Mean Skew Kurtosis
B: Size, prior performance,
industry
-0.045 -0.018*** -0.042 -0.021*** -0.041 -0.022*** -0.031 -3.059 1.755
Panel B: 24-month BHARs
Theoretical CDF 0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5.0 95.0 Mean Skew Kurtosis
Market value deciles
(13D-13G) 0.107 0.291*** 0.128 0.270*** 0.137 0.260*** 0.199 0.432 2.064
(13D-PE) -0.341 0.989 -0.189 0.837 -0.119 0.767 0.324 2.472 7.877
Book-to-market deciles
(13D-13G) -0.023 0.070 -0.012 0.059 -0.007 0.055 0.024 -1.307 6.320
(13D-PE) -0.192 0.378 -0.127 0.313 -0.097 0.283 0.093 2.576 1.065
Market index -0.320 -0.065*** -0.294 -0.091*** -0.282 -0.104*** -0.193 0.052 3.985
Fama-French three-factor model -0.031 -0.015*** -0.030 -0.017*** -0.029 -0.018*** -0.024 -1.555 11.062
Equally-weighted market index
A: Size, book-to-market, industry -0.022 -0.0104*** -0.021 -0.012*** -0.020 -0.012*** -0.016 -1.462 6.047
B: Size, prior performance,
industry

















Panel C: 36-month BHARs
Theoretical CDF 0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5.0 95.0 Mean Skew Kurtosis
Market value deciles
(13D-13G) 0.231 0.507*** 0.261 0.476*** 0.275 0.462*** 0.369 0.336 1.698
(13D-PE) 1.048 6.374*** 1.629 5.793*** 1.906 5.516*** 3.711 1.056 2.620
Book-to-market deciles
(13D-13G) -0.011 0.064** -0.003 0.055** 0.001 0.052** 0.026 -0.562 5.502
(13D-PE) -0.035 0.184** -0.011 0.160** 0.001 0.149** 0.075 0.239 4.946
Market index -0.791 -0.205*** -0.732 -0.264 -0.702*** -0.293*** -0.497 -0.914 10.340
Fama-French three-factor
model
-0.028 -0.014*** -0.0278 -0.015*** -0.026 -0.016*** -0.021 -1.513 13.546
Equally-weighted market index
A: Size, book-to-market,
industry (FF 3 factors)
-0.019 -0.011*** -0.019 -0.011*** -0.018 -0.012*** -0.0154 -1.377 4.807
Target firm - PE firm -0.049 0.013* -0.042 0.006* -0.039 0.003* -0.018 -2.414 10.465
B: Size, prior performance,
industry
-0.027 -0.014*** -0.026 -0.016*** -0.025 -0.016*** -0.021 -1.241 4.637
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Table 2.4: Test-specification using Calendar–time portfolio approach in post–activism years
The following table reports the specifications of t-statistics using calendar–time portfolio approach in nonrandom samples based on various matching criteria for
the period of 12-month, 24-month, and 36-month in post-announcement of Schedule 13D filing in three separate panels. The CT PA returns are calculated in each
calendar month i, a portfolio is formed comprising of all firms experiencing the same event over the period of interest. Each event firm is matched with nonevent
firm on two criteria; i) size/industry/book-to-market value; ii) size/industry/prior performance. The statistical significance in abnormal returns is tested using
the parametric pairwise t-test, based on the cross-sectional standard deviations of the abnormal returns. The null hypothesis tested is that the average monthly
abnormal return is equal to zero. p-values are reported to show the significance of t-statistic. ***, **, * denote the level of significance for 1%, 5%, and 10%
respectively in a two tailed test.
Panel A: 12-month CTPA
Theoretical CDF 0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5.0 95.0 Mean Skew Kurtosis
Size
Top decile -0.0347 0.028 -0.028 0.021 -0.024 0.018 -0.003 0.226 5.327
Bottom decile -0.176 0.116 -0.146 0.085 -0.131 0.070 -0.030 0.913 20.196
Book-to-market
Top decile -0.069 0.011** -0.060 0.003** -0.056 -0.001** -0.028 -0.270 5.129
Market index -0.115 -0.014*** -0.104 -0.024*** -0.099 -0.029*** -0.064 8.533 85.473
Fama-French three-factor model -0.036 0.004** -0.032 0.001** -0.030 -0.001** -0.016 -0.312 4.86
Equally-weighted market index
A: Size, book-to-market, industry -0.018 0.003* -0.015 0.001* -0.014 0.000* -0.007 -0.062 3.840
B: Size, prior performance, industry -0.043 -0.005*** -0.039 -0.009*** -0.037 -0.011*** -0.024 -0.060 5.101
Panel B: 24-month CTPA
Size

















... table 2.4 continued
Theoretical CDF 0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5.0 95.0 Mean Skew Kurtosis
Top decile -0.030 0.024 -0.024 0.018 -0.021 0.015 -0.003 0.089 4.50
Bottom decile -0.227 0.054* -0.197 0.024 -0.182 0.009* -0.086 -0.318 10.072
Book-to-market
Top decile -0.023 0.016 -0.019 0.012 -0.017 0.010 -0.003 -1.190 7.217
Market index -0.101 -0.051*** -0.096 -0.056*** -0.094 -0.059*** -0.076 8.073 92.788
Fama-French three-factor model -0.036 0.003** -0.032 -0.001** -0.030 -0.002** -0.016 -0.347 5.091
Equally-weighted market index
A: Size, book-to-market, industry -0.019 0.002** -0.017 0.001** -0.016 -0.001** -0.008 -0.179 3.908
B: Size, prior performance, industry -0.045 -0.004*** -0.041 -0.008*** -0.039 -0.010*** -0.025 -0.439 5.614
Panel C: 36-month CTPA
Size
Top decile -0.029 0.021 -0.024 0.016 -0.021 0.013 -0.004 0.108 4.896
Bottom decile -0.163 -0.007*** -0.146 -0.024*** -0.138 -0.033*** -0.085 -0.014 3.421
Book-to-market
Top decile -0.023 0.016 -0.019 0.012 -0.017 0.010 -0.003 -1.190 7.217
Market index -0.096 -0.047*** -0.091 -0.052*** -0.088 -0.054*** -0.071 8.621 100.380
Fama-French three-factor model -0.035 0.002** -0.031 -0.001** -0.030 -0.003** -0.016 -0.284 5.556
Equally-weighted market index
A: Size, book-to-market, industry -0.016 0.001** -0.014 -0.001** -0.014 -0.001** -0.007 -0.291 5.986
B: Size, prior performance, industry -0.042 0.009* -0.036 0.004* -0.033 0.001* -0.016 0.071 4.871
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Table 2.5: Buy-and-hold long-run abnormal returns in post–activism years
This table reports the average buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the period that extends from pre-announcement 12-months to 36-months in post-announcement
of Schedule 13D filing and Schedule 13G filing in three separate panels. The monthly returns are computed for 589 target firms and 898 firms targeted by similar
set of 112 hedge funds in the U.S. All data is extracted from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The prices are taken at the end of each month trading day. The
abnormal returns for each firm is computed using Fama-French three-factor model comprising on six equally-weighted portfolios formed on size, book-to-market.
The risk-free rate is one month U.S. Treasury bill rate. For each pre-announcement return, the first monthly observation starts from preceeding month that is
m0−m1. The similar procedure is adopted for calculating the post-announcement returns. The statistical significance of each of the average long-term abnormal
common stock return is tested using the parametric t-test, based on the cross-sectional standard deviations of the abnormal returns. The null hypothesis tested is
that the average long-run abnormal return is equal to zero. p-values are reported to show the significance of t-statistic. ***, **, * denote the level of significance
for 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, in a two tailed test.
Reference benchmark No. ofobs. Statistics
Pre-announcement Post-annoucement




portfolio (13D - FF
three factors)
589
Estimates 0.076 -0.062 -0.076 -0.074
p-value 0 0 0 0
t-statistic 0.56 -0.28 -0.63 -9.17
Constant 9.87*** 10.7*** 10.0*** 3.1***
% of negative ab-
normal returns




portfolio (13G - FF
three factors)
887
Estimates -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.012
t-statistic -0.08 0.06 -0.3 -4.07
Constant 11.903*** 11.9*** 11.8*** 11.9***
p-value 0 0 0 0
% of negative ab-
normal returns






Estimates -0.094 0.086 0.028 0.124
t-statistic -0.55 0.91 0.21 1.07
Constant 11.90*** 10.5*** 11.2*** 12.4***
p-value 0 0 0 0
% of negative ab-
normal returns

















Table 2.6: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns for yearly horizon of accumulation
This table reports abnormal returns for each separate year in three separate panels. For each yearly-horizon, we compute abnormal return for each 12-months.
The monthly returns are computed for 589 target firms and 898 firms targeted by similar set of 112 hedge funds in the U.S. All data is extracted from Thomson
Reuters Datastream. The prices are taken at the end of each month trading day. The abnormal returns for each firm is computed using Fama-French three-factor
model comprising on six equally-weighted portfolios formed on size, book-to-market. The risk-free rate is one month U.S. Treasury bill rate. For each
pre-announcement return, the first monthly observation starts from preceeding month that is m0−m1. The similar procedure is adopted for calculating the
post-announcement returns. The statistical significance of each of the average long-term abnormal common stock return is tested using the parametric t-test,
based on the cross-sectional standard deviations of the abnormal returns. The null hypothesis tested is that the average long-run abnormal return is equal to zero.
p-values are reported to show the significance of t-statistic. ***, **, * denote the level of significance for 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, in a two tailed test.
Reference benchmark No. ofobs. Statistics
Pre-announcement Post-annoucement




portfolio (13D - FF
three factors)
589
Estimates 0.076 -0.062 -0.054 -0.053
p-value 0 0 0 0
t-statistic 0.562 -0.285 -0.361 -6.714
Constants 9.871*** 10.720*** 24.302 15.09





portfolio (13G - FF
three factors)
887
Estimates -0.000 -0.001 -0.009 -0.015
t-statistic -0.083 -0.414 -3.916 -7.351***
Constants 11.90*** 11.832*** 23.793*** 35.792***
p-value 0 0 0 0







Estimates -0.094 0.086 0.032 0.066
t-statistic -0.552 0.915 0.233 0.357
Constants 11.884*** 10.449*** 22.259*** 31.643***
p-value 0 0 0 0
% of negative ab-
normal returns
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Table 2.7: Calendar-time portfolio returns: Fama-French three factor model
This table reports the average calendar-time portfolio monthly abnormal returns from pre-announcement 12
months to 36 months of post-announcement for the event firms filing 13D and 13G. The calendar-time portfolio
returns are regressed against Fam-French three-factor model and estimates for intercept are reported using
following regression: Rpt − R f t = αi + βi(Rmt − R f t) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + εit . In calendar time portfolio
approach, for each firm i, we form a portfolio consisting of all j firms experiencing same event within τ months
prior to the given month. For each firm i, the number of firms in reference portfolio varies; so therefore, we
use both ordinary least squares (OLS) and weighted least squares to estimates the regressor intercept alpha.
the average abnormal montly return. The weights used in computing the WLS is the number of firms in each
portforlio for every event firm. The monthly returns are computed for 589 firms filing 13D and 898 firms filing
13G targeted by similar set of 112 hedge funds in the U.S. market over the period of January 2000 to December
2013. The prices are taken at the end of each month trading day. The abnormal returns for each firm is computed
using Fama-French three factors comprosing on six equally-weighted portfolios formed on size, book-to-market.
The risk-free rate is one month U.S. Treasury bill rate. For each pre-announcement return, the first monthly
observation starts from preceeding month that is m0−m1. The similar procedure is adopted for calculating the
post-announcement returns. The statistical significance of each of the average long-term abnormal common
stock return is tested using the parametric t-test, based on the cross-sectional standard deviations of the abnormal
returns. The null hypothesis tested is that the average long-term abnormal common stock return is equal to zero.
p-values are reported to show the significance of t-statistic. The number of observations is the total nubmer of
months in each regression. ***, **, * denote the level of significance for 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. in a two
tailed test.
Panel A: CPTA - Post Announcement monthly abnormal returns
12-month 24-month 36-month
OLS Intercept -0.012 -0.008 -0.007
t-statistics -1.410 -0.970 -0.920
No. of observations 160 168 168
WLS Intercept -0.019 -0.016 -0.015
t-statistics -38.11 -51.40 -66.41
No. of observations 160 168 168
Panel B:Duration of Post announcement monthly abnormal returns
12-month 24-month 36-month
OLS Intercept 0.006 -0.014 0.001
t-statistics 0.300 -0.810 1.130
No. of observations 160 160 168
Continued on next page...
152
TABLES AND FIGURES
... table 2.7 continued
12-month 24-month 36-month
WLS Intercept 0.005 -0.003 0.002
t-statistics -2.33 -3.19 20.44
No. of observations 160 160 160
Panel C. Post announcement monthly abnormal returns for 13G firms for three years
12-month 24-month 36-month
OLS Intercept -0.015 -0.015 -0.013
t-statistics -2.212 -2.337 -2.193
No. of monthly observations 154 154 154
WLS Intercept 0.000 0.000 0.000
t-statistics -0.930 -0.440 -0.410
No. of monthly observations 154 154 154
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Table 2.8: Monthly calendar-time portfolio returns: Fama-French three factor model
Monthly abnormal returns (ARit ) for each firm are calculated using the returns on the Fama-French three factors
value-weighted market index, value-weighted small stocks minus big stocks, and value-weighted high book-
to-market value minus low book-to-market value: Rpt −R f t = αi+βi(Rmt −R f t)+ siSMBt +hiHMLt + εit . In
each calendar month t, we calculate a mean abnormal return MARt = ∑ntt=1 xitARit , where nt is the number of
firms in the portfolio in the month t. The weight, xit, is 1/nt , when abnormal returns are equally weighted.
A grand mean monthly abnormal returns MMAR is calcuated: MMARt = 1T ∑
T
t=1 MARt where T is the total
number of calendar months. To test the null hypothesis of zero mean monthly abnormal returns, a t-statistics is




The reason for using this simple method is to eliminate the possible cross-sectional dependence occurring
because of industry clustering and making choice of inappropriate modelling when reference portfolio is based
on non-random firms. The monthly returns are computed for 589 firms filing 13D and 898 firms filing 13G
targeted by similar set of 112 hedge funds in the U.S. over the period of January 2000 to December 2013. The
prices are taken at the end of each month trading day. The risk-free rate is one month U.S. Treasury bill rate.
For each pre-announcement return, the first monthly observation starts from preceeding month that is event
month m0−m1. The similar procedure is adopted for calculating the post-announcement returns. The statistical
significance of each of the average long-term abnormal common stock return is tested using the parametric
t-test based on the cross-sectional standard deviations of the abnormal returns. The null hypothesis tested is that
the mean monthly long-term abnormal common stock return is not different than zero. p-values are reported to
show the significance of t-statistic. The number of observations is the total nubmer of months in each regression.
***, **, * denote the level of significance for 1%. 5%. and 10% respectively.
12-month 24-month 36-month
MAR 1.263 1.260 1.261
MMAR 0.008 0.008 0.008
Number of months 150 150 150
Standard deviation 0.101 0.101 0.101
Std. Dev. / Sqr 150 0.008 0.008 0.008
t-statistic 1.023 1.021 1.022
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Table 2.9: Long-run abnormal returns and crisis effect – event-firms (13D)
The following table reports the results for various approaches including CARs, BHARs, and CT PA when crisis
impact is taken into account. The entire set of monthly stock prices for 589 target firms covering January
2000 to December 2013 is divided primarily into two sub-groups; pre-crisis staring from January 2000 to
June 2007; post-crisis period starting from July 2007 to December 2013. Panel A reports the results for full
sample. CARs, and BHARs are calculated using Fama-French three factors including market index, SMB, and
HML. Calendar-time portfolio returns for each firm in each month are computed by averaging the returns on a
portfolio formed by consisting of all firms experiencing similar event in last 12-, 24- and 36-months. Panel B,
and Pancel C reports the results for pre- and post-crisis period respectively. A pairwise t-test is conducted to
test the difference between targets and nontargets abnormal returns. p-values specify the level of significance




Return in points -0.819 - 0.067 -
t-statisitcs 9.934 -1.799 -
p-value 0.000 0.0730 -
No. of observations 589 589 589
Pre-crisis (Jan.
2000-June 2007)
Return in points -0.888 -0.054 -
t-statisitcs -10.950 -0.473 -
p-value 0.000 0.637 -
No. of observations 347 347 347
Post-crisis (July
2007-Dec. 2013)
Return in points -0.769 -0.083 -
t-statisitcs 6.222 -1.999 -
p-value 0 0.047 -
No. of observations 242 242 242
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Table 2.10: Long-run abnormal returns and crisis effect – 13G firms
This table reports the results for cumulative abnormal returns in nontarget firms when we control for crisis effect
in analysis. The sample consists of monthly stock prices for 898 firm covering January 2000 to December 2013,
and divided into two sub-groups; pre-crisis staring from January 2000 to June 2007; post-crisis period starting
from July 2007 and lasts at December 2013. When an activist acquires a fund with more than 5% ownership
stake and files Schedule 13G to the SEC of US with no intent of influencing firm’s internal governance then
it is known as passively targeted firm. We use passively targeted firms by similar hedge fund to evaluate the
actively targeted firm’s performance.
CARs BHARs CTPA
Full sample
Return in points -1.227 - -
p-value 0.000 - -
t-statisitcs -10.436 - -
No. of observations 898 898 898
Pre-crisis (Jan.
2000- June 2007)
Return in points -3.397 - -
p-value 0.000 - -
t-statistic - - -
No. of observations 480 480 480
Post-crisis (July
2007- Dec. 2013)
Return in points -1.377 - -
p-value 0.000 - -
t-statistic -12.577 - -
No. of observations 418 418 418
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PAPER 3
HEDGE FUND DECISION MAKING: EVIDENCE FROM TARGET
FIRM LEVERAGE
Zazy Khan
ABSTRACT. Hedge fund targets have experienced unprecedented upsurge in leverage
following the recent financial crisis. This study examines whether increase in target
leverage affects a fund decision of holding stake in firm. We investigate the link between
different components of a firm capital structure and their subsequent effects on fund
strategy of retaining the target. Using a hand collected data on 543 US listed firms over the
period of 2000 to 2013, we show that leverage explains the cross-sectional variation in fund
decision of holding the target. The significance of leverage pronounces in the first year
and becomes marginal in the second year after activism when we control for crisis effect.
Activists prefer to restructure the debts prior to their exit after first year of activism. We also
find that increase in leverage is utilized to improve investment and payout policy in targets.
Keywords: Hedge funds, leverage, capital structure, target firms
JEL classification: G12; G14
3.1 Introduction
"Have fund-owned firms become more leveraged?" Is the question which is circulating in
mainstream financial press since the outbreak of financial crisis of 2007-2009.1 An analysis
of recent fund–acquired targets reveals that leverage ratio has achieved unprecedentedly new
levels.23 The upsurge in leverage level in post–crisis period in particular, is partly explained
by the Fed’s recent policy of quantitative easing which led to record low interest rates and
1See, e.g.,[1] http://ww2.cfo.com/credit/2013/04/leverage-ratios-surge-at-large-companies/
2 From 11% in 2012 to 13% in 2013. S&P Capital IQ.
3Following the literature, we measure the leverage as a ratio of total debt to total equity.
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consequently enticed to high borrowings from financial intermediaries.4 Hedge funds which
are structurally characterized by leveraging targets availed this opportunity and channelized
it for the activism. The fundamental question arises whether this increased level of leverage
in targets creates any obstacle for the activist fund to sell its holdings at premium.
Numerous studies in hedge fund literature have empirically shown that funds likely target
financially growth firms– suggesting corporate changes to targets capital structure and take
managerial actions which lead target’s stock to reflect its fundamental value. 5 Activists
preferably target cash excessive firms to achieve two central objecitves; first, to mitigate
agency issues related with cash hoarding, and second to distribute excess cash among share-
holders. In addition with depleting excess cash, activists on the other hand channelize the
firm–associated financial intermediaries to provide more leverage to finance certain projects.
Given the lower interest rates, a stimulus in high demand for debt from traditional sources
would certainly alter the components of capital structure.
This study augments Greenwood and Schor (2009) work, which documents that fund–
related activism increases the likelihood of a target firm being taken over at higher premium
in the period following fund activism. However, contrary to their study, we attempt to explore
whether this decision of selling the stock in target is subject to existing level of leverage in
the firm. Despite the signifcant recovery of the hedge fund industry in the post-crisis period,6
the target firms are getting more leveraged and as a result this increase in leverage is affecting
considerably various components of the cost of capital. The proportionate changes in cost of
capital ultimately transmit into firm’s capital structure and thus affect the ability to payback
the debts. In addition, different level of cost of capital (precisely cost of debt) determines the
price which allows a potential buyer to offer to the activist fund. The activist fund typically
acquires largely concentrated stake in target and intents to sell it after having offer reasonably
higher than holding price assuming other things remain the same. The buyer presumably
evaluates the stock on its fundamental parameters particularly taking into account the target’s
existing capital structure. Given this information, higher level of leverage lowers the odds for
a fund to sell its stock at higher premium, rather it extends the holding period to restructure
the debts.
4See e.g. Anne-Sylvaine Chassany; Finance: return of the buyout kings, March 7, 2014.
5Hedge fund theoritians (Bratton, 2006; Briggs, 2007; Kahan and Rock, 2007).
6According to Hedge Fund Research (HFR), a leading fund research firm, the assets under management in
hedge fund industry have achieved new level of $2.85 trillion dollars in fourth quarter of 2014.
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In addition, this study endeavours to explore the channels to which these additional
borrowings are allocated. Prior documented studies on fund activism find that activists
introduce innovative techniques to enhance firm’s productivity which may enable their targets
to be more competitive. To do so, funds increase allocation towards investment component
in the long-term as documented by Klein and Zur (2006) who find that post-activism one
year accounting performance shows that target firms experience substantial improvement in
investment component including capital expenditures and research and development. We
hypothesize that additional borrowings are used to improve the investment in targets. To
test this hypothesis, we evaluate the changes in targets capital expenditures and research
and development in one year following activism and find that one year post–activism capital
expenditures have significantly increased. In addition, we also hypothesize that increase in
leverage is positively correlated with firm’s distribution policy. To test this hypothesis, we
examine the changes in firm’s dividend yield and payout ratios in one year post-activism.7
Using a universe of 4260 Schedule 13D files and their subsequent amendments filed by
112 hedge funds over the period of 2000-2013, we extract data for 543 firms listed in the
U.S. and examine whether increased level of leverage affects the fund decision of holding
stock in target firm. In answering this question, we initially compare the characteristics of
the targets with a matching sample of nontarget firms based on a well-defined benchmark of
size/ book to market value/ 2–digit SIC industry codes. The difference in medians are tested
using Wilcoxon signed rank test indicating that targets are likely undervalued stock which is
consistent with the prior fund–related literature. Additionally, statistically significant estimate
on cash variable conforms with the widely accepted argument that targets are in general cash
excessive and are likely to be involved in agency-related issues. These results comply with
our assumptions which state that active funds target undervalued and cash hoarding stock.
The study uncovers new aspects in activism-related literature and examines yet unques-
tioned dynamics of target firms’ debt structure. It comparatively analyzes the change in
leverage before and after the crisis and arguably explains the factors for differential effect.
The studies in hedge fund have been widely discussing a fund’s leverage as an important
element in determing fund’s portfolio positions (which is validate and still holds), however,
on the contrary, a limited amount of attention is paid to target firms’ leverage. Firm’s leverage
is merely seen as a part of accounting measures while assessing the performance follow-
7Anecdotal evidence reveals that activists may suggest firms to increase leverage which could be possbily
used as higher payout to existing shareholders. In doing so, these funds are seen proposing it at the end of
specific period which could be quarter, mid year, or annually to get reputation in industry and among investors
and good compensation for their performance.
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ing the fund activism. Unlike previous fund-related studies, however, we are focused on
examining whether a fund decision of holding ownership stake in a firm contiguously related
with target’s leverage. We test the hypothesis whether a firm’s leverage is positively related
with the fund decision of holding the firm and we find that leverage accounts for much of
the variation in fund’s decision making. We also find that the activist funds increase the
leverage in targets to use it as to provide capital for future long-term investments and as a
result to enhance firm’s value. However, if existing level of leverage is seen as impacting a
fund decision of selling stock at premium, then as a strategy, a fund delays to sell the stock
and rather prefers to restructure the debts.
We further investigate whether increased level of leverage in targets is mainly induced
by crisis period. To examine it, we anaylze the impact of recent financial crisis on targets’
leverage. The findings suggest some interesting insights. Crisis, primarily appears significant
in our initial analysis. In the first year following the activism, leverage is significantly distin-
guishable from zero which holds with the hypothesis of long-term investment stating that
funds do not reduce their ownership in first year. However, in second year, both crisis and
leverage become insignificant and as a result, we find that fund reduces its ownership. The
insignficantly reduced level of leverage after controlling for crisis effect is attributed to the
activist’s strategy of restructuring debts in targets in the first year of activism. In addition, to
assess the impacts of crisis on firm’s leverage, in particular post–crisis period, we introduce
the interactive terms with crisis. The findings suggest two emerging trends; first, post–crisis
leverage in targets has increased, which is consistent with Brav et al. (2008); Klein and Zur
(2006) who use pre–crisis sample and document that firms’ book leverage increases in the
post-activism and find weak correlation between dividend increase and leverage increase.
In other words, expropriation of creditors is unlikely to be a source of shareholder gains.
It contrasts, however with Boyson and Mooradian (2011) findings, who report substantial
reduction to leverage following the activism. The second notable finding is that crisis effect
on leverage is significant in first year of activism with and without interactive terms indicating
that funds are found in restructuring debts before entering to the second year of activism.
Hedge funds are viewed as myopic investors who take large positions in firms suggesting
managerial measures and taking actions which improve the stock price to reflect the firms’s
fundamentals. However, it is largely propagated that these short–run returns are extracted
on the cost of long–term value destruction. Contrary to this view, we find an overwhelming
majority of funds present in target firm and participating actively even after two years of
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activism.8 In some cases, activists reduce their shareholding below 5% within first year of
activism, however, in aggregate such number accounts for insignificant portion of entire
sample. Funds average period of holding stake in firms ranges between one to two years
which is consistent with the period reported by Brav et al. (2008). Related to the period
of holding stake over long-term, we find that fund presence is subject to existing level of
leverage.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section reviews the documented
literature on the impact of capital structure on firm value with anecdotal example. Section
3 sheds light on data collection and variable construction. Section 4 presents summary
statistics about activist funds and target firms. Section 5 analyzes the formulation of model,
and discusses results for full and crisis period. Section six concludes the paper.
3.2 Literature review
In this section, we review capital structure and firm value related literature broadly into two
subjects; first, we explore the studies examining relationship between capital structure, cost
of capital, and subsequent impact on value of the firm and we investigate whether changes
to a firm’s capital structure affects its value. Second, we attempt to find empirical evidence
from activism related literature analyzing firm’s leverage impact on a acquirer’s decision of
holding the stock. To latter part of the literature, we provide anecdotal evidence from hedge
fund industry in explaining how leverage in activists target firms has increased following the
recent financial crisis and its subsequent impact on fund decision making.
3.2.1 Capital structure and firm value
The composition of capital structure in an corporate entity and its impact on firm’s value has
been long debated in finance literature. In their seminal study, Modigliani and Miller (1958)
argue that in a given perfect market setting, firm’s value remains irrelevant in relation to
changes in capital structure. Since the appearance of this proposition, numerous studies have
been explaining the capital structure both theoretically (Miller, 1977; Modigliani and Miller,
1963; Myers, 1977, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984) and empirically (Bhandari, 1988; Booth
8Bebchuk et al. (2014) tests for the probability of a target firm to be disappeared during crisis due to financial
stress and finds that targets insignificantly differ from nontargets.
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et al., 2001; Fama and French, 1998; Masulis, 1980; McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Rajan
and Zingales, 1995).9 In addition, a large amount of discussion in literature covers the central
question on how to achieve optimal capital structure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers,
1993). Voulgaris et al. (2004) stress on importance of capital structure composition and argue
that it performs a crucial role in a firm’s survival, performance, and growth. Firms employ
various combinations of debt and equity in an attempt to achieve the optimal capital structure,
which involves a tradeoff between cost and anticipated benefits. A number of studies have
empirically tested the link between changes to capital structure and subsequent impacts on
firm’s value (see, e.g., (Bhandari, 1988)). We argue for why we substantially emphasize on
firm’s capital structure albeit other factors also serve an important role.
3.2.1.1 Debt and firm value
Revisiting Modigliani and Miller (1958) propositions which posit that a firm value invariably
reacts to the composition of capital structure, we review the previously documented studies
which have argued and tested the capital structure puzzle by discussing the relationship
between debt component as a source of financing and changes to firm’s value. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) argue that an optimal capital structure can be obtained by trading off the
agency cost of debt in exchange for the benefit of debt. Explaining changes in two broad
forms of capital structure, Masulis (1983) documents that stock prices and firm value is posi-
tively related to changes in debt level and leverage. In another important study, Jensen (1986)
argues that when firms have more internally accumulated funds than (externally) positive
net present value projects, then managers are forced to pay external debts that otherwise
might have been invested in projects which have negative net present value. This induces
over-investment problem which can be lessened if managers are forced to pay out excess
funds for servicing debts. Myers (1993) suggests that a firm with outstanding debts may
have the incentive to reject the projects that have positive net present value if the benefits
from accepting the project accrue to the bondholders without also increasing shareholder’s
wealth. This phenomenon is termed as under-investment and may cause harm to the value
of the firm, in particular in those firms which have higher propects in future investments.
Given these theoretical explanations in Jensen (1986) and Myers (1993) discussions, on the
contrary, Stulz (1988) argues that debt financing can possibly have both positive and negative
9 Harris and Raviv (1991) have well-documented a survey of studies on the theory of capital structure. They
broadly classify these studies base on tax, bankruptcy cost, agency cost, information asymmetry, interaction
within input or output and corporate considerations.
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impacts on the value of firm.
3.2.1.2 Equity and firm value
Unlike debt-source of financing, equity is an internally generated source which might be
aggregated by summing paid-up capital, share premium, reserves, and retained earnings. In
pecking order theory proposed by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that
there is a hierarchy of firm preferences with regard to the financing of their investments, and
that there is no well-defined target debt ratio. This theory proposes that firms finance their
needs orderly, initially by using internally generated funds, i.e., undistributed earnings, where
there is no existence of information asymmetry, next by less risky debt if additional funds are
needed and lastly by risky external equity issues to cover any remaining capital requirements.
The order of preferences reflects relative costs of finance which vary for different sources of
financing.
3.2.2 Targets leverage in post activism period – anecdotal evidence
The motivation of this study is primarily driven by those events which took place in the
wake of recent finacial crisis and led to upsurge in firms leverage following the fund-related
activism. In this section, we analyze few anecdotal cases to get answers to the questions
we raised in earlier analysis. We are interested in to know whether target firms, on average,
exhibit similar level of debt prior to fund activism compared to matching sample firms. In
addition, whether targets experience increased level of debts following activists suggested
measures. Moreover, we also investigate the reasons behind the upsurge in leverage. And fi-
nally, to examine the fund’s behaviour in such cases in which target firms are highly leveraged
and funds want to exit. In an attempt to explore the working mechanisms between activist
and target might explain various dimensions of fund’s lockup period, activism dynamics and
long-term impacts on firm performance.
3.2.2.1 Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund 1 Ltd and Spectrum Brands
On September 08, 2009, Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund 1 acquired 30.5% equity in
Spectrum Brands which deals in multiple domestic products.10 The fund explicitly describes
the firm’s stock as undervalued in Schedule 13D to the SEC. Such value stock appears as a
10The fund in this example is randomly selected to see proceedings in target firm over the course of activism.
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potential investment for an activist in which fund suggested measures can lead to increase in
price by improving the fundamentals.11
After initial 13D filing, Harbinger Master Fund filed several ammendments from the
period October 2009 to September 2010, the time when both reached on agreement to transfer
the majority interest from acquirer to Harbinger Group Inc.. During this period, acquirer
together with other shareholders urged Issuer to merge with another firm namely Battery
Merger Sub. On June, 2010, the Issuer announced that its shareholders had adopted and
approved the Merger Agreement in accordance with the terms. Prior to the merger agreement,
Harbinger Master Fund entered with Spectrum Brands on an agreement which allowed
acquirer to contribute 27,756,905 shares of common stock of the Issuer to Harbinger Group
Inc. in exchange for 119,909,830 newly issued shares of Harbinger Group Inc. The exchange
ratio of 4.30:1:00 highly benefitted the shareholders of Harbinger Master Fund with an offer
by $27.36 per share.12
3.3 Data collection and variable construction
3.3.1 Hedge fund sample
Primarily, a sample of 200 hedge funds is obtained upon request from Barclayhedge.com
(private) database with assets under management (AUM– hereafter) and monthly net returns.
Of this, funds functioning only in the U.S. are chosen. At next stage, the funds investing
in equities under various categories including global macro, global, event driven, market
driven among others are shortlisted. To this sample, we add more funds found in hedge
fund literature and on related websites. A list of at least 500 randomly chosen funds is
assembled. To this extent, the details about fund holdings (AUM) and acquired stakes in
firms are unknown. To make it further diversified and well-balanced sample, I perform a
search test in the Securities and Exchangd Commission’s EDGAR search file with the first
name of fund in our list and retrieve additional funds. This process helps in to add more
funds to the list which precisely marks about 800 activist hedge funds. From these 800
11On February 3, 2009, Spectrum Brands and its United States subsidiaries filed voluntary petitions
in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas. See, for details, http://www.
nbcnews.com/id/29001985/ns/business-us_business/t/spectrum-brands-files-bankruptcy/
#.VO8RbUZ0zIU. On July 15, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court entered a written order confirming the Issuer’s Joint Plan of
Reorganization. On August 28, 2009, the plan became effective and the debtors emerged from reorganization proceedings under the
United States Bankruptcy Code. Following fund acquisition on June 8, 2009, the firm board of director approved seven more members to
be new directors to the reorganized firm.
12[1]http://www.harbingergroupinc.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=118763&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1470262
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funds, we drop funds functioning as abitrageurs or taking positions for short period trading
purposes. This leaves our initial activist sample to 127 funds involved in activism. To avoid
any possible selection bias, the funds are chosen regardless of their characteristics e.g., fund
size (AUM), previous filing record, performance, and characteristics about fund managers.
At next stage, each fund is searched in EDGAR system for its record from January 2000
to December 2013. Funds usually report several mandatory files during the period, they
operate. When a hedge fund acquires 5% or more ownership stake in a publicly listed firm
with intent to intervene in the business course of a firm, it is officially required to report the
13D Schedule within 10 days to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC henceforth)
of the U.S. under the ’Securities Exchange Act of 1934’ in order to regulate the transaction
for certain purposes in the secondary market.13 The Schedule 13D indicates the filer as an
activist and provides the details about filer name, the issuer name and identity as an asset
class (bank, money manager), the number of total shares outstanding and their form (ordinary
or preferred stock), payment methods and related costs, the purpose of transaction, filer
holdings in total outstanding shares, and other necessary documentation in the course of
transaction’s proceedings.14
The Schedule 13D discloses essential information about filer’s identity. Item 2 entitled
as "Identity and Background" describes the reporting person’s business address and type,
record about filer’s, if any, criminal and civil proceedings in last five years. However, it does
not mention explicitly the filer’s type whether it is hedge fund or non-hedge fund. Thus,
to clarify any doubts about fund’s identification and position, we examine thoroughly each
fund’s personal webpage and verify it with Factiva and other related websites. During this
systematic search process, some funds are found offering services simultaneously for hedge
funds as well as for private equity funds. I trace the parent investment companies which
manage these funds and check their identification. If the filer is found non-hedge fund, I
simply exclude it. To give an example from the list of activist funds, Deephaven Capital
Management LLC, which manages hedge funds and invests in fixed income securities and
13The Schedule 13G is a mandatory disclosure statement for the persons subject to Section 13(g). The
qualified institutional investor is requiresd to meet two core elements. First, the institution must have acquired
the ownership stake in an ordinary course of business and not with the purpose of influencing the control of
issuing authority. Second, the issuer must belong to a specific regulatory institution e.g. bank, insurance firms,
saving association under Federal Act, registered investment bank among others. The filer (qualified institutional
investor) of 13G Filing is required to report within 45 days of the end of calendar year in which the beneficial
owner holds more than 5% or within 10 days of the end of the calendar year in which filer holds more than 10%
onwership stake.
14Schedule 13D and other filings can easily be downloaded through EDGAR filings search on
[1]www.sec.govwww.sec.gov website.
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in private equity funds. To make sure whether it is classified as hedge fund, we check its
website and record on past transactions in SEC to confirm its identification.
Using EDGAR’s system to retrieve 13D filings could possibly bias the sample toward
big funds and small firms. To acquire a meaningful stake in a firm for activism, a fund is
required to invest a substantial part of holding capital. However, some activist funds have
involved in target firms with ownership stake less than 5%, thus do not appear in EDGAR’s
system. For example, in recent period, Sandell Asset Management after acquiring merely
2% stake in JDS Uniphase Corp. (operating in networks and optical products), urged the
target to consider a proposal of divesting some subsidiary assets. Following this suggestion,
JDS announced its plan saying "This is a strategy our board has been actively considering
for some time, ..." The effectiveness of proposal in short period is manifested by fund’s
reputation and its active role in another firm namely Bob Evan Farms Inc., where it acquired
four board seats and urged the firm to spin–off particular assets.15 These events account for a
significant portion of the fund-activism. I gather information about such events using various
sources including financial press and related websites.16
Activist funds file initial Schedule 13D and then frequently report changes to it known
as amended file (13D/A). In some cases, these amended files are not reported after first
announcement to EDGAR’s system. The amended files are used to follow the developments
on fund activism during a specific period. In addition, to know how long the fund stayed in
firm (in later part of analysis, these amended files are well explained). A notable example
is Del Mar Asset Management, LP when it acquired 4.38% stake in Kennedy-Wilson Hold-
ings, Inc. and announced 13D Filing on November 16, 2009. However, EDGAR’s system
does not report amendments following the initial filing, thus, all such cases are not considered.
A structurally well-defined procedure of multiple cross-checking and scrutinization leaves
the sample with 112 U.S. hedge funds demonstrating the average characteristics of industry.
In comparison with seminal study by Brav et al. (2008) who analyze 236 activist hedge
funds over the period of 2001 to 2006, this study investigates 13D Disclosuers filed by 112
activist funds for a wide period starting from January 2000 to December 2013. Our sample
15[1]http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/09/10/activist-sandell-urged-jds-to-explore-options/?KEYWORDS=hedge+fund+2+equity+stake.
16An important criticism is drawn on activist’s successful campaign by seeking insights to know how activists
systematically gain board seats or influnce firm to implement their suggested plan by holding even less than 5%
ownership stake. To gain insights into this puzzle, activists normally propose their agenda to inclined but reluc-
tant large shareholders including pension funds, mutual funds, private equity funds, and more possibly with other
hedge funds with whom they can find common grounds. Activists lead the campaign on behalf of other institu-
ional sharedholders by dividing the monitoring cost proportionately. [1]http://business.financialpost.com/2014/11/15/how-
activist-hedge-funds-on-steroids-have-become-a-boardroom-enemy/
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composition in terms of activists’ distribution resembles to Boyson and Mooradian (2011)
study who investigate 111 activist hedge funds owned by 89 hedge fund management firms
over the period of 1994 to 2005.17 Table 3.4 represents the distribution of the activist funds
over the period of 2000–2013. An overview of the sample depicts the monotonic trend. The
number of activist funds on average do not vary from 2002 to 2005, however, just before
crisis and in following years, an increasing trend is observed. On average, each activist fund
targets 6 firms over the sample period. However, some funds exceptionally (e.g. Harbinger
Capital Partners Master Fund, Carl Ichan C, Jana Partners LLC, and VP Partners LLC, among
others) engage in, on average, more than 20 firms in sample period which demonstrates their
wide activist role.
3.3.2 Target firms sample
For a comprehensive list of 760 Schedule 13D events with the announcement dates, we
retrieve 688 firms which are uniquely targeted by 112 activst hedge funds over the period of
January 2000 to December 2013. For about 9% cases (760–688), some firms are targeted
repeatedly in similar months, so therefore in order to avoid repetition in analysis, we drop the
firm occuring twice, however we strictly consider the purpose of transaction for which firm
is targeted. At next stage, these firms are searched into the Thomson Reuters Datastream
for their DS Mnemonic Codes (identification codes). During search process, a large part of
firms do not appear in Datastream, thus we drop them from our sample. Our well–defined
search process shortlists 589 U.S. firms, ultimately. These firms are publicly traded at
NY SE/AMEX/NASDAQ exchanges.18
For a comprehensive sample of 543 target firms, we extract data on their stock prices
and for accounting figures from their balance sheets, income and cash flow statements,
respectively. Stock prices are daily based and start prior to January 2000 to December 2013.
Of these 543 firms, a large number of target firms are reported as either dead or completely
buyout, merged, or delisted from Datastream during the course of activism. Given that, the
database does not explain any reason for disappearing firms. The missing annual accounting
figures account for approximately 20% of entire sample. However, these caveats have been
17How well our sample is diversified and representative of the industry? According to global research firm
Preqin [1]https://www.preqin.com/, currently more than 400 activist hedge funds functioning worldwide. Of these 400 active funds,
60% are US based thus comprising 240 funds from which we assemble our sample with 112 activist funds (47%).
18In comparison with first chapter, the number of firms have been improved. We correctly identify firm codes
for those companies which are merged in other firms after some period.
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noticed by prior fund-related studies. Among others, Greenwood and Schor (2009) reduce
their sample size approximately half to the firms available in Compustat but find it arguably
upward biased to small firms.
Over the course of activism, an activist fund keeps on following in the target firm and
reports several amendments known as 13D/As. These amended files reveal the fund’s consid-
eration about the target contemporary performance and its strategic plans regarding future
policies. In the majority of these cases, a fund demands merely a formal communication
for investment purpose, however, sometimes, it recommends an entire change in the course
of actions including displacement of CEO, board management, bargaining for appropriate
deals in mergers and acquisitions (M&As), corporate and governance matters. In order
not to miss any important information, we go through these amended files in particular
and gather all theoretical information on relevant items. In case of a significant change to
the previously submitted purpose of the transaction (e.g., if a fund initially purchases the
stock for portfolio investment by having no intention of playing an active role at manage-
rial level and later on alters it to participate in corporate activities as an aggressive/hostile
investor) then this amended file would be considered as a separate case. However, earlier
studies report that these follow up events do not affect the significance of the overall re-
sults (see, e.g., (Greenwood and Schor, 2009)). In this sample, 3500 amended files out of
total 4260 (6 amendments per initial announcement) constitute about 80% of the total sample.
3.3.3 Matching firms sample
As discussed in the section 3.3.1 that when an activist crosses a threshold by acquiring 5% or
more ownership stake in a publicly listed firm and reveals explicitly no interest to influence
the control in firm, then it is mandatory for the acquirer to report Schedule 13G within 45
days at the end of calendar year in which the investor holds ownership. In case of holding
10% or more stake, the duration to file Schedule13G announcement restricts to 10 days at
the end of calendar year. We experience that an activist also acquires firm for longer period
with nonactive purpose by filing 13G to the SEC. This intuitively motivates to a comparative
analysis and raises question to investigate whether firms actively targeted perform better than
non–actively targeted firms. In other words, to evaluate the performance of firms reported
in 13D Schedules, we use the firms reported in 13G Form. We gather all reported 13G
disclosures for the similar set of hedge funds for which we collect 13D files over the period
of January 2000 to December 2013. From these 13G Files, we gather all relevant information
including firm name, percentage of holding to total ownership, and type of shares (common
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versus preferred stock). Unlike 13D Schedule, 13G Form is distinctively exempted from
several clauses to report.19
We collect initially 955 firms from 112 hedge funds reporting 13G Filings over the
period of January 2000 to December 2013. At next stage, we search these firms in Thomson
Reuters Datastream database to retrieve their DS Mnemonic Codes (identification codes) in
order to collect data. For a small number of firms, which constitute approximately 6% of
entire sample, however we do not find codes, thus these firms are dropped from our sample.
For the rest of 898 firms, we extract data on daily and monthly stock prices and annual
accounting figures from using Datastream. All matching firms are US based and listed at
NY SE/AMEX/NASDAQ exchanges.
3.3.4 Crisis definition
For the analyses of daily and monthly stock returns, we divide the data into two sub-groups,
for the period before crisis, it starts from January 2000 to July 2007, and for the period during
and after crisis, it begins from July 2007 and lasts until December 2013. For the annual
accounting analyses, the observations for the crisis begin from 2007 and onward.20
For stock returns, the crisis is measured by means of a dummy variable which takes
value one, if Schedule 13D is filed from July 2007 and ends at 2013. In similar fashion, for
accounting analyses, crisis is equal to one, if Schedule 13D is reported in year 2007 and
onward. Prior studies considering recent crisis impact have been using a similar definition
(For detail, e.g., see, Becht et al. (2014); Ben-David et al. (2012); Maier et al. (2011)).
19In some cases, funds initially report 13D Schedule to the SEC, however later on they are observed to
change the status to 13G depending on investment strategy.
20The crisis in sub-prime sector which started in early 2007 subsequently trickled down to the financial
institutions including banks, holding companies, investment banks, and brokerage houses in the mid of 2007. A
general concensus among academicians define the recent financial crisis period from July 2007 till December
2009. Maier et al. (2011) explain the definition of crisis by stating "at the end of June 2007, hedge funds of the
investment bank Bear Stearns, which had invested overwhelmingly in the sub-prime mortgage market, were
among the first to struggle". (see for details, ’Bear Stearns says battered hedge funds are worth little’, New
York Times, July 18, 2007., [1]http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/18/business/18bond.html?_r=0.
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3.4 Summary statistics
3.4.1 Activist funds and target firms
Table 3.2 delineates the distribution of target and nontarget firms according to 2–digit SIC
industry codes. An overview clearly depicts that both event and non-event firms are largely
drawn from manufacturing (41% & 36%) and services (22% & 19%) sectors respectively
followed by sector related with financial services. Since the target and nontarget firms
are drawn from similar hedge funds thus showing on one hand homogeneity in selecting
firms, on the other hand evidently supporting the view that activists widely target firms from
production sector for which activists suggested measures take time to be implemented. To
simplify it, if an activist led campaign results in increase the allocation for firm’s research
and development, it certainly takes time to show the effect of such measures, thus activists
target firms for longer period to stay and take actions which lead the firm to improve its
value.
A large number of activist campaigns took place between 2005 and 2008 prior to the
recent financial crisis as shown in table 3.3. The chronological distribution of the target and
nontarget firms reveals that targeting firms for activism before crisis period is considered as
profitable practice. Given the fund inflows to the hedge fund industry and highly positive
absolute returns to investors from funds allowed the activists to serve as an ideal candidate for
monitoring.21 In 13G firms, we once again experience similar trend, which exhibits higher
growth in acquiring firms (13G) during 2004 to 2008.
3.4.2 Characteristics of target firms
The discussion of this study essentially begins with the assumption that hedge funds likely
target financially healthy and growth firms, however randomly. Activists lead a course of
actions according to their pre-specified stated objectives and suggest measures which affect
the market price to reflect its potential intrinsic value. The selection of a target is largely
subject to a fund’s intended period of holding stake in target, capital–lockup period together
with fund and firm operational and financial characteristics. We investigate the fundamental
questions of interest; what kind of firms do hedge funds target for activism? Whether the
choice is centered around targets’ distribution and leverage policy. To investigate these
21According to Eurekahedge, a research firm in hedge fund, the assets managed by the fund industry declined
by $470 billion between June 2008 and April 2009.
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concerns, we adopt two approaches following the prior activism–related literature (Boyson
and Mooradian, 2011; Brav et al., 2008; Greenwood and Schor, 2009). In first approach, we
compare characteristics of targets with matching sample firms based on size/book–to–market
value/ 2–digit SIC industry. And in second approach, using multivariate logit regression
model, we attempt to predict the likelihood of a firm targeted by activist for the purpose of
activism.
We construct a sample of matching firms reporting Schedule 13G based on market capi-
talization, book-to-market value, and 2–digit SIC industry codes in the year in which firms
are targeted. At first stage, all firms in both samples are sorted out using a criterion of 2–digit
SIC code. For each target firm, we find at least one nontarget firm to compare with industry
code. In case of unavailability of industry code to match with, we exclude it from the sample.
At next phase, we choose matching firm whose market value of equity ranges between 70%
to 130% of market value of target firm a month before being targeted. Following this filtering
reduces the size of sample considerably. However, yet for each individual target the nontarget
firms exceed. Finally, we compare the nontarget matching firms holding book-to-market
value closest to the book-to-market value of target firms. The target firm and matching peer
with missing observation of book-to-market value are removed from sample. Our matching
procedure successfully provides one-on-one matching between target and nontarget.
Table 3.5 presents the summary statistics of target firms’ characteristics and compares
it with matching sample firms in one lagged year of fund activism. In order to mitigate the
effect of outliers, we winsorize all variables at 1% level. We report means, medians, and
standard deviations for both samples. To test the difference betweens median observations of
target and non-target firms, we perform Wilcoxon signed rank test and report the p-values.
All figures are annual and retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datastream. We compute the
accounting measures for firm performance which may include the proxies for firm size, oper-
ating and financial performance, debt capacities, profitability, investment, and valuation.22
In comparison with matching firms, most of the characteristics of the target firms appear
reasonable in year prior to fund activism. Using Wilcoxon signed rank test to examine the
difference between medians yield statistically significant results for most of the characteris-
tics. We begin by discussing the proxies for the size of firm measured as market value or
capitalization (defined as the number of shares times per share price) and annual sales. We
find that there is observable heterogeneity in difference in medians’ observation. The targets
22Table 3.1 provides detailed description on definitions and computational process of these ratios.
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appear larger than nontargets and this difference is positively significant at 1% level.
Activist funds largely emphasize on target’s value for which we find strong evidence
that undervalued stock is more likely prone to the fund activism. Regarding firm’s valuation
as indicated by book–to–market ratio (book value of equity/market value of equity) and
Tobin’s Q (long-term debt + the market value of equity/ long term debt + the book value of
equity), the difference in medians are 0.80 and 0.03 percentage points respectively, which
are significant at 1% and marginally at 10% level. We track this information to the stated
objectives of funds and find that as an evidence 60% of firms are explicitly described as
undervalued. Activist funds suggest suitably managerial actions which help target to improve
its price and thus generate returns for its shareholders.
When we scale firm’s operational performance expressed as sales growth (measured as
annual percentage growth in sales) and return on assets (experssed as the ratio of EBITDA
to lagged assets), the difference in medians is distinguishable from zero and targets out-
perform their peers by 8 percentage points and 3% respectively. Hedge funds likely target
operationally well performing firms which contrasts with prior documented literature on
non-hedge fund activism (see, for details, Gillan and Starks (2007)).
The targets debt capacity is assessed in terms of book leverage (defined as debt/(debt +
book value of equity)) and market leverage (ratio of total debt to aggregate of total debt and
market value of equity). Targets appear less leveraged as compared to their matching peers.
Targets low level of leverage prior to fund activism provides a good start to analyze fund
suggested actions and their subsequent impacts on firms’ capital structure. Next variable
cash (defined as cash percentage of total assets) is significantly lower than nontargets by 15
points which is significant at 1% level. The median observations for dividend yield (defined
as (common dividend + preferred dividend) /(market value of common stock + market value
of preferred stock)) and payout ratios for both targets and nontargets are zero. An interesting
aspect to see how much targets reinvest in comparison with industry peers? To assess it, we
check their two important components — capital expenditures (measured as percentage of
total assets) and research and development (R&D, measured as percentage of total assets).
Targets capital expenditures are remarkably higher than nontargets. On the contrary, however,
nontargets outperform targets in research and development.
In summarizing the characteristics of the target firms in one year before activism by a
set of conventionally defined ratios, we may conclude that the activist funds likely target
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medium size, undervalued, operationally and financially healthy firms.
3.4.3 Likelihood of fund–activism using logit regression
To assess the likelihood of fund–activism in the year before activism, we perform a logistic
regression. Table 3.6 presents the logit model results. The dependent variable is a dummy
variable which indicates the probability of a firm being targeted by a fund in year before
activism and vector of independent variables include firm characteristics which are discussed
in section 3.4.2. We compare each target with matching sample firm based on size/ book-to-
market/ industry in the same year. After matching procedure, we substract each nontarget
firm observation from target and regress fund dummy against vector of difference in firm
characteristics. We control for industry and year fixed effects. In order to control for any
outliers or extreme values, all variables are winsorized at 1%.
Table 3.6 exhibits the effects of covariates on likelihood of fund–activism. In column II,
we report the marginal probabilities for each covariate. We find these results much in line
with the results obtained in section 3.4.2. To discuss estimates in logit model, conventionally
marginal probabilities are interpreted. For instance, firm’s operating performance expressed
as ROA is interpreted as a one standard deviation decrease in ROA is associated with 9.5%
increase in the probability of being targeted, assuming other factors remain the same. In a
similar way, analyzing valuation, debt capacity, and investment aspects conform with our
predictable hypothesis that activists likely target small, financially well performing and un-
dervalued stocks — which is also consistent with the documented literature on fund–activism.
3.5 Empirical analysis
3.5.1 Mechanics of fund decision policy
An activist’s decision whether to retain its ownership stake in target firm is subject to a
number of factors. We have extensively argued in our theoretical discussion that a firms’
leverage largely determines this decision particularly in post–crisis period. Based on our
arguments, we formulate these factors in a model which is closely related with (Greenwood
and Schor, 2009) work.
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Presenceit = β0+β1t∆Leverage+β2tListedY +β3tCapstructure
+β4tCharacteristics+ εit (3.1)
Where Presence is a dummy which takes value 1 if fund holds its stake in target over the
entire year of activism. ∆Leverage is a dummy variable which equals to 1, if firm leverage
increases in the year following activism. ListedY is a dummy variable which takes value 1, if
firm is still alive and traded on any US exchange. Capstructure includes various components
of capital structure including leverage ratio, cost of equity, cost of debt, and weighted average
cost of capital. Characteristics includes firm size, profitability, liquidity, growth, valuation,
and payout policy. Each covariate in model is matched with a controling firm based on
well-defined benchmark of size/book-to-market/industry.
To motivate the composition of our model, we argue for the variable listed, which allows
to determine whether firm is still alive and listed on either exchange in the US. A link between
fund presence and firm being listed explains the period the fund acquires the firm. In our
sample, a large number of firms either delist or do not provide data to be accounted for in
examining the fund decision.
3.5.2 Results
3.5.2.1 Leverage level and fund decision – Full sample analysis
In this section, we use a wide array of multivariate logit regression models to test the pre-
dictable hypotheses whether our central variable of interest– leverage explains any part
of cross-sectional variation in our dependent variable which is fund decision of retaining
stake in a target firm. The dependent variable is a dummy which adopts value 1, if fund
stays in firm following the activism. The vector of explanatory variables include leverage,
difference in leverage level between current year and year before activism, which is dummy
and takes value 1 if net difference is positive, difference in leverage between year after
activism and year before activism which is dummy variable and takes value 1 if net difference
is positive, cost of capital, cost of debt, a dummy to indicate whether firm listed in the year
following activism, and vector of firm characteristics which include accounting measures
of performance including size, profitability, liquidity, valuation, and operational efficiency
measures. Most of the independent variables are nondummies, thus we do not supress the
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constant term. Each panel reports results obtained from different model specifications which
we explain in subsequent analysis. We use vector of control specifications which includes
firm size, industry, and year fixed effects for each regression. The number of observations
in each regression significantly reduce for which we argue in following part of analysis. In
addition, the standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and reported in parentheses for
each regression.
We begin by discussing table 3.7 which presents results for fund decision making in first
year after activism in two separate models. In model I, using cost of debt variable in our
regression, we find that the leverage is significantly negative at 5% level. In economic terms,
it makes reasonable sense and interpreted as one standard deviation decrease in leverage ratio
is associated with 0.005 percentage points increase in the probability of being fund present
in firm in first year after activism assuming other factors remain the same. This result is
partly consistent with our assumption that funds do not exit from target given higher level
of debts, rather it restructure them. The fund may sell its stake in second year of activism
after restructuring debts. In model II, which replaces variable cost of debt with WACC, the
estimates improve statistically significantly. Target firm’s leverage in one year following
activism is negatively significant at 1% level which is interpreted as one standard deviation
decrease in leverage ratio is associated with 6% increase in the probability of fund being
present in target in one year post-activism. The dummy, ∆Leverage1 indicates that change
in leverage increases (in existing year) in comparison with year before activism which is
positively significant at 10%. A positive coefficient on the variable ∆Leverage1 indicates
that current year leverage exceeds the leverage in year prior to fund activism. This finding
is in support of our view which states that firm leverage increased following fund activism.
In recent period, a study by Bebchuk et al. (2014) investigating the long term impact of
hedge funds on target firms report that 19% of the activist interventions are characterized as
"investment-limiting" by which they mean increase in leverage, higher payout, or reduced
investment at the end of fiscal year in which activism takes place and two subsequent years.
They find significantly increase in leverage upto 5% from pre-activism to the post-activism
years. To the rest of our model, we do not find any component in firm characteristic explain-
ing any variation in fund decision. Given that both models exhibit substantially fewer number
of observations is because of lack of adequate observations to compute weighted average
cost of capital.
Table 3.8 reports the estimates after regressing fund presence in second year of activism
against a set of dummies, and firm characteristics in three separate models. We include
175
Hedge fund decision making: Evidence from target firm leverage
additional dummies of ∆LeverageY 2 which explains change in leverage level in second
year of activism compard to first year, Firm Listed Y 2 dummy which indicates if target is
contemporarily traded in stock exchange after two years of activism.
In model I, the coefficient on leverage is positively significant, however marginally at 10%
which may be interpreted as fund decision to hold target’s stock in second year of activism
is positively associated with positive level of leverage. The variable Firm Listed Y 1 is also
marginally significant which shows that firm is traded in first year of activism. Regarding firm
characteristics profitability, valuation, and growth are also significant. Model II represents
results by replacing variable cost of equity with "wacc" i.e., weighted average cost of capital.
In comparison with result for leverage in model I, we find entirely different output. The
coefficient on leverage is no more positive when we account for weighted average cost of
capital. This differential effect in both coefficients is partly explained in the components
measuring cost of capital. In addition, we do not find any other dummy showing significance.
In model III, we replace capital structure component with "cod" which is cost of debt and
find that leverage is negatively related with fund presence in target firm following second
year of activism. The results for leverage in model II and III are consistent which explain that
in second year of fund activism, an activist is presumably restructuring debts in target firm
by reducing the leverage. Another interesting finding is the change in leverage level in first
and second year of activism which is positive (statistically insignficant) and in part supports
the view that during the course of activism, firms experience increase in leverage level.
3.5.2.2 Firm leverage and fund decision making during crisis period
In this section, we analyze the impact of crisis on target firm’s leverage and to explore the
channels by which these borrowings are acquired and in addition to investigate the venues to
which these additional borrowings are allocated. As we have been discussing in our previous
analyses that the channels by which activists manange the capital for firm’s investment are
target’s borrowings which are obtained from traditional money lending institutions. Given
that, we are interested in to measure the impact of crisis on target’s leverage and to examine
whether change in leverage due to crisis affects the fund decision of presence in target firm.
Table 3.9 presents the results obtained from multivariate logit regression model to assess
the marginal effect of crisis. We revisit the model specification used in section 3.5.2.1 and
incorporate crisis dummy into it. Model I, II, and III use similar variables by replacing with
component of capital structure systematically. We use "cod" i.e., cost of debt in model I,
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"wacc" which represents weighted average cost of capital in model II, "coe" cost of equity in
model III. All regressions control for firm size, industry and year fixed effects. All variables
are winsorized at 1% level.
The results in table 3.9 are consistent with the results reported for entire sample period
in table 3.7. In model I, the estimates for crisis, leverage, and ∆LeverageY 1 are statistically
significant when using cost of debt as variable in regression. This may suggest that during
crisis period, firm’s leverage persistenly accounting for much of variation in fund decision
making. The change in leverage level during crisis period in first year after activim is positive
which is in line with the findings for full sample period. On the contrary, when we use
weighted average cost of capital, we observe that coefficient on crisis dummy is no more
statistically significant. The effects for leverage and change in leverage still pronounce
significantly. Model III results appear in the similar way except for leverage effect. The
variable for which estimate statistically remain invariably same is the change in leverage
level which is positive and conforms with argument that during the course of activism, targets
experience increase in leverage.
In comparison with results presented in table 3.9, the crisis effect fades away in second
year of fund decision across all models. Table 3.10 assesses the effect of crisis on fund deci-
sion in second year of activism using additional specifications including change in leverage
in year 2 and firm being listed in year 2 following fund activism. In model I, ∆LeverageY 2
and Firm Listed Y 2 are positively marginally significant. These results are consistent with
the theory that following activism firms increase their leverage in particular during crisis
period. We find much similarity in estimates when we replace "cod" with "wacc" variable.
The results drastically change when we incorporate cost of equity as a component of capital
structure. The firm’s leverage becomes positively significant at 1% implying that one standard
deviation increase in firm’s leverage is associated with 0.6% increase in fund decision to
hold stake in firm. Given the scenario in which targeted firm is overdebted, an activist likely
prefers to restructure debts in order to sell firm at premium. This finding is also supported by
positively significant coefficient on ∆LeverageY 2 which describes leverage as increased in
second year of activism compared to the first year.
Summarizing results from table 3.9 and 3.10, we may conclude that crisis effect is sig-
nificant in first year of activism and in second year it marginally vanishes. Firm’s leverage
decisively determines fund decision of holding stake in first year of activism. The change in
leverage level in current and following years remain significantly positive which supports
177
Hedge fund decision making: Evidence from target firm leverage
our view that target firms increase their leverage during the crisis period. Another equally
important finding we observe that funds remain active in listed firms even after two years of
activism which contrast with widely spread critique for which they are blamed (that activists
behave myopically) to extract the short-run gains over the cost of long-term value destruction.
3.5.2.3 Firm leverage and fund decision making – using crisis interactive terms
In section 3.5.2.2, we analyzed results for the full sample period and later on crisis dummy
is incorporated into the analysis. We find that crisis signficantly affects an activist decision
making about stock retaining in the first year of activism, however in the second year it
becomes insignificant. In this section, we attempt to decompose the crisis effect from the
analysis of full sample period to assess which part of sample is deriving our significant
results. For this purpose, we generate crisis interactive terms with all dummies, and firm
characteristics. In what follows, we are mainly focused on our central variable of interest
which is leverage or change in leverage level, thus our analysis would be centered around
this specific variable (crisis-interactive term).23
In table 3.11, the dependent variable is dummy which takes value 1 if fund is present
in firm in first year following activism, vector of independent variables include a vast array
of dummies and their interactive terms with crisis dummy, firm characteristics with crisis
interactive terms and control variables which include industry and year fixed effects. In
model I, the crisis dummy is negatively insignificant. The coefficient on Leverage is positive,
however insignificant. On the contrary, when we control for crisis effect, we find that leverage
is positively significant at 5%. This result is crucial in the wake of recent financial crisis
for which we argue that activist’s target firms became highly leveraged during crisis period.
A positive observation explains that fund does not sell the stock which is highly leveraged,
rather retains it to restructure the debts. As an evidence, the change in leverage level is also
positively significant. The coefficient on "coe" i.e., cost of capital is positively significant
which means that cost of equity increased in the period before crisis, however significantly
reduced during the crisis period which also supports our view that lower cost of capital
encouraged funds to increase their borrowings for targets.
In model II, we regress similar specifications by excluding variable "coe" cost of equity.
An overview of the coefficients depicts almost similar results as estimated in model I. The
23Due to inadequate observations for the variables "cod" (cost of debt), and "wacc", the model does not
produce output, thus we are unable to report the estimates.
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effect of crisis on firm’s leverage is positively significant, however the magnitude reduces.
The differential effect in leverage variable with crisis interactive term could be attributed to
the variable cost of equity. Cost of equity being an important component of capital structure
explains partly variations in the leverage level. Once again, we find positively significant
effect for the change in leverage level in the year after activism.24
Table 3.12 reports the results for multivariate logit regression model. The dependent
variable is a dummy which takes value 1 if activist fund exists in target firm in second year
of activism. We include some additional specifications to our baseline model as explanatory
variables. All variables are added with crisis interactive terms to capture the crisis effect. In
each respective model, we control for industry and firm fixed effects.
In model I, the coefficient on crisis dummy is negatively marginally significant. For
the set of variables explaining leverage, we do not find any statistical significance. The
estimates in model II appear similar to model I, in which we do not add variable cost of
equity. The insignificant coefficient on leverage could be argued that activist fund readily has
restructured the debts in target firm, thus leverage is no more a decisive factor in determining
fund decision about selling the stock. This view is also evidenced by coefficient on variable
∆Leverage1 which is negative implying that leverage level has reduced in target firm as
compared to previous year.25
Summarizing these results, we may conclude that leverage plays an important role in fund
decision about retaining target firm stock, and this effect pronounces in first year of activism
when fund accumulates higher level of debt in target as compared to nontarget firm. Activist
holding concentrated stake in overdebted firm finds it difficult to sell the stock at premium
and thus extends its holding period, however meanwhile suggests measures to target’s capital
structure which may include restructuring debts. Once target firm successfully reduces these
debts, activists sell the stock to likely potential buyer at higher premium.
24In an unreported regression model, when we regress fund dummy against crisis dummy, and other dummies
with crisis-interactive terms, we find crisis effect negatively significant for leverage and interactive terms. The
estimates on "Leverage * Crisis" explains largely cross-sectional variation in fund decision regarding firm
holding in first year of activism. Moreover, these results persistently pronounce for all components of capital
structure including cost of debt, equity, and weighted average cost of capital.
25In an auxiliary analysis, when we use model specifications for second year fund dummy with crisis,
leverage and other dummies with crisis interactive terms, the coefficient on crisis yield negatively significant
results for two different settings; first model using cost of debt as component of capital structure, second
weighted average cost of capital. The estimates on variable "Leverage * Crisis", however appears insignificant
and thus does not explain any variation in the fund decision making.
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3.5.3 Impact of additional leverage on target firm distribution and in-
vestment policies
We hypothesize whether additionally borrowed money induced in target firms is utilized
in enhancing firm’s payout and investment aspects. To test this hypothesis, we analyze
post-activism one year changes in firm’s distribution measures as indicated by payout and
dividend yield and investment measures as assessed by capital expenditures and research and
development.
Table 3.13 presents the changes in firm’s payout, dividend yield, capital expenditures, and
research and development in one year following the activism. Using Wilcoxon signed rank
test, we test the difference in medians for target firms in time-series setting. The coefficients
on payout and dividend yield clearly indicate that firm has improved its distribution in one
succeeding year following activism. Both estimates are statistically significant at 1% and 10%
respectively. Regarding firm’s investment side, we find that difference in median observation
is positively significant which is in line with our assumption that firms experience increase in
investment primarily financed by additional borrowings.
3.6 Concluding summary
The recent financial crisis (2007–08) has likely changed the paradigm of shareholder activism.
Given the enormous amount of outflows of funds from the hedge fund industry following the
crisis, activists are hindered to raise an adequate amount of liquidity and thus face restraints
to finance their portfolios. To this problem, alternatively, funds have channelized firm’s
borrowings from traditional financial institutions for their investments. We examine this
phenomenon and attempt to investigate some relevant concerns which may explore how
additional borrowings might affect fund decision to sell its stake in target. Additionally,
we are also interested in to examine the impact of crisis on firm’s leverage. Moreover, we
investigate those venues in which this additional leverage is likely allocated.
Using a uniquely hand-collected set of data consisting of 543 US listed firms targeted
by 112 activist hedge funds over the period of January 2000 to December 2013, we analyze
the target firms’ performance in the year before activism, in particular leverage level before
being targeted. The target firms exhibit relatively less leveraged in comparison with matching




Using a wide array of multivariate logit regression model, we test the predictable hypothe-
ses whether target firm’s leverage explains the cross-sectional variation in fund’s decision
making to hold the stock. The decision of fund whether to stay in the firm is tested in the first
and second year of activism for full sample period as well as after controlling for the crisis
effect. Our findings are mixed and suggest partly consistency with the predictable theory.
Target firm’s leverage significantly explains the fund decision making in first and second
year of activism in full sample analysis. When we account for the crisis effect, however,
target’s leverage effect appears significant during crisis period in first year of activism and
does not yield any evidence for second year of activism. Based on these results, we draw
the implication that the activist fund holds the stock in target given higher level of leverage,
restructures it and sells it in second year at higher premium.
We also investigate those potential venues to which the firms higher leverage is used. We
find that firms have experienced significantly substantial improvement in distribution and
investment policy. One-year following the activism, the firms’ payout and dividend yield
have increased remarkably. In addition, the targets also experience significant increase in
capital structure when we analyze the performance measures in time-series analysis.
These findings have considerable implications in the wake of recent financial crisis. In the
post-crisis period, regulatory institutions are much concerned to regulate all such activities
under taken by alternative asset classes which could possibly cause vulnerability to the global
financial system. In recent periods, US regulatory authorities introduced Dodd-Frank (2010)
Act to revamp and transparent the financial system in order to prevent another crisis.26 Hedge
funds being significant stakeholders are critically viewed in the wake of recent crisis as
these funds rightly induced excessive leverage into the securities which later had disastrous
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Table 3.1: Variable definitions
Variable Description
Market value Total number of outstanding shares times price per share.
Net sales Firm’s annual sales in dollars.
Tobin’s Q Aggregate of long term debt and the market value of equity




Firm book value of equity/market value of equity.
Growth in sales Annual percentage growth in sales.
Cash flows Percentage of assets.
Book leverage Total debt divided by aggregate of total debt plus book value
of total equity.
Market leverage Total debt divided by total debt plus market value of equity.
Cash Cash and cash equivalents, divided by total assets (%)
New equity Amount of new equity issued during the year divided by the
lagged assets (%)
Dividend yield Common dividend plus preferred dividend divided by aggre-
gate of market value of common stock and market value of
preferred stock.
Payout Total dividend divided by net income before extraordinary
items.
Capital expenses Percentage of total assets.
Research and
development
Percentage of total assets.
Return on equity Ratio of net income divide by total equity.
Profitability Ratio of earnings before interest and taxes divided by net
sales.




Liquidity Cash and short term assets divided by current liabilities.
Growth Ratio Retention rate which is equal to 1 minus dividend declared
divided by net income
Return on equity Net income divided by total equity.







Re Cost of equity
Rd Cost of debt
E Total common shareholders equity
D Total Debt
V Total value is the aggregate of total equity and total debt.
Cost of equity Dividend per share divided by current market value of stock
multiplied by growth rate of dividends.
Cost of debt Annual interest payment of total debt divided by market
value.
Industry Classified based on 2-digit SIC codes of the target




Table 3.2: Distribution of firms by industry
The table provides a comparative summary about the industry classification from which the firms are targeted.
An activist files Schedule 13D upon crossing threshold of 5% or more ownership stake in a publicly listed firm
with intent to influence the firm’s internal governance. 13G is reported when fund is not intended to offer an
active role in target firm’s management. For 543 target firms, we have 898 nontarget firms targeted by similar
112 US hedge funds over the period of January 2000 to December 2013.
SIC 2 digit Industry
13D firms 13G firms
N % N %
01-09 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 0 0% 0 0%
10-14 Mining 41 8% 110 12%
15-17 Construction 5 1% 9 1%
20-39 Manufacturing 223 41% 327 36%
40-49 Transportation & Public Utilities 52 10% 72 8%
50-51 Wholesale Trade 12 2% 16 2%
52-59 Retail Trade 37 7% 34 4%
60-67 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 52 10% 156 17%
70-89 Services 121 22% 174 19%
Total 543 100% 898 100%
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Table 3.3: Chronological distribution of target and matching firms
The following table represents the chronological distribution of firms drawn from Schedule 13D Files, and
Schedule 13G Files from EDGAR search system in Securities and Exchange Commission of the US. These
files are reported by a similar set of activist US hedge funds over the period of January 2000 to December
2013. A 13D Disclosure indicates intent of an activist to influence the internal governance of target firm
whereas a 13G Disclosure shows a fund has no intention to play an active role. All firms are publicly traded at
NY SE/AMEX/NASDAQ exchanges.
Year No. of targets % of sample No. of matching % of sample
2000 25 4.60% 12 1.34%
2001 31 5.71% 28 3.12%
2002 32 5.89% 35 3.90%
2003 35 6.45% 78 8.69%
2004 37 6.81% 106 11.80%
2005 63 11.60% 76 8.46%
2006 66 12.15% 148 16.48%
2007 76 14.00% 122 13.59%
2008 56 10.31% 83 9.24%
2009 24 4.42% 55 6.12%
2010 48 8.84% 87 9.69%
2011 32 5.89% 42 4.68%
2012 10 1.84% 9 1.00%
2013 8 1.47% 17 1.89%
Total 543 100% 898 100%
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Table 3.4: Chronological distribution of hedge funds
The table represents the chronological distribution of the activist hedge funds over the period
of January 2000 to December 2013.

















Table 3.5: Firm characteristics in pre-activism year
The following table reports the average firms characteristics for 543 targets and compares them with the characteristics of a 898 matching sample non-targets by
similar 112 U.S. hedge funds over the period of 2000-2013. I report mean, median, and standard deviation for both targets and non-target firms. The last two
columns report the Wilcoxon signed rank test for the differences in medians between targets and the matched firms with their respective p-values. The targets are
matched with non-targets on firm’s size, book-to-market value, SIC 2-digit codes. The definitions of all variables are provided in table 3.1. The data to compute
all these ratios is extracted from using Datastream.
Characteristics
Event firms: 13D Non-event firms: 13G Median comparison1
Mean Median Sd. Mean Median Sd. Difference p-val
Market Value ($ mln.) 1038.66 203.69 2297.72 687.96 166.77 1734.88 36.92 0.000
Sales ($ mln.) 1428.27 311.26 5375.86 631.63 36.72 2168.69 274.54 0.000
Tobins’Q -0.52 1.68 44.57 2.92 0.88 15.17 0.80 0.000
Book/Market 0.46 0.42 0.78 0.48 0.39 0.74 0.03 0.093
Sales Growth 1.36 1.06 2.34 1.19 0.98 2.66 0.08 0.004
Return on Assets -0.03 0.03 0.24 -60.76 0.00 481.20 0.03 0.000
Book Leverage 0.42 0.33 1.05 2.92 0.88 15.17 -0.55 0.016
Market Leverage 0.27 0.19 0.29 0.17 0.00 0.27 0.19 0.06
Cash (% Assets) 0.75 0.02 2.59 0.34 0.17 0.35 -0.15 0.002
Dividend Yield 0.45 0.00 1.14 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.002
Payout 0.01 0.00 0.91 1.35 0.00 7.92 0.00 0.397
CapEx 5.81 3.35 8.86 54.14 1.29 204.04 2.07 0.420
R&D 0.07 0.00 0.14 1.19 0.98 2.66 -0.98 0.053
Return on Equity -0.03 0.08 3.67 -52.79 0.00 219.74 0.08 0.040
Total Assets ($ mln.) 1940.54 376.00 5079.77 951.73 100.30 2825.04 275.70 0.001
1 Wilcoxon signed rank test for differences in medians between the target and the matched firms.
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Table 3.6: Logit regression – likelihood of fund activism
The table reports the effects of covariates on the probability of the firm being targeted by hedge fund in the
year before activism. The dependent variable is a dummy which takes value 1 if firm had been a target in the
previous year. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Column I reports the coefficients and column
II reports marginal probabilities. All data is extracted from Datastream. I winsorize all variables at 1%. *, **,
*** indicate the level of significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
Characterisitcs Coefficients Marginal Probabilities
Market Capitalization -2.962** -0.414*
-1.439 0.232




Return on Assets -0.679* -0.095*
(0.397) 0.057
Tobins Q -0.540** -0.075***
(0.217) 0.023
Book to market value 0.169 0.024
(0.108) 0.016




Dividend Yield -0.795 -0.111
(0.727) 0.089
Research Development -0.000 -1.51e-07
(0.000) 0.000







Table 3.7: Impact of leverage on fund decision of holding stock in target – first year
following activism
The dependent variable is a dummy which takes value 1 if a fund holds the stake in a firm in the first year after
activism. The set of independent variables include components of capital structure, firm characteristics and
dummies. ∆ Leverage1 is a dummy which is equal to 1 if difference in net leverage (leverage in current year
minus leverage in previous year) is positive. Firm Listed Y 1 – dummy which takes value 1 if firm is listed in
the first year of activism. Firm Listed Y 2 – dummy which takes value 1 if firm is listed in the second year of
activism. "cod" is cost of debt, wacc is weighted average cost of capital, coe is cost of equity. Model I uses cod,
Model II uses WACC. All variables are winsorized at 1%. Firm characteristics are defined in table 3.1. ***, **,
* present 1%, 5%, 10% level of significance.
Fund presence in
first year activism
Model I Model II
Coefficients Marg. Prob. Coefficients Marg. Prob.
Leverage -1.862** -0.0051 -1.518*** -0.063
(-2.77) (-0.49) (-3.47) (-1.85)
∆Leverage1 3.370 0.010 2.296* 0.093
(1.23) (0.68) (2.37) (1.18)
Firm Listed Y 1 -0.731 -0.002 10.90 0.987
(-0.18) (-0.19) (1.48) (17.41)
Profit 19.45* 0.0529 25.61 1.070
(2.01) (0.44) (1.72) (3.20)
Growth 4.519 0.012 0.176 0.007
(1.36) (0.49) (0.16) (0.15)
codt/ WACC 40.01 0.109 17.81 0.744
(1.91) (0.42) (1.27) (1.10)
Liquidity 0.261 0.001 0.233 0.010
(0.18) (0.19) (0.65) (0.54)
Q 1.430 0.004 -0.099 -0.004
(1.46) (0.51) (-0.18) (-0.20)
BM 2.735* 0.007 0.688 0.029
(2.08) (0.48) (0.84) (0.73)
ROA -10.37 -0.028 -9.452 -0.395
(-0.67) (-0.33) (-0.76) (-0.93)
Cash 2.761 0.008 0.292 0.012
(1.69) (0.56) (0.59) (0.46)
MV -0.370 -0.001 0.073 0.0031
(-0.43) (-0.36) (0.21) (0.23)
Constant -1.828 -1.833
-0.14 (-0.43)
Pseudo R2 0.509 - -
# Observations 40 59 59
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Table 3.8: Impact of leverage on fund decision of holding stock in target – second year
after activism
The dependent variable is a dummy which takes value 1 if a fund holds the stake in a firm in the second year after activism. The set of
independent variables include components of capital structure, firm characteristics and dummies. ∆ Leverage1 is a dummy which is equal
to 1 if difference in net leverage (leverage in current year minus leverage in previous year) is positive. Firm Listed Y 1 – dummy which
takes value 1 if firm is listed in the first year of activism. Firm Listed Y 2 – dummy which takes value 1 if firm is listed in the second year
of activism. "cod" is cost of debt, wacc is weighted average cost of capital, coe is cost of equity. Model I uses cod, Model II uses wacc.
All variables are winsorized at 1%. Firm characteristics are defined in table 3.1. ***, **, * present 1%, 5%, 10% level of significance.
Fund presence 2nd
year activism
Model I Model II Model III
Coeff. Marg. Prob. Coeff. Marg. Prob. Coeff. Marg. Prob.
Leverage 0.041* 0.010 -0.980* -0.006 -0.785* -0.169
(2.23) (2.11) (-2.19) (-0.43) (-2.25) (-2.16)
∆ Leverage1 0.187 0.046 2,129 0.012 0.915 0.189
(0.33) (0.34) (1.10) (0.52) (0.83) (0.88)
∆Leverage2 1.024 0.213
(0.85) (0.87)
Firm Listed Y 1 1.364* 0.328 0.967 0.007 12.78 0.985
(2.48) (2.68) (0.85) (0.40) (1.91) (35.54)
Firm Listed Y 2 -11.77 -0.955
(-1.79) (-10.54)
Profit -0.011** -0.003 -3.009 -0.017 -1,824 -0.393
(-3.10) (-3.31) (-1.14) (-0.47) (-0.92) (-0.91)
Growth 1.042* 0.257 1.085 0.006 0.934 0.201
(2.42) (2.69) (1.34) (0.35) (1.33) (1.30)
coe/wacc/cod 13.31** 3.288 2.013* 1.166 11.10 2.393
(2.75) (2.70) (2.00) (0.47) (0.99) (0.99)
Liquidity -0.038 -0.009 0.629 0.004 0.383 0.082
(-1.19) (-1.23) (1.46) (0.45) (0.77) (0.75)
Q -0.485* -0.120 0.126 0.001 0.165 0.036
(-2.07) (-2.11) (0.29) (0.22) (0.52) (0.52)
BM -0.680 -0.168 -1.610* -0.009 -0.661 -0.142
(-1.57) (-1.62) (-2.31) (-0.39) (-1.20) (-1.26)
ROA -0.725 -0.179 0.776 0.005 1,895 0.409
(-0.70) (-0.69) (0.06) (0.07) (0.20) (0.20)
Cash 0.110 0.027 1.018* 0.006 0.425 0.092
(1.84) (1.82) (2.27) (0.44) (0.96) (0.93)
MV -0.001 -0.000 -0.630 -0.004 -0.373 -0.080
(-0.01) (-0.01) (-1.29) (-0.33) (-1.06) (-1.08)
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y
Pseudo R2 0.263 - 0.508 - 0.271 -
# Observations 130 130 51 51 52 52
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Table 3.9: Firm leverage and fund decision making in first year of activism with crisis
effect
The dependent variable is a dummy which takes value 1 if fund holds the stake in firm in the first year after
activism. Crisis is a dummy which equals to 1 if firm is targeted during July 2007 to December 2013. The set of
independent variables include components of capital structure, firm characteristics and dummies. ∆ Leverage1
is a dummy which is equal to 1 if difference in net leverage (leverage in current year minus leverage in previous
year) is positive. Firm Listed Y 1 – dummy which takes value 1 if firm is listed in the first year of activism.
Firm Listed Y 2 – dummy which takes value 1 if firm is listed in the second year of activism. "cod" is cost of
debt, wacc is weighted average cost of capital, coe is cost of equity. Model I uses cod, Model II uses wacc. All





Model I Model II Model III
Coef. Marg. Prob. Coef. Marg. Prob. Coef. Marg. Prob.
Crisis -3.149* -0.535 -2.922 -0.486 -3.269* -0.481
(-2.24) (-2.34) (-1.77) (-1.80) (-2.16) (-1.97)
Leverage -1.02** -0.148 -0.907** -0.129 -0.021 -0.003
(-2.68) (-3.07) (-2.86) (-3.51) (-1.07) (-1.06)
∆Leverage1 1.750* 0.225 1.651* 0.212 1.458*** 0.178
(2.11) (2.41) (2.04) (2.26) (3.61) (4.20)
Firm Listed Y 1 -0.596 -0.0791 -0.481 -0.064 1.020** 0.154
(-0.74) (-0.83) (-0.60) (-0.66) (2.60) (2.18)
cod/wacc/coe -0.008 -0.00114 0.900 0.128 0.986 0.122
(-0.03) (-0.03) (0.84) (0.76) (1.45) (1.44)
Liquidity 0.418 0.061 0.499 0.071 0.223* 0.027
(1.50) (1.55) (1.38) (1.44) (2.08) (2.31)
Profit 12.77* 1.859 16.66* 2.372 0.033 0.004
(2.08) (2.50) (2.50) (3.02) (1.90) (1.98)
Growth -0.140 -0.020 -0.612 -0.087 -0.582* -0.072
(-0.19) (-0.19) (-0.75) (-0.77) (-2.47) (-2.64)
Market Cap -2.841 -0.414 -2.925 -0.416 1.937 0.240
(-1.15) (-1.10) (-1.17) (-1.16) (1.60) (1.59)
Q -0.083 -0.012 0.028 0.004 -0.154* -0.019
(-0.31) (-0.31) (0.10) (0.10) (-2.06) (-2.12)
BM 0.532 0.077 0.365 0.052 -0.106 -0.013
(1.32) (1.46) (0.93) (1.03) (-1.00) (-1.00)
ROA -8.966 -1.305 -14.36* -2.044 -1.581 -0.196
(-1.92) (-1.80) (-2.06) (-1.66) (-1.71) (-1.65)
Constant 1.150 1.850 -1.168
(0.46) (0.73) (-0.83)
Pseudo R2 0.275 0.292 0.181
# Observations 123 123 116 116 313 313
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Table 3.10: Firm leverage and fund decision making in second year of activism with crisis
effect
The dependent variable is a dummy which takes value 1 if fund holds the stake in firm in the second year after activism. Crisis is a
dummy which equals to 1 if firm is targeted during July 2007 to December 2013. The set of independent variables include components
of capital structure, firm characteristics and dummies. ∆ Leverage1 is a dummy which is equal to 1 if difference in net leverage (leverage
in current year minus leverage in previous year) is positive. Firm Listed Y 1 – dummy which takes value 1 if firm is listed in the first year
of activism. Firm Listed Y 2 – dummy which takes value 1 if firm is listed in the second year of activism. "cod" is cost of debt, wacc is
weighted average cost of capital, coe is cost of equity. Model I uses cod, Model II uses wacc. All variables are winsorized at 1%. Firm
characteristics are defined in table 3.1. ***, **, * present 1%, 5%, 10% level of significance.
Fund presence
2nd year activism
Model I Model II Model III
Coef. Marg. Prob. Coef. Marg. Prob. Coef. Marg. Prob.
Crisis 2.036 0.460 1,798 0.420 0.547 0.125
(1.72) (2.06) (1.48) (1.65) (0.82) (0.82)
Leverage -0.590 -0.134 -0.439 -0.105 0.029*** 0.006
(-1.92) (-1.40) (-1.67) (-1.69) (3.48) (3.48)
∆Leverage1 -0.992 -0.214 -1.101 -0.253 -0.087 -0.020
(-1.06) (-1.18) (-1.13) (-1.20) (-0.25) (-0.25)
∆Leverage2 1.653* 0.378* 1.697* 0.397 0.734* 0.169
(2.03) (2.14) (2.08) (2.29) (2.05) (2.03)
Firm Listed Y 2 1.370* 0.271 1.683* 0.350 1.376*** 0.277
(2.27) (1.49) (2.43) (3.06) (3.82) (4.48)
cod/wacc/coe 1.934 0.438 -4.013 -0.963 0.101 0.023
(1.01) (1.75) (-1.49) (-1.50) (0.19) (0.19)
Liquidity 0.030 0.007 -0.077 -0.019 0.023 0.005
(0.15) (0.15) (-0.31) (-0.31) (0.69) (0.69)
Profit 7.933* 1.798 8.888* 2.133 -0.008 -0.002
(2.00) (2.08) (2.07) (2.12) (-0.54) (-0.54)
Growth 0.803 0.182 0.667 0.160 0.182 0.041
(0.48) (0.45) (0.50) (0.50) (1.13) (1.13)
Q 0.059 0.014 0.010 0.003 -0.099 -0.023
(0.17) (0.17) (0.02) (0.02) (-1.39) (-1.40)
BM -1.207** -0.274 -1.507* -0.362 0.038 0.009
(-3.06) (-2.42) (-2.38) (-2.45) (1.40) (1.40)
ROA -17.80* -4.034 -17.39* -4.173 -0.194 -0.044
(-2.40) (-2.91) (-2.15) (-2.23) (-0.27) (-0.27)
MV 28.72*** 6.509 25.78*** 6.188 -0.651 -0.147
(3.90) (4.38) (7.77) (8.63) (-0.46) (-0.46)
Constant 0.736 1.628 -1.963
(0.24) (0.48) (-1.60)
Pseudo R2 0.390 0.418 0.166
# Observation 130 130 123 123 306 306
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Table 3.11: Impact of crisis on leverage and fund decision making in first year of fund
activism
The dependent variable is a dummy which takes value 1 if fund holds the stake in firm in the first year
after activism. Crisis is a dummy which equals to 1 if firm is targeted during July 2007 to December 2013.
The set of independent variables include components of capital structure, firm characteristics and dummies.
∆ Leverage1 is a dummy which is equal to 1 if difference in net leverage (leverage in current year minus
leverage in previous year) is positive. Firm Listed Y 1 – dummy which takes value 1 if firm is listed in the
first year of activism. Firm Listed Y 2 – dummy which takes value 1 if firm is listed in the second year
of activism. Explanatory variable "coe" is cost of equity. For Model II, we drop "coe". All variables are




Model I Model II
Coefficients Marg. Prob. Coefficients Marg. Prob.
Crisis -3.197 -0.090 -3.950 -0.316
(-0.98) (-0.53) (-1.23) (-0.72)
Leverage 0.013 0.000 0.042 0.002
-0.41 -0.42 -1.52 -1.35
Leverage * Crisis 0.180** 0.003 0.137* 0.006
(-2.60) (-2.32) (-2.42) (-3.16)
∆ Leverage1 1.516* 0.026 1.277* 0.059
-2.48 -1.5 -2.25 -1.54
∆ Leverage1 *Crisis 0.196 0.003 0.162 0.007
-0.24 -0.25 -0.22 -0.23
Listed Y 1 1.280* 0.0315 1.150* 0.074
-2.43 -1.2 -2.34 -1.35
Listed Y 1* Crisis -1.382 -0.028 -0.714 -0.036
(-1.46) (-0.96) (-0.78) (-0.73)
coe 2.227* 0.037






Model I Model II
Coefficients Marg. Prob. Cofficients Marg. Prob.
-2.12 -1.35
coe * Crisis -3.871* -0.064
(-2.25) (-1.44)
Liquidity 0.218 0.003 0.196 0.009
-1.33 -1.09 -1.58 -1.32
Liquidity* Crisis -0.053 -0.001 -0.051 -0.002
(-0.34) (-0.33) (-0.55) (-0.54)
profit 0.037 0.001 0.030 0.001
-1.7 -1.2 -1.5 -1.21
Crisis* Profit -1.163*** -0.019 -0.721** -0.034
(-4.23) (-2.59) (-2.64) (-4.72)
Growth -0.287 -0.005 -0.203 -0.009
(-0.72) (-0.67) (-0.61) (-0.60)
Growth* Crisis -1.839* -0.030 -1.852** -0.087
(-2.47) (-1.60) (-2.67) (-1.64)
Q -0.181 -0.003 -0.051 -0.002
(-1.38) (-1.13) (-0.38) (-0.38)
Q* Crisis 0.005 0.000 -0.11 -0.005
-0.03 -0.03 (-0.65) (-0.65)
BM -0.049 -0.001 -0.047 -0.002
(-0.64) (-0.61) (-0.73) (-0.69)
BM* Crisis -0.04 -0.001 -0.041 -0.002
(-0.27) (-0.26) (-0.31) (-0.30)
ROA -1.577 -0.026 -0.147 -0.007
(-0.90) (-0.77) (-0.09) (-0.09)





Model I Model II
Coefficients Marg. Prob. Cofficients Marg. Prob.
ROA* Crisis 1.490 0.025 -0.372 -0.017
-0.68 -0.67 (-0.18) (-0.18)
MV 0.044 0.001 0.0121 0.001
-0.29 -0.28 -0.08 -0.08
MV* Crisis 0.188 0.0031 0.198 0.009
-0.86 -0.82 -0.95 -0.86
Constant -0.231 -0.193
(-0.11) (-0.11)
# Observation 313 313 327 327
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Table 3.12: Impact of crisis on leverage and fund decision making in second year of
fund activism
The dependent variable is a dummy which takes value 1 if fund holds the stake in firm in the second year
after activism. Crisis is a dummy which equals to 1 if firm is targeted during 2007 to 2013. The set of
independent variables include a vector of dummies, well-defined firm characteristics, and cost of equity. For
Model II, we exclude "coe". All variables are winsorized at 1%. Firm characteristics are defined in table 3.1.
***, **, * present 1%, 5%, 10% level of significance.
Fund presence
2nd activism year
Model I Model II
Coefficients Marg. Prob. Coefficients Marg. Prob.
Crisis -6.533* -0.898 -5.855* -0.861
(-2.20) (-7.11) (-2.34) (-6.11)
Leverage -0.010 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001
(-0.36) (-0.36) (-0.17) (-0.17)
Leverage * Crisis 0.042 0.0101 0.038 0.009
-1.48 -1.54 -1.73 -1.82
∆Leverage1 -0.346 -0.082 -0.363 -0.085
(-0.76) (-0.76) (-0.85) (-0.85)
∆Leverage1 *Crisis 1.452 0.348 1,710 0.403
-1.5 -1.63 -1.84 -2.08
Listed Y 1 1.894** 0.366 1.700** 0.334
-2.9 -3.66 -2.67 -3.34
Listed Y 1* Crisis 0.761 0.183 0.682 0.163
-0.44 -0.45 -0.55 -0.55
Listed Y 2 0.306 0.072 0.301 0.07
-0.57 -0.58 -0.57 -0.58
Listed Y 2* Crisis -0.729 -0.168 -1.031 -0.231
(-0.66) (-0.69) (-1.01) (-1.07)





Model I Model II
Coefficients Marg. Prob. Cofficients Marg. Prob.
∆ Leverage2 0.339 0.081 0.25 0.059
-0.72 -0.71 -0.55 -0.55
∆ Leverage2 * Crisis 0.098 0.024 -0.359 -0.082
-0.1 -0.1 (-0.39) (-0.41)
coe 1,368 0.326
-1.27 -1.27
coe * Crisis -4.374* -1.042
(-2.08) (-2.05)
Liquidity -0.032 -0.007 -0.015 -0.003
(-1.08) (-1.08) (-0.46) (-0.46)
Liquidity* Crisis 0.076** 0.018 0.053* 0.012
-2.65 -2.53 -2.12 -2.09
profit 0.0357 0.009 0.0402 0.009
-1.4 -1.38 -1.54 -1.51
Crisis* Profit -0.182 -0.043 -0.129 -0.031
(-0.90) (-0.85) (-0.69) (-0.66)
Growth 0.576 0.137 0.401 0.095
-1.74 -1.72 -1.87 -1.85
Growth* Crisis -1.233* -0.294 -1.056* -0.249
(-2.23) (-2.16) (-2.18) (-2.12)
Q 0.069 0.0164 0.203 0.048
-0.45 -0.45 -1.45 -1.43
Q* Crisis -0.359 -0.086 -0.514** -0.121
(-1.96) (-1.87) (-3.03) (-2.84)
BM 0.062 0.014 0.035 0.008






Model I Model II
Coefficients Marg. Prob. Cofficients Marg. Prob.
-1.8 -1.79 -1.1 -1.1
BM* Crisis -0.038 -0.009 0.052 0.012
(-0.30) (-0.30) -0.47 -0.47
ROA -0.347 -0.083 0.572 0.135
(-0.26) (-0.26) -0.49 -0.49
ROA* Crisis -0.855 -0.204 -1.680 -0.397
(-0.46) (-0.46) (-0.99) (-1.02)
MV -0.13 -0.031 -0.167 -0.039
(-1.08) (-1.07) (-1.49) (-1.47)
MV* Crisis 0.537** 0.128 0.541** 0.128
-2.81 -2.74 -3.14 -3.07
Constant -0.226 -0.0984
(-0.14) (-0.07)
# Observations 305 305 322 322
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Table 3.13: Changes in firm distribution and investment in one year post-activism period
The table reports the changes in firm payout, dividend yield, capital expenditures, and research and development in one year after activism in time-series setting.
The changes in characteristics are for 543 firms targeted by 112 hedge funds over the period of 2000 to 2013. We report mean, median, and standard deviation for
pre and post one year following activism. The last two columns report the Wilcoxon signed rank test for the differences in medians and report p-values. Table 3.1
provides detail definition of each variable. The data to compute all these ratios is extracted from using Thomson Reuters Datastream.
Characteristics
Pre-activism Post-activism Median comparison1
Mean Median Sd. Mean Median Sd. Difference p-val
Payout 0.05 0.00 0.31 0.06 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.0063
Dividend Yield 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.0760
CapEx 0.09 0.025 0.66 0.04 0.030 0.07 0.05 0.0000
R&D 0.09 0.00 0.24 0.08 0.03 0.22 0.03 0.5249
1 Wilcoxon signed rank test for differences in medians between the target and the matched firms.208
